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Editors’ Preface and Acknowledgements 
Aimee Imlay and Matthew Wentz 
Editors-in-Chief, University of Kentucky 
The 2019-2020 disClosure collective is thrilled to present the 29th volume of disClosure: A 
Journal of Social Theory. This volume focuses on theories of populism and brings together a wide 
range of perspectives relating to the phenomenon, experience, and study of populism. The recent 
uptick in populism signals political, economic, and/or social unrest across the globe, yet, 
populism remains a phenomenon that is difficult to define. Our goal with this volume was not to 
define populism. Instead, this issue engages conversations about the various types and origins of 
populisms, as it is our belief that the development and definition of populism is both historically 
and socially contingent.  
The articles, artwork, and poetry contained in this volume illuminate the various 
conceptualizations and understandings of populism as well as the historical and social conditions 
which foster populism. Topics include left-wing populism in the United States, the relationship 
between populism and truth, nationalpopulism, the theoretical and ontological roots of 
authoritarian populism, and much more.  
We present interviews with the four scholars invited to the University of Kentucky’s 
Committee on Social Theory 2019 Spring Lecture Series: Chip Berlet, Paulina Ochoa-Espejo, 
Kenneth Roberts and Maria Pía Lara. In addition, this volume contains an interview with Nancy 
Maclean, the Fall 2019 Social Theory Distinguished Speaker. In these interviews many themes 
emerged including the importance of a conceptual distinction between types of populism, the 
relationship between billionaires and the erosion of liberal democracy, right-wing extremism, the 
emergence of populism in the United States and the link between ‘the People’ and populism.  
This volume is a result of the conversations inspired by University of Kentucky professors 
Stefan Bird-Pollan (Philosophy), Carol Mason (Gender and Women’s Studies), Yanira Paz 
(Hispanic Studies) and Carlos de la Torre (Sociology) in the Social Theory 600: Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives in Social Theory capstone course during Spring 2019. The course explored  
populism from a historical and comparative perspective and shaped the development of this 
volume. We are indebted to the professors’ expertise and perspectives in this course.  
ix 
 
We wish to extend our gratitude to Stefan Bird-Pollan who served as the faculty advisor 
for the disClosure collective this year. We thank you for your invaluable support, guidance and 
for introducing us to Han Woo Ri where we will be sure to enjoy many more meals in the future.  
We would also like to thank the University of Kentucky’s Committee on Social Theory for 
its support, particularly the Committee’s Director, Tad Mutersbaugh. We also thank Adrian Ho, 
Director of Digital Scholarship at UK Libraries for his support throughout this process.  
We are grateful to the disClosure editorial collective members who graciously worked on 
this journal on top of research, coursework, teaching and personal responsibilities. Finally, thank 
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Poems on the Effects of 21st Century Populism 
Jason David Peterson, Twin Cities Poetry Workshop 
 
Three poems exploring the toxic effects that today's populism is having on families, society, and the 
environment. The selection includes “How We Got Here,” “Beyond the Ticket Booth,” and “The 





How We Got Here 
 
We ate everything in the house. The yard picked clean— nothing even that any 
starving memory could hold out for. We ate our anger and soon our love 
and the patience of others. 
We ate our hunger and moaned as it grew heavier inside us. 
We ate the world raw and the bitter green 
and salty blue and endless black on black went down in a flush of burn and clay. 
We ate the future before it limped away. 
We ate the rules 
of all of this, and now it has no meaning. 
As if nothing was ever made or eaten— 
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Beyond the Ticket Booth 
 
Held waters dislodge in a rage oceans rash, pale as salted grass and caverns cave, the sky’s 
 
grey head pinned to the valley by the cold boot of rotation forced to take all of this in. 
 
I am watching a spring of summers buried under the fall of winters 
 
a furious sun towing the black sheet faster than the chariot could ever pull her 
 
an ashen rain we’ll soon gather and weather. 
Think of them all— 
 
the incredible things we’ve done to fuck things up— 
I want this to be the end 
 
we paid for, some ragged stub to let us know we got our dollars’ worth of show. 
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The End of Conversation 
 
Anyone can scream. 
They’re doing it in rounds 
—overworked throats and played-out phrases decoupage our city 
in pith and spittle, so how can I tell you 
of outrage? A whisper carefully delayed, 
a currency in flames, an act of kindness? 
 
There’s no wrong answer but we all still lose, gasping in the crowded air. 
 
If I were dying now of that very violence, it would kill me faster having to explain. 
So I lie in silence, wave my arms making logic angels in the massacre 
of words, and wait for a new sound to articulate. 
© 2020 The Author(s). This is an open access article published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits 
unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the original author(s) and 
the publication source are credited.  
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“You Cannot Slaughter Ideas”: Liberalism and the State of 
Exception in Argentina 
Arlo Elliot, California Polytechnic University San Luis Obispo 
 
Existing historiography of Latin America has highlighted the role of liberalism in the 19th century 
formation of modern states, but it is typically viewed as historically discontinuous with the 
subsequent violence of the 20th century. Narrowing the focus to Argentina, we see historians like 
Jeremy Adelman asserting that the promise and successes of the early liberal republics were 
historically isolated from the brutal military rule that would emerge following the Peronist era. 
More intellectual histories of Argentina like David Rock's Authoritarian Argentina also focus on 
the prominence of conservative nationalists in this period of violence. Incorporating the work of the 
Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, I argue that embedded within the legal and practical 
framework of Argentine liberalism is the possibility of a “state of exception”, wherein the sovereign 
body suspends the law in the name of saving it. 
 
The purpose of applying the theoretical lens of Agamben's work to Argentina's politics are twofold. 
The first is to overcome the idea that the development of liberalism in Argentina and the extra-
juridical violence that succeeded it are historically discreet phenomena. The two share a connective 
tissue, as described in the work of Agamben, and the same laws that brought the liberal “public 
sphere” into being also simultaneously demarcated an illegible outside, producing beings outside 
the law. The second is the issue of how we as historians bear witness to an event like the 
disappearances and murders of political dissidents, as detailed in the government report Nunca Mas. 
Looking at that extra-juridical violence as an aberration outside of the arch of “historical progress” 
not only denies those affected a voice, but also crucially cedes a portion of the political realm of 
memory to the same ideas that helped formulate the “state of exception”. Keywords: Agamben, 
state of exception, Argentina, liberalism, homo sacer, Habermas, public sphere. 
 
Introduction 
At the end of his book Republic of Capital, Jeremy Adelman writes a eulogy to what he calls 
the “unfinished revolution” of liberalism in Argentina, highlighting among other things, “the 
failure of political parties to act as the conduits for political integration” and thus head off the 
swelling of dissent and subsequent legitimation crises that would define the 20th century. 
(Adelman, 1999, 291). The question that bears asking is whether or not liberalism in both 
Argentine and general context ever offered truly popular political integration. In Argentina, the  
 
 





founder of the liberal tradition is widely considered to be author, activist and eventual president 
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento. In his epoch-defining work Facundo, first published in 1845, 
Sarmiento informs us that there are two forces in Argentina: one of civilization and progress, and 
one of fatalism and barbarism, diametrically opposed and incompatible. A close reading of this 
text reveals that Sarmiento believed that it was an obscure and barbaric nature of the gauchos, or 
Argentine cowboys that commanded much of the rural economy, that stood in the way of liberal 
republican government in Argentina.  
The Republic of Argentina underwent a number of radical shifts following the framing of 
its first constitution in 1853, eventually culminating in a legitimacy crisis that overthrew Isabel 
Perón, then president, and replaced her with a military junta. In understanding the erasure of 
political and historical subjects, it is important understand the historical conditions necessary to 
strip a human being of their rights. When it came to power, the junta declared a state of siege and 
over the course of seven years of authoritarian rule snuffed out the lives of as many as thirty 
thousand desparecidos, or “the disappeared.” Seeking to respectfully bear witness to the 
desparecidos, this paper will seek to interrogate the grounds of history and memory in Argentina 
to see how the state of exception becomes not only possible but institutionalized. The paper seeks 
to link these two disparate events in Argentina’s history by the use of critical theory, engaging 
with the ideas of Jurgen Habermas and Giorgio Agamben to illustrate how the conditions within 
liberalism allowed for the suspension of the rights of subjects, the invocation of a state of 
exception, and ultimately the justification for mass murder. While the era of early liberalism and 
the period of military rule in Argentina are separated by over one hundred years and a radically 
different international and domestic circumstance, this paper seeks to use the former to cast light 
on the latter and build on existing critiques by scholars like Agamben of how a liberal rights based 
framework can break down with a dramatic impact on society. Existing political, cultural, and 
racial tension can become inflamed and lead to both state and civilian violence. This is what 
happened in Argentina, yet rather than considering it as an aberration from the development of 
republicanism or liberalism in Argentina, this paper seeks to put it on a continuum with those 
political and social developments. Sarmiento viewed civilization and barbarism as irreconcilable 
forces in the Argentine social order, and the latter would have to be excluded or destroyed to 
make a liberal government function. By examining Sarmiento’s writing, this paper seeks to bring 
into question whether liberalism in its Argentine context ever lived up to lofty ideals of equality 
and universal rights for sovereign citizens, and whether or not its incompleteness or limitations 
allowed or prepared ground for the military junta that would eventually come to control the 
country through martial law. 
 The essay will be divided into three parts. The first will be a brief exposition of a 
theoretical framework for the state of exception furnished by Italian political philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben. The second, in two parts, will be an analysis of Argentine liberalism during the 19th 
century, beginning with a reading of Facundo interrogating the tension between civilization and 
barbarism and Sarmiento’s demarcation of what makes a legible subject. This will be used to 
inform an exposition of the subsequent development of institutional liberalism in Argentina, with 
the guiding historical reference being Hilda Sabato’s work Political Participation in Buenos Aires.  
The third and final section of the essay, also in two parts, will analyze the continued influence of 





liberalism in Argentine amidst an increasingly volatile political climate, eventually resulting in 
the 1976 coup. This will conclude with a reading of Nunca Mas and other testimonies of the 
desperacidos, seeking to bear witness to subjects that have been stripped of their rights and made 
illegible.  
Theorizing the State of Exception and Bare Life 
 How does a body become excluded from the social order? Giorgio Agamben stresses that 
homo sacer, or bare life, plays an essential role in modern politics, “in which a human life is 
included in the juridical order solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be 
killed)”. (Agamben, 1998, 8). Agamben, drawing from the work of Carl Schmitt, reminds us of 
the paradoxical role of the sovereign in modern jurisprudence, where the sovereign is at the same 
time “outside and inside the juridical order”, “having the legal power to suspend the validity of 
the law” (Ibid, 15). The sovereign, operating from this position of paradox of being both the 
administrator and suspender of laws, is able to decree when laws no longer apply and thus 
designate beings “exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and 
inside, become indistinguishable” (Ibid, 28). Bare life is characterized by this ambiguous relation 
to the law, abandoned by the juridical order to the power of the sovereign. The extinguishing of 
this life is neither homicide (profane) nor sacrifice (religious); rather, the designation of bare life 
is what constitutes the authority of the sovereign (Ibid, 83). Using analysis indebted to Michel 
Foucault's notion of biopolitics, Agamben points to the concentration camps in Nazi Germany as 
a physical reification of the state of exception, a space “in which not only is law completely 
suspended but fact and law are completely confused”(Ibid, 170). The construction and 
maintenance of the camps in Nazi Germany was furnished by the scientifico-juridical discourse 
of eugenics, which provided the justifications for designating beings as outside of the law, 
reduced to bare life (Ibid, 146). The social implications for the manufacture of bare life are obvious 
and devastating both for Agamben’s example of Nazi Germany as well as the abstract juridical 
model he provides. Any legislative apparatus that can waive or void the rights of subjects by 
emergency decree necessarily grants those rights precariously; at this point, any pluralistic 
protections for minority groups or political dissidents granted by a liberal government can easily 
be stripped because of a real or imagined threat to sovereign authority.  
 This is a sketch of the theoretical framework that will be referenced in this study. 
Recognizing that Argentina has a different historical reality and intellectual tradition than 
Germany, the framework will be used minimally and when applicable. The first use will be in 
recovering a sketch of figures outside the law in the thought of Sarmiento (and the thinkers and 
policies he influenced) and in articulating what constituted bare life in late 19th century Argentina. 
The second will be in retracing the figure of bare life in the state of exception instituted by the 
military junta, this time manifested both in the physical space of the detention centers and in the 
practice of torture and execution. It is from the particulars of Argentine history that we may better 
understand and give nuance to the critical theory and history of the state of exception; likewise, 
the theory grants us a lens of viewing the social history of Argentina in a new light. 
 
 





Argentine Liberalism and the Demarcation of Legible Subjects 
Facundo: Civilization or Barbarism 
 Since publication in 1845, the specter of Facundo’s influence in Latin American political 
theory and the proposed dialectic of civilization and barbarism has loomed over Latin American 
literature and political critique (Sarmiento, 2003, 2). Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria notes in his 
introduction that Sarmiento attempted to give “Argentina a national discourse, a set of figures 
and ideas through which the country could think of itself” (Ibid, 10). To understand that 
discourse, this paper will perform a close reading of those figures and their influence to locate the 
threshold of bare life in Sarmiento's prose. In tracing the life of Juan Manuel Quiroga and his 
myriad grievances with the regime of Juan Manuel de Rosas, Sarmiento also articulates the values 
and aspirations of a particular vein of Argentine liberalism that would become influential in the 
nascent republic. Thus, this analysis should not be thought of as arguing that Facundo became the 
guiding doctrine for all policies of the government, but rather represented an influential strain of 
thought that created a vision for Argentine public life. The central figure that Sarmiento writes 
against is that of the caudillo, or strong man, and the gauchos, or cowboys that support them. In 
Sarmiento’s framework the prominence of the caudillos is a problem relating to the social life of 
gauchos, which he contrasts unfavorably with European enlightenment principles such as reason 
or the scientific method. 
  Sarmiento casts the knowledge of the gaucho (and of the caudillo) as originating from a 
profane and obscure source. His central premise, as in the title, is that the Argentine consciousness 
is going to be formed through a “struggle between European civilization and indigenous 
barbarism, between intelligence and matter.” (Ibid, 59). He is deeply concerned with both the 
geography of the Pampas (the arid mountains of Argentina) and its resistance to more European 
modes of civilization, remarking that their topography has “reproduced in the pastoral habits of 
America the same grave countenances, hospitality, and dress of the Arabs.” (Ibid, 60). The 
knowledge that exists in the Pampas comes about by way of poetry; awakened by the terrible 
expanse of the desert, with Sarmiento writing that “the man who moves among these scenes feels 
assaulted by fears and fantastic uncertainties, by dreams that disturb him while he is 
awake.”(Ibid, 61). Yet Sarmiento draws a crucial distinction, between “learned poetry, the poetry 
of the city” and the “popular poetry, innocent and disorderly, of the gaucho” (Ibid, 62). This is the 
opaque source that the gaucho derives his authority form; notably, poetry could be set against a 
more modern form of knowledge production, such as history or science, emphasizing the crudity 
of the gaucho's epistemological framework. 
  In perhaps the liveliest section of the whole book, Sarmiento creates several sardonic 
portraits of the types of gauchos one might encounter in 19th century Argentina. The rastreador, 
who “is a serious, circumspect person, whose pronouncements are accepted as evidence in lower 
courts.” (Ibid, 64). He can track thieves even if their tracks are two years old, and does so silently, 
with dignity as if though “microscopic power develops in the visual organs of these men” (Ibid, 
66). Next is the baqueno, “the most complete topographer, the only map a general takes along to 
direct the movements of his campaign” (Ibid, 66). Like the rastreador, he works in silent 
pronouncements, as if “a traveler asks to be taken directly to a place fifty leagues distant, the 
baqueno stops for a moment, searches the horizon, examines the ground… and takes off at a gallop 





as straight as an arrow, until he changes direction for reasons only he knows.” (Ibid, 67). He can 
tell the direction an enemy is approaching by the movement of wildlife; we learn that “If condors 
and the crows fly in a circle in the sky, he knows whether there are men hiding, or a recently 
abandoned camp, or simply a dead animal.” (Ibid, 67). The authority that these men are granted 
in the society of the Pampas derives from a source that is illegible for Sarmiento; for him, these 
are absurd rituals codifying unearned positions of power. 
 Continuing with his satire, Sarmiento tells the reader that the bad gaucho is a horse thief 
by occupation, feared for his prowess on the horse and with weapons, and respected even those 
he robs from (Ibid, 68). With each theft “The poets of the surrounding region add this new deed 
to the biography of the hero of the desert, and his renown soars all across the vast countryside.” 
(Ibid, 68). The cantor meanwhile is a figure ripped from the Middle Ages; a bard or troubadour 
who contributes to “the ideal image of that life of revolt, civilization, barbarism, and danger.” 
(Ibid, 69). The cantor “is doing the same work of chronicle, customs, history, biography as the 
bard of the Middle ages, and his verses would be collected later as the documents and data on 
which future historians would base their evidence”, except that Argentina does not yet have a 
society “with a knowledge of events superior to that which this poor fellow unfolds in his 
innocent rhapsodies” (Ibid, 70). The methods by which the gauchos constitute their histories and 
knowledge is, for Sarmiento, archaic and arcane; a byproduct of feudal living conditions and a 
lack of modern education. 
 Sarmiento effusively presents the reader with these portraits of gaucho culture as, 
presumably, comic relief for an otherwise serious book. Yet we can catch a glimpse of his beliefs 
in it nonetheless:  the knowledge of the gaucho arrives through obscure means; it is not legitimated 
through European institutions, through the press or the nascent public sphere. There gatherings 
take place in the pulperia, an “assembly without public objective, without any social purpose” 
(Ibid, 74). It is an impenetrable discourse that, for Sarmiento, signifies barbarism and contempt 
for reason. The people of the Pampas have no interest in government but wield mighty influence 
over it nonetheless, as Sarmiento writes that the people did not demand representation at Buenos 
Aires through violence but “with the barbarism they sent to it in Facundo and Rosas.” (Ibid, 127). 
Acclimated in a nomadic lifestyle and profane knowledge and cast from the mold of the Pampas, 
Argentina has birthed “two distinct, rival, and incompatible societies… One Spanish, European, 
Cultured, and the other barbarous, American, almost indigenous.” (Ibid, 77). The pulperia is 
neither a salon nor a coffee house, and the sense of public obligation for the gaucho starts and ends 
with his obligations to his caudillo. 
 The bifurcation between civilization and barbarism emerges for Sarmiento as one group 
dedicated to abstract ideals and the progress of humanity and the other hopelessly and illegibly 
resistant to enlightenment. It is for Sarmiento not just a matter of culture but race, as he tells us 
that “The American races live in idleness, and demonstrate an incapacity, even when forced, to 
apply themselves to hard, uninterrupted work.” (Ibid, 51). Sarmiento notes Africans “provided 
[Rosas] with excellent, incorruptible soldiers of another language and a savage race.” (Ibid, 223). 
When discussing the influence of Facundo himself, Sarmiento notes that his sayings “have a 
stamp of originality that gave him a certain Oriental aspect, a certain tint of Solomonic wisdom 
in the mind of the common class.” (Ibid, 101). This is no compliment, but rather another 





suggestion that any wisdom held by the fabled caudillo is foreign to civilization. Sarmiento has no 
doubts as to where this civilization lies, and proposes that the best solution to the barbarism of 
the countryside is to encourage a massive European migration (Ibid, 249). This can be seen in part 
as a reaction to the Rosas regime, where following the French blockade of Buenos Aires “Death 
to the foreigners!” became a common slogan (Ibid, 249). Yet it can also be read as a further 
demarcation of civilization and barbarism, this time along racial lines.  Over a hundred years later 
in 1978, the Argentine Minister of the Interior, General Albano Harguindeguy, announced that it 
would become necessary for Argentina to encourage European immigration “to remain one of 
the three countries with the highest proportions of white population in the world” (Jaroslavsky, 
2004, 100). 
 What is revealed in Sarmiento’s writing is the figure of bare life, beings placed on the 
outside of legible society in order to constitute a normative inside. Sarmiento and Harguindeguy, 
the junta general, are both addressing a vastly different public in vastly different eras of Argentine 
history, yet both trace the figure of a legible inside and an excluded outside based on whiteness 
and alleged European virtues. Sarmiento at this point is merely a writer and not a legislator, yet 
his ideas are crucial to giving shape and form to the liberal dialogue and policies that would be 
developed after the fall of the Rosas regime. In the next section we will ask, more generally, how 
does the figure of bare life come to be constituted in the nascent Argentine public sphere? 
Institutionalization of Liberalism: The Public Sphere in Buenos Aires 
 A fellow member of “the outlaw generation” of Argentinian writers that Sarmiento 
belonged to, Esteban Echeverria’s 1838 short story “The Slaughterhouse” can be thought of as a 
counterpart to Facundo, highlighting the “barbarity” of the city of Buenos Aires instead of the 
countryside (Echeverria, 1980, 3). Depicting Buenos Aires during a period of flood and famine, 
the people of the city go wild when a small shipment of fifty cattle arrive, and even the rats “were 
revitalized when they heard such wild cries and began to run in every direction” (Ibid, 7). The 
cows arriving were seen religiously, as a gift from The Restorer of Laws (Rosas), and the first 
slaughtered was for him; even the butcher shop was governed by a caudillo (Ibid, 8). But as 
impatience for the fresh meat spread through the crowd, “one could see four hundred black 
women crouching in a line unraveling in their laps the tangle of intestines and pulling off, one by 
one, the little pieces of fat that the butcher’s blade had missed” (Ibid, 11). Knife fights and snarling 
dogs were a “miniature version of the barbaric way individual and social issues and rights are 
aired in our country” (Ibid, 11). A boy is beheaded by a rope attached to a bull in revolt, and the 
crowd barely notices the death before they chase after the bull, by which time the crowd was so 
riled that “one of the women lost control of her bowels, another said Hail Mary's in two seconds 
flat, and two of them promised St. Benedict to give up their jobs as scavengers... No one knows if 
they kept their promises.” (Ibid, 14). After the bull is wrangled, the crowd, now with lust for more 
blood, notices a man whom they deem to be a “Unitarian dandy” and promptly knock him off 
his horse. The caudillo judge of the slaughterhouse instructs the crowd to take the man to a torture 
table, where “cards and drinking glasses were cleared only when tortures or executions by the 
Federalist henchmen of the slaughterhouse took place.” (Ibid, 17). The Unitarian dies in the 
struggle, much as the bull did, and Echeverria dispassionately remarks at the end that “it can 
clearly be seen that the focal point of the Federation was the slaughterhouse.” (Ibid, 21). 





 “The Slaughterhouse” pours over many of the same themes as Sarmiento, and as with 
Facundo a definite outside can be determined: the irrational and bloodthirsty rabble of the city, 
with racial overtones. It is a vignette of barbarism arriving at the city, caudillo culture set on the 
ill-suited stage of Buenos Aires, with the one figure representing civilization in the story literally 
dying not from violence, but from horror and outrage. In order to transform the city, liberal 
reformers had to establish a sovereignty that derived its authority from something other than 
direct violence. Hilda Sabato's excellent book The Many and the Few details that sovereignty began 
to look like with the formation of a bourgeois public sphere in Buenos Aires, drawing on the work 
of social theorist Jürgen Habermas. The public sphere is, for both Habermas and Sabato, a space 
where a small bourgeois group is able to participate in free discussion of art, culture, and politics 
that then comes to shape society, as well as legitimating public institutions through their origin 
in free debate. Writing near the time of Rosas fall, Sarmiento notes proudly that five hundred 
copies of Facundo were circulating the republic, showing a nascent seed of public discourse 
planted in an extremely select group (Sarmiento, 2005, 215). For context, Sabato informs us that 
the population of Buenos Aires alone was nearing three hundred thousand, so those five hundred 
copies of Facundo would have landed in the hands of a population that was characterized by 
literacy, access to an amount of free time for reading, and an interest in public debate (Sabato, 
2001, 154). The limited scope of who was able to access the public sphere should be considered in 
both the case study of Buenos Aires as well as the historical model of the public sphere, as it 
reveals a wide gap between the narrowly selected “public” and the broader group of the 
“people”. Tracing the thought of German philosopher Immanuel Kant, Habermas argues the 
public sphere reflects both a juridical and practical order: the law enshrines the subject’s duty to 
the public, and the subject’s performance of public duty conversely grants the law legitimacy 
(Habermas, 1989, 115). This idea works on a hypothetical model if enfranchisement and full 
protection of the law is eventually extended to everyone; that is, if everyone can be made part of 
a public. The Argentine Constitution of 1853, which was critical to enshrining the public sphere, 
gives no reference to who the rights of citizenship are extended to; it is left ambiguous. When one 
hears Sarmiento tell us that the Argentine gaucho, due to geographic isolation, “lacks the basis for 
all social development; since the ranchers do not meet together, they have no public needs to 
satisfy; in a word, there is no res publica.”, it is not hard to imagine why the framers of the 
Argentine Constitution would have been hesitant to extend citizenship to everyone (Sarmiento, 
2003, 55). The public sphere for Sarmiento could not extend to these people of the Pampas, 
therefore the legitimation of liberalism depended on their exclusion. 
 After the fall of Rosas, the press in Argentina expanded rapidly, numbering over a 
hundred papers a mere 30 years after the caudillo's fall (Sabato, 43). An improvement over the 
circulation of news in the Rosas era, these papers appeared in different languages and with 
different ideological nuances, reflecting a number of the groups that would come to constitute 
the Argentine public sphere (Ibid, 47). In 1850, Sarmiento had written “Periodical publications 
are in our time like daily respiration; neither freedom, nor progress, nor culture is conceivable 
without this vehicle that links societies to one another.” (Sarmiento, 2005, 205) Yet it is not pure 
extensity: Habermas reminds us that public debate was also predicated on the simultaneous 
existence of a private and intimate sphere, where privileged members of the bourgeoisie reflected 
on societal concerns and then extended those reflections outward into public discourse 





(Habermas, 50). Newspapers were an outgrowth of this class, and eventually “the function of the 
bourgeois public sphere crystallized in the idea of 'public opinion'” in the late 18th century (Ibid, 
89). Similarly, Sabato shows us that the multitude of papers in Buenos Aires bellied the small 
circle of individuals who ran them, and public opinion was important among the elites to 
legitimate political rule (Sabato, 51). This was because the Argentine press fostered a space where 
opinions could be discussed that “did not imply the contestation of government authority or 
political power”, providing a means for privileged members of the public to air grievances 
without implying a threat to the overall order of society (Ibid, 136). 
 In February of 1875, an angry mob burned town a Jesuit school in Buenos Aires, with La 
Tribuna writing that “these are not the events produced by a cultured and civilized people. No: 
that was the savage spirit of the rabble.” (Ibid, 144). El Espanol attributed the causes to “native 
elements that are used to electoral violence”, raising the familiar specter of the indigenous gaucho 
(Ibid, 145). Despite the finding of guilt at the hands of a racialized mob, the papers had been 
responsible for shaping and promulgating the Anti-Jesuit sentiments, going so far as to call for 
protests to Jesuit schools and referring to Jesuits as “vermin” and “assassins” (Ibid, 145). La 
Tribuna even wrote after the incident that “The memory of the excesses shall recede, sooner or 
later, but the protest against the advances of the Church will never die.” (Ibid, 152). At this point, 
the press was beginning to wield influence not just on the bourgeois class that contributed to it, 
but on a diverse group of literate and semi-literate city dwellers that was rapidly expanding by 
the time of the attack on the school of the attack on the school (Ibid, 154). It was no longer just the 
five hundred copies of Facundo circulating around the republic; it was rather an entire public 
relations industry that was reflexively shaping and molding the discourse of the city. Habermas 
illustrates how in Europe the degraded public sphere transforms from a space to mediate public 
opinion into a manufacturer of public opinion through public relations (Habermas, 221). 
Sarmiento, in a work written during his career as a politician, implored his fellow patricians that 
educating the masses should be done “Out of selfishness” to “blunt that instinct of destruction 
which is now dormant but which political life itself... must awaken.”. (Sarmiento, 1948, 293). 
Sarmiento believed there was grave danger in exposing the uneducated masses to new forms of 
democratic participation, and that the violence that was endemic to the Rosas regime might 
resurface. 
 At the end of Facundo, Sarmiento writes that “The political doctrines that nourished the 
Unitarists up to 1829 were incomplete and insufficient for establishing a government and 
freedom; the Pampas stirred, and that was enough to make their edifice, based on sand, fall to the 
ground. This inexperience and lack of practical ideas were remedied by Rosas, in the minds of 
all, with the cruel and instructive lessons that his frightful despotism gave them.” (Sarmiento, 
2003, 242). If Sarmiento sees the promises of the Unitarists (forbearers to Argentine liberalism) as 
unfulfilled, it is this new liberal public sphere that has formed as a corrective to the weaknesses 
of that former liberal regime. Yet Sarmiento informs us that Rosas will be remembered as “a great 
and powerful instrument of Providence, which accomplishes everything important for the future 
of our homeland”, for he has tamed the caudillos of the interior and “The day that a good 
government is established, it will find local resistance conquered and everything in place for the 
union.” (Ibid, 239). This is open to interpretation: could the liberal state that imagined in a 





generation of writers and thinkers have come into being without the violence of the preceding 
years? If the foundation of the liberal state necessitated a period of violence, would a period of 
violence be necessary again, when societal contradictions reemerged? 
Bearing Witness to the State of Exception 
The Degradation of the Public Sphere 
 What can be seen throughout the development of the public sphere in Buenos Aires is not 
only the extension of citizenship and rights to a critical public, but also a delimitation of that 
public, and the spectre of beings excluded from the political, reduced to bare life. It is here again 
that we turn to a critique of the very notion of a public sphere. Habermas would admit that the 
access to the public sphere is restricted to certain sections of the bourgeoisie who have the time 
to engage with the multifarious strands of thought that were publicly blossoming (Habermas, 
50). Yet the legitimacy of the public sphere as a source of sovereign authority derives from the 
active dialogue between all members of that public; paradoxically that public has been historically 
created through the designation of a limit of who is allowed to speak publicly. The rights of 
citizenship enshrined in the 1853 are a bold promise; yet it is a promise that is underscored by 
that documents ambivalent and decided silence on exactly who is a full citizen. This is a 
contradiction that never resolved itself in the Habermasian notion; instead the public sphere 
degrades and is turned from a space in which public opinion is formed through dialogue and 
becomes a space in which non-public opinions are manufactured and broadcast to a mass of 
people. Full access to the public sphere by the proletarian or peasant is never attained; this is the 
conclusion of Sabato as well, although she argues that it at the very least formed a space of 
mediation and negotiation. Without denying the subaltern voices of Buenos Aires in the 19th 
century, we can ultimately see that the promise of the public sphere, while grandiose, was 
ultimately unfulfilled. 
 As problems and contradictions inherent in mass politics began to arise in Argentine 
society in the early 20th century, the ghost of Sarmiento was revived throughout Ezequiel 
Martinez Estrada's fatalistic historical survey and social critique X-Ray of the Pampa (published 
1933) as a way of understanding the predicament of the republic following a coup in 1930. Estrada 
returns to the desert, writing that “[the Pampa] is the land of disordered adventures in the fantasy 
of a shallow man”, where “the coarse man discovers new beginnings” and “the cultivated man 
finds his end.” (Estrada, 1971, 7). Yet the problems this time are not confined to the countryside, 
as following the 1853 revolution “residual elements of reaction took refuge in Bueno Aires (Ibid, 
227). The “elements of reaction” that Estrada describes are the same that Echeverria diagnosed a 
hundred years earlier; a barbarism arrived at the city. Estrada in many ways reflects a final and 
frustrated culmination of the Argentine liberal: disillusioned with the people for being unable to 
accommodate to the contradictions and imbalances of a system that frequently denied them full 
personhood. Of course, Estrada does not ascribe these people a voice: his American gaucho was 
“a floating being, parasitically dependent on the cow and the horse, with nothing to restrain him 
in his ambitions or his career, since nothing knew bounds here – neither the law nor property nor 
life.” (Ibid, 22). Estrada still sees a barbarian desert where “politics has no exit to well-structured 
forms”, and instead “it projects its energies to the level of magic, of mysterious and arbitrary 
powers.” (Ibid, 279). The social mores of the Pampas are not fixed in meaning or tradition, but are 





rather transitory “pseudostructures, firm in the basic outlines of their physiognomies, but hollow 
in meaning and in substance.” (Ibid, 345). 
 Estrada's analysis reads as a 20th century version of Facundo but without the larger than 
life caudillo characters to frame it. Those characters are replaced in Estrada’s analysis by the 
oppressive geography of the Pampas, the decaying Republican institutions and the hypermodern 
“bureaucratic organs” of the state, where libraries and schools become places where books are 
“removed from life and from reading, they line the walls and impose silence.” (Ibid, 363). He 
retraces Sarmiento's steps and notes obliquely that the Argentine people “are still in the Hesiodic 
period of improvisation when the poet is faced with the materials of reality but not with its 
problems”. (Ibid, 387). If Sarmiento’s cantor was a figure of the Middle Ages, the poet of the 
modern Pampas is a figure from early Greece! The poet is, as always, the caudillo, “always the 
antiengineer, the technician of that anodyne reality, stronger than that reality and capable of 
stamping it with the bias of his talent as an improviser and a creator.” (Ibid, 388). Estrada goes on 
to tell us that “What Sarmiento did not realize was that civilization and barbarity were the same 
thing, like the centrifugal and centripetal forces of a system in equilibrium.” (Ibid, 398). The liberal 
reforms under Sarmiento did not stamp out the latter; instead “The defeated barbarity, with all 
its vices and its faults of structuring and of contents, had acquired an aspect of truth, of prosperity, 
and of cultural and mechanical advances.” (Estrada, 399).  
Estrada was at the time one of the leading thinkers in Argentina, and the work, which 
advances a similar thesis to Sarmiento, made shockwaves at the time it was published. The idea 
that is important to keep sight of is that there might be people within the republic of Argentina 
who are incapable, due to an element of their nature, of being members of an enlightened or 
liberal government. For both Estrada and Sarmiento, the barbarism they saw boiling up in the 
Pampas was a product of backwards caudillo culture; Estrada suspected that one could not 
extricate barbarism from civilization as easily as Sarmiento hoped. Yet his pessimism is directed 
almost solely at the people and their mute resistance to civilizing elements: read as a contempt of 
the masses, he avoids structural critique in favor of fatalist aphorisms, tautological geographies, 
and hangs the fate of Argentina on the unchangeable nature of the gaucho.   
Twenty years later in 1952 an American journalist covering the rise of Perónism, the 
populist political system associated with president Juan Perón, wrote, “Another dictator and his 
spectacular wife dominate the Argentine today”, before launching into a detailed parallel 
biographies of Juan Perón and Juan Rosas and their wives (Cowles, 1952, ix). The report that 
follows is a dubious and Sarmiento indebted sketch of Rosas coupled with a crude reading of 
how taken Perón was with European fascism and Stalinism and is the outcome of “the union of 
neo-fascism and communism” (Ibid, 246). While these remarks reflect media sensationalism more 
than anything else, Perón was so taken by both the Argentine and international media to be the 
second Rosas that it became a popular narrative of the Argentine bourgeoisie. La Prensa, a 
conservative Argentine daily newspaper that had had been founded in 1869, promoted these 
narratives and quickly came into the cross-hairs of the Perónist regime. After being charged with 
crimes against the nation, the paper published an editorial the next day that led with a Sarmiento 
quote “Barbarians! You cannot slaughter ideas.” and denounced “Anachronistic scenes, blind 
hatred persecuting ideas, gallows being raised.”(Defense of Freedom, 1952, 158, 162). On March 20, 





1951 the paper was claimed by the state, although the editor filed a public protest decrying that 
“La Prensa has, for more than eighty years, served the Republic in the organization of its 
institutions, in the dissemination of information and culture among the people”, with “absolute 
impartiality” and any investigations will confirm the paper's “moral authority” (Ibid, 177). The 
analysis in the previous section indicates that the formation of a public sphere in Argentina was, 
at best, incomplete, with popular opinion and populist politics being used as tools of the media 
to shape the political and social realm.  
 In The Fourth Enemy, James Cane explores the disintegration of the public sphere in 
Argentina, noting that the 1951 expropriation of the newspaper created a “public sphere devoid 
of the embarrassing indicator that the Peronist movement had yet to achieve the total consensus 
of all Argentines long claimed by its founder” (Cane, 2011, 226). He also argues that “the 
opposition increasingly found itself with little to gain by remaining within the bounds of Peronist 
legality and little to lose by stepping beyond them.” (Ibid, 226). Yet were the people, who long 
were denied a voice in the public sphere, actually the ones formulating an opposition? Ten years 
later, on the eve of another coup, the Argentine General Ongania addressed the Fifth Conference 
of American Armies at West Point in 1964, stating that the authority of government will be 
compromised under the influence of “exotic ideologies”, which present a threat “to the basic 
principles of a republican political system” (Nunca Mas, 1986, 386).He goes on to say “Since the 
people are powerless to exercise this right by themselves, it is the duty of the institutions which 
the people have armed and given to the mission to sustain the effective validity of the 
Constitution, to act on their behalf.” (Ibid, 444). Perónism and the reaction to it by Argentine elites 
is a hotly debated history that can be but briefly touched upon here to highlight that both Perón 
and his opponents appropriated the institutions and the ideals of republicanism, populism, and 
liberalism to further their political ends. Yet, tracing out a genealogy from Sarmiento, this 
cynicism and calculated use of the public is not a new occurrence in Argentine history. It is within 
the backdrop of this cynicism and escalating crises that we arrive at the 1976 coup and the Process 
of National Reorganization (PNR) (Rock, 1993, 224). 
Bearing Witness to the Desparecidos 
 On March 24, 1976, the first day of the coup, the members of the Supreme Court of 
Argentina were suspended and replaced with judges hand selected by the junta, who “has to 
swear to uphold the Articles and objectives of the ‘Process’” (Nunca Mas, 386). The government 
during the PNR declared a “state of siege” to justify their free movement inside and outside the 
law; the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (the Commission) declared that it 
is “inappropriate to talk of the authority of an illegal government in relation to the state of siege 
since this was intended to be use in the last resort to protect the legal state, and not… to legalize 
political persecution by a dictatorship which destroyed our republican institutions” (Ibid, 403). 
The contradictions here, while obvious, bear examination. The liberal republican government 
derives its authority from public institutions; yet, under a state of siege, the public’s access to 
those institutions can be suspended indefinitely until the crisis is over. The junta’s aims in the 
PNR and declaration of a state of siege were explicitly stated as protecting the ideals of the 
republic; yet the Commission deems those claim illegitimate because they suspended republican 
institutions, which occurs de facto in a state of siege. To analyze the state of exception from the 





top down is to wrestle with ambiguity of sovereignty, when the sovereign is both inside and 
outside the law. The junta’s declaration of a state of siege amounted to a simultaneous suspension 
of all laws and an extension of absolute law over the bodies of the Argentine people. 
 This is the reduction of beings to bare life, stripped of rights and in ambiguous relation to 
the law. As this paper has argued in its survey of Argentine intellectual history, this figure does 
not appear for the first time here. When Sarmiento stared plaintively at the Pampas and waxed 
on the incompatibility of the indigenous and black people with European progress, he etched that 
figure. That etching undoubtably bore influence on the Argentine Constitution of 1853, which 
deliberately omitted any reference to whom citizenship was extended to, an ambiguous and 
precarious relationship to the law was enshrined for most subjects. The justifications any 
government gives for suspending liberty are always dubious, but liberalism in Argentina was 
formulated with a deep suspicion of the masses, and whether or not their habitudes and way of 
life would stand in the way of progress. At the time that the radical PNR began, it was again 
Argentines who, although allegedly under the influence of “exotic” ideologies, became excluded 
from the political order in the state of siege, giving the junta the flimsy legal justification to snuff 
out their liberty and lives.  
Walter Meza Niella was 14 when the police raided his family's house in January of 1978. 
They struck him on the head with their rifles, knocking him to the ground, and then grab his still 
stunned body to use as a human shield while they searched his house for his father (Jaroskavsky, 
32). Being held by the hair, he remembers when a soldier shouts “Aha! Look at the old man! I had 
an idea that he was a real Peronist, but he's got books by Karl Marx here.” (Ibid, 32). He and his 
mother were then taken to a facility and tortured for information about the father, and suffered a 
brain aneurysm due to repeated head trauma (Ibid, 32). While recovering from the aneurysm, he 
learned that his father had managed to escape to Brazil, but was captured on his return to the 
country. 
Luis Alberto Urquiza, a psychology student working for police intelligence services at the 
time of his arrest, testified “Francisco Gontero, who, from a distance of four or five meters, loaded 
his 45-calibre gun and fired three shots, one of which went through my right leg at the height of 
my knee... The same person then ripped my trousers and poked a stick and then his finger into 
the wound.” (Nunca Mas, 28). He was released after two years detention for lack of evidence. Why 
was a psychology student who worked for the police tortured? The military regime had a disdain 
for psychoanalysis, as Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera stated in La Opinion in 1977 that “the 
inner intimacy of the human being was attacked by Freud, in his book The Interpretation of 
Dreams” (Jaroslavsky, 100). Yet whether the target is Marx or Freud, the result is the same: the 
banishing of profane knowledge that threatens society by force, in this case the violence of the 
police under the military junta. 
The bodies of the desparecidos were sent irregularly to cemeteries around Argentina 
(Nunca Mas, 231). Before arriving at the cemeteries they were often stored in unrefrigerated 
warehouses and lockers, typically arriving infested with maggots and in various stages of 
decomposition. There were never any names on the corpses; occasionally there would be the 
name of what policeman or police unit sent the corpse. Autopsies were banned on the bodies of 
political subversives, so little information was gathered about how they died. Stripped of names 





and unreported, these anonymous deaths are what characterized the desparecidos and the form 
that law took in the state of exception, enacting itself on the surface of bare life. Pregnant women 
who were held at the Campo de Mayo Military Hospital were blindfolded and given Caesarean 
sections to accelerate births; their children were often never seen by them, instead raised by the 
staff of the hospital (Ibid, 295). In this sense there is an extension of the PNR over both life and 
death, and of course a vanquishing of all rights and recourse for former subjects now reduced to 
bare life.  
Conclusions 
In Nunca Mas, the official government report on the desparecidos, the Comission states that 
the doctrines behind repression were originating in the general movement to repress the influence 
of left-wing and communist movements that was encouraged and funded by the United States. 
The Argentine General Camps wrote in 1981 that “France and the United States were our main 
sources of counter-insurgency training. They organized centres for teaching counterinsurgency 
techniques and sent out instructors, observers, and an enormous amount of literature.” (Ibid, 442). 
Yet they do not turn a critical lens to that older imperialism of ideas, the migration of liberalism 
from France and England to the heady discussions on the streets of Buenos Aires in the 19th 
century. The US could not have aided in repression if the existing apparatus for repression did 
not exist, and that apparatus was not built overnight. 
 David Rock, in his influential Authoritarian Argentina, writes that the true source of the 
conflict was not Cold War ideological conflict but in fact a conflict between regressive Nationalist 
movements within Argentina, which “became the expression of deep-rooted historical forces in 
Argentina that continually challenged and resisted the mainstream liberal conceptions of the state 
and society” (Rock, xv). For Rock, the authoritarian and military regimes in Argentina never 
achieved a coherent ideology, and “Nationalists surfaced as major contenders for power only at 
times of threatened political breakdown”. (Ibid, xx). Highlighting the often incohate and 
contradictory doctrines pushed forth by the military regime, at one moment denouncing “Marxist 
psychoanalysis in the universities” and at the next stating that “liberalism engenders 
communism”. (Ibid, 203). Agreeing with Rock that one cannot simply point to the United States 
as the culprit in Argentine affairs during the tumultuous years of repression and violence, and 
the impetus for the suspension of democratic rights must be found elsewhere.  
Yet this paper disagrees with him that these right ideas were lurking in the shadows of 
Argentine society waiting for “periods of extreme political strain or breakdown”. Rather, these 
ideas were in plain sight within the framework of Argentine liberalism.  To view the junta as an 
aberration or deviation is to ascribe to a historical tautology of liberal progress that fails to account 
for the elements within liberalism that produce the conditions for a state of exception to emerge. 
In contextualizing the junta in the larger history of Argentina, it must be understood that the 
grounds for exclusion of beings from the political did not originate solely from right wing or 
reactionary forces, but in fact was enshrined in the earliest doctrines of liberalism. In 
understanding how a state of exception emerged in Argentina in 1976, it is also necessary to 
understand the historical contingencies and continuities that flowed not from Rosas, but from the 
1853 revolution.  
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Hi, nice to meet you. First of all, we would like to give you the opportunity to introduce yourself: what do 
you do, how did you end up here? 
Paulina Ochoa Espejo (POE): Well, hi, I’m Paulina Ochoa-Espejo. I am a political science professor 
at Haverford College. I work on Political Philosophy and Political Theory, and most of the work 
that I do is normative and interpretive. So, I try to think of questions that have to do with how 
and why we legitimize government and power.  
 
So, you write about populism and you basically have described it in a historical way or in a hypothetical 
way, but what is populism for you?  
POE: This is something very interesting! I have to confess that I don’t find the debate about what 
populism is so exciting. I think that defining populism has kept us from doing things that are 
more interesting; to figure out other things: what does populism do, how do populists recognize 
themselves, what does one do after recognizing populism… Definitions and concepts are very 
important, but when we are thinking about democracy, we don’t spend all of our time defining 
democracy. We also think about other things about democracy. So, I’m not going to say that I 
don’t think that is important, but it’s just not the part of populism that interests me the most. For 
the most part, I’ve decided that I think I’ll just go with the ones that are out there, so I’ve chosen 
to stick with what Cas Mudde has defined: it’s an ideological or ideational definition. I don’t think 
it’s perfect, but I do not want to go out and give one myself. I do care a lot about concepts, but 
my concept—the one I care about—is The People, not populism.  
 
 




I wanted to start talking about Podemos and this concept in Spain that says that Podemos is a populist 
party. My question is if this party would fit in the definition of populism? 
POE: That is fascinating for two reasons. The first one is that Podemos is a self-conscious populist 
party. Most of them are not, right? So, most parties are whatever they are and then there is a critic 
or there is a commentator who says, ‘that is a populist party.’ But Podemos is a party that was 
crafted, that was self-consciously thought of as a populist party. And it was a populist party 
constituted in a very specific model, which is Laclau’s model of populism. So, I would say that it 
is a populist party because they say so themselves, but I think that also for that reason I would 
consider them a populist party is that they are trying to create a People both by inclusion and by 
exclusion. And so, that is something that fits well with most definitions of populism including 
the one that I use, which is Mudde’s. But also, I think that there is a second reason. So, first, self-
consciously populist, according to him they are populist, and also, second, because it fits the 
model. How well it fits the model? Well, that is the historical part, right? I mean, do they manage 
to create a People? Have they managed to include and exclude those they wanted to include and 
exclude? Did the party itself generate the kind of movement that creates a People of the left? I am 
not sure. Actually, I don’t know enough of Spanish politics. I mean, history can tell you whether 
it has succeeded, but it seems that at this point and time they are sort of at a point which it seems 
they are not succeeding. But, you know, these things are long term and they happen over time, 
so I guess part of what I bring into this debate is that the People is not something that happens at 
once. The People is an extended process in time. So, let’s see. You know, it’s still an open 
possibility. 
 
You mention that populist parties and movements think of The People as a unified, non-changeable, 
homogeneous group that they target. That could be Trump with white American men, anti-muslims, etc. 
So, when I read one of your articles, it made me feel that this idea of The People may work because of fear—
fear that The People is going to change and you’re not going to belong to it. So, staying in the homogenous 
group led by a populist makes you feel safer. Why do you think that works?  
POE: Well, I think that it’s fascinating. The whole thing about the social psychology of group-
making is that it’s an empirical matter. It’s something you need to go and figure out. What I’ve 
noticed from what I’ve known is that people like groups. People like to be in groups. And politics 
is about group-making. That’s the truth. There are always groups, and I think it would be hard 
to avoid that that is the case. 
Now, what are the psychological mechanisms that make you want it? I don’t know 
exactly, but what I do know is that not everybody feels the same. Any political theorist would 
win if they could say, ‘human beings are always like that.’ So, for example, Hobbes had a moral 
psychology, so did Locke, and so did Saint-Thomas. They had a theory of moral psychology. But 
in the case of Hobbes, he wants to say, as an empirical matter, ‘people are like this’—except when 
they are not! And that’s the thing, right? If we could count on them to always be exactly the same, 
then we could have a theory that would say “it’s always that way”, but the problem is that people 
love to make groups… but not always. Sometimes, they dissolve the group. Sometimes, there are 
people who are completely individualistic, or there are people who feel safer when there’s no one 
following them around, or there are people who go crazy to have followers. So, there are 




tendencies, but I don’t think that you can say this is a feature of the human mind. Maybe it is a 
feature of the human mind on most occasions, but there are some exceptions. So, I don’t think 
you can rely on social psychology or on moral psychology to do a theory about populism.  
 
You say in one of your articles that, more than biology or performance, group identities are formed by a 
common aesthetic judgement. So, what do you think are the aesthetic judgements shared by Podemos and 
the people that follow Podemos, and the right-wing party Vox? That is, what could be the difference between 
the aesthetic judgement that a person would draw to join Podemos rather than Vox?  
POE: This is interesting. So, what I was trying to do in that article—I was criticizing Kennan 
Ferguson because he wanted to say: ‘ok, what makes a group that we can call a People?” Right? 
Most people would think that is either shared genes or a biological link, and some think that what 
makes a People is like a shared performance. His proposal was like, ‘no, what makes a People is 
a shared aesthetic judgement.’ I think that I could agree with him. A group can be made by shared 
aesthetic judgements, and it is usually a group that is better defined than a group defined by the 
other two criteria, because people always behave in different ways at different times and because 
it is very, very hard to make a group follow anything that is biological. So I thought that was a 
good definition.  
But notice that this is what makes a group that considers itself a People. I don’t think a 
political party is that kind of a group. It is not a People. A political party is a group of citizens that 
want to fight for power. If those citizens want to characterize themselves as a People, then they 
are making a point about their right to be separate, to self-determine. The problem is that, when 
a party claims to be a People, they have a tendency to want to be The People—The People who 
then have a right to exclude others from their territory or from their institutions, and they think 
they have a claim to exclude others from their spaces. So, I think at that point when a party thinks 
that they are a People, then they tend to say, ‘well, we are The People; we want a different 
country.’ So, unless a party thinks that they want a different country or to exclude people, they 
shouldn’t call themselves a People. 
Podemos hasn’t made that claim, but they do have this idea that the way you make politics 
is by excluding others. To what degree they want to exclude them? I don’t know exactly how it 
has played out in practice. Do they consider themselves part of the Spanish People? I think they 
do—the new Spanish People. What makes them smart is that they are displacing the New People 
to the future, which is something I sort of agree with. But that is exactly what liberalism does: to 
displace People into the future, so in that respect, it is surprising, because they consider 
themselves a party that is not a liberal party.  
 
The next question is about resistance. In one of your articles, you have written about how populism is 
created by political communities of resistance created by right-wing and left-wing populism. Is there any 
difference? Why? Is it a resistance to democracy? 
POE: Did I think of them as a People? I hope I didn’t. What I think is that you have communities 
and we tend to make groups. And those groups can be friends, or families, or political parties. 
And groups make power. Sometimes you want to resist oppression and injustice, so it is 
important to build groups to achieve purposes. One of the important purposes of group-making 




is resisting injustice. So there needs to be certain kinds of solidarities to resist injustice, and those 
allow you to create groups against interests that want to perpetuate injustice. Are those The 
People? I don’t think so. I hope they don’t see themselves as a People.  
 
Answering your question about if you wrote whether they were People or not, I think you wrote: “the 
populists make them feel as People, but they are not People.” 
POE: I mean, I guess they can become A People, but I hope they are not.  
 
You mean they are not self-considered People, but the Populists use them? 
POE: That’s right. It’s just so easy to use that kind of identification and say, ‘let’s create more 
power out of this.’ Of course, if you identify the group with The People, it’s so much easier to get 
more power, because there is a tendency to stick together in order to defend something that has 
a right for self-defense, a right for self-determination, a right of being a union. There is that 
tendency. However, I think those types of communities undermine democratic practices.  
 
If democracy is supposed to be the best system, for being just and plural, then why would you want to create 
these groups of resistance? If democracy is so good that you want to live in it and you are part of The People, 
why create resistance to that system? 
POE: If there would be an ideal democracy, I would not want to have resistance to it. I have not 
seen one yet. Most existing political systems aspire to be one thing or another, but they often 
foster a lot of injustices and oppression. So in those kinds of circumstances, I can see reason for 
communities of resistance. 
 
What about the “mistake” that democracy makes? What are the drawbacks of democracy? What is the 
failure of democracy? 
POE: In that article, one of the things that I have in mind is that those groups that want to become 
a political group around a national or cultural identity, normally I would say those groups are 
fantastic because they foster a sense of identity. It makes it clear, in terms of who you are and 
who you want to be. They foster your self-esteem and goals that you wouldn’t be able to 
accomplish on your own. So collective aims and trust, reciprocity, solidarity… All of those things 
are good things on their own.  
Now, my concern is that when you have subgroups like that within a state, they often 
have a tendency not to want to share with other groups, and so fostering those groups, they tend 
to break communities by exclusion. That may be a problem when those groups don’t exist on 
their own as states, or when those groups do not exist homogeneously in one particular territory, 
which happens all the time. It is important to foster those groups if they have been oppressed as 
a People. But if they have not been oppressed as a People, sometimes it is not the best idea to have 
them to separate themselves from the rest, because you end up physically having to divide them. 
And that creates pain. So, I doubt whether you could have a world where you have territories for 
specific peoples, and it would not be able to exist even in the ideal world. Does that make sense? 





So, there is not going to be an ideal democracy. 
POE: I think an ideal democracy would be a plural democracy. 
 
But you would need to have right-wing groups. 
POE: Sure, but that would be groups. They wouldn’t be The People. I would never imagine, nor 
want, a country where everyone thought the same. In my view, an ideal democracy would be a 
plural democracy where all sorts of groups existed and overlapped, groups that were different 
kind of groups. And one could belong to different groups without having to be exclusive to be a 
member of one of them. If that is too abstract, I think you should be able to root for a football 
team, and like certain colors. They are cross-cutting cleavages, as political science says.  
 
And my final question is about the mottos that populists use: Take our country back, Make America Great 
Again. They are used by right- and left-wing parties alike. So what are the differences in the usage of these 
mottos and in which way would they differentiate?  
POE: So that is where you wanted to get at when you were asking about a common aesthetic 
judgement. What would differentiate a populist among the right and the left? What makes them 
similar is that they both imagine themselves as being The People, which means that they have a 
particular understanding of popular sovereignty, they think that The People is sovereign and 
cannot be wrong, so that means that the leader cannot be wrong if they embody The People’s 
will. How are they different? The right usually associates The People with a nation and the left 
with the poor, or even with the working class. So, you could have a populism like Pope Francis 
wants, the virtue of the poor, and a populism that is a Marxist populism, that imagines The People 
as a group made of the workers. But what differentiates the populist from the Marxist is that the 
populist is murkier; they tend to fall into the nation as well, so the extremes touch, the right and 
the left, in the murky part. The right emphasizes the hierarchical structure, the top-down aspects, 
something in common between populism and fascism, but they are not the same. Right wing 
populism tends to be xenophobic, but there are instances of the left being xenophobic as well, like 
keeping migrants away because they take the jobs away from the poor. There are differences and 
points in common. Moralistic ideas you can have in both sides. It seems to me that these 
differences are associated with the nation, mostly.    
 
Finally, we talked about how the system is not fair. Does fair mean that it doesn’t obey people’s will, as 
politicians claim? How does, then, disobedience work in this system? Should we accept laws that are not 
made by us? Should we keep giving this system the power? Or, otherwise, should we just disagree and 
protest and change? Maybe even fight against it? 
POE: This sounds interesting. Let me ask you one question: when you say the system is not fair, 
what do you mean by system?  
The system as democracy. In your article, you claim that democracy is thought to be by the People, for the 
People, and right now democracy is probably neither by the People nor for the People. People don’t decide 




those who rule them, and people don’t decide their rules, and then, as a consequence, they are not rewarded 
by those rules.  
POE: Given that democracies are supposed to be legitimate because everybody has a chance to 
participate, and people have not had a chance to participate, maybe these democracies are not 
fully legitimate. I think that is the case, so the question is: given that democracies are not fully 
legitimate, should we reject them? Should we have a chance to overturn democracies? I think 
there are two types of considerations.  
One is a pragmatic choice: maybe we have a right to overturn them, but is it convenient? 
Is it convenient to overturn a system that is not a very good political system but might be better 
than the alternatives? That’s kind of the Churchill take on democracy. The democracy we have is 
not very good, but it’s better than the alternatives. In these pragmatic terms, maybe you should 
try to change it from the inside, if you don’t have anything better to substitute it for. The second 
one is: What if we could make it better? What if it would be possible to have more participation? 
Should we fight to make it better? I say yes!  
The question is: how does one fight? I think it depends on the circumstances. In some 
cases, it seems that the best way to destroy oppression is to highlight the injustices by organizing 
in groups using the mechanisms that already exist in Constitutional democracy. That is the best 
way to do it. Sometimes you have to overturn the existing laws and there are different ways that 
are, from a pragmatic perspective, more efficient. I think a good example, because it worked 
relatively well, were the civil rights movements in the United States and in other places. From my 
perspective, I remember how people in Mexico managed to go from an authoritarian regime to 
something that is a bad-functioning democracy, but we can fairly say it’s a democracy. It was 
hard to get there, and I admire those who turned Mexico from an authoritarian regime to a 
democracy, and I think we should not let go of it. So, yes, I think there has to be some organized 
movement in order to do it. Is that a populist movement? I don’t think so. I think this all happens 
within democracy, and I don’t think you need populism in order to do that. Appealing to The 
People in that sense actually pushes us further away from the democracy that we would like to 
have.  
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This paper seeks to explore the dynamics of contemporary authoritarian populism from a historical 
perspective, relying on the approaches of Durkheim’s experimental sociology and Levinas’s ethical 
phenomenology. By reading the works of these two thinkers in concert, a pathology is exposed within 
this particular form of politics in that the State must necessarily close itself off to the critique of 
exteriority. Our reading of Durkheim explores the social pathology of nationalism while our reading 
of Levinas demonstrates the philosophical dimension of this pathology as the inevitable outcome of 
any philosophical thinking which privileges ontology above all else. The way these thinkers address 
these themes can serve as a guide as we attempt to overcome the same pathology today in various 
forms of authoritarian populism that adopt the same mentalities and methods utilized by past forms 
of this corrupted idealism. Keywords: nationalism, ontology, populism, Durkheim, Levinas. 
 
Introduction 
One of the great social theorists of our time passed away in July of 2019. Ágnes Heller 
dedicated her life to shedding philosophical illumination on complex political and social 
phenomena and in her last years she deployed her considerable talents in direct opposition to the 
politics of Viktor Orbán, the current prime minister of Hungary. Heller’s legacy is that of a 
political critic precisely because she refused to be drawn into philosophical dilemmas in which 
opposing capitalism necessarily meant dogmatically supporting Marxism. As a survivor of both 
the Nazi Holocaust and the Stalinist purges in occupied Hungary, Heller’s primary political 
commitment was an opposition to totalitarianism in all its forms. Her first-hand experiences with 
the barbarism of both left and right totalitarian governments lead Heller to build a career as an 
outspoken critic of all forms of political totality. 
One of the deep motivations of her work is the view that while philosophy has long 
engaged with conceptions of evil as it has been formulated by religious thought, in the 
contemporary world (beginning with Auschwitz) “demonic” evil manifests exclusively as 
political evil. Against Hannah Arendt’s conception of the banality of evil, Heller argues that evils  
committed or enabled by “demonic” agents become radical only when married to practical 
political power. She notes that Nero, for example, “was a murderer on a grand scale because as 




Emperor of Rome he had the power to murder” (Heller 2011, 24). As the technology of cruelty 
evolved from Nero’s flames to the furnaces of Auschwitz, the scale of atrocity within reach of 
demonic figures expanded exponentially. This leads to the current situation in which “modern 
demons are in full bloom only in the situation of power” (Heller 2011, 27). Heller’s approach 
shows that philosophy is uniquely suited to exposing the machinations of evil, and further, that 
in our time the evil most urgently vital to oppose is found in the political sphere of human life. 
This is why, even in her final philosophical pursuits, Heller remained firmly fixed on opposing 
and challenging the politics of Orbán. 
Heller’s analysis of Orbán, which she offered in an interview on August of 2018, less than 
a year before her death, can help us orient our discussion of authoritarian populism here. When 
asked if she considered Orbán to be a “populist” she pronounced her diagnosis of his particular 
pathology as follows: 
I do not like the term populist as it is used in the context of Viktor Orbán, because 
it does not say anything. Populists rely typically on poor people. Orbán uses 
nationalistic vocabulary and rhetoric, he mobilizes hatred against the stranger and 
the alien, but it has nothing to do with populism. It has to do with the right-wing, 
but this is also questionable, because Orbán is a man who is interested only in 
power… From the time he became the prime minister of Hungary, Orbán was 
always interested in concentrating all the power in his hands. I would describe 
him as a tyrant. He is a tyrant because nothing can happen in Hungary that he 
does not want, and everything that he wants is carried through in Hungary. This 
is a very tyrannical rule… Everyone who is under Orbán must serve him and must 
agree with him. No counter opinion is tolerated because this is a mass society, not 
a class society (Heller 2018). 
This mentality of total concentration of power that Heller diagnoses in Orbán is certainly not 
limited to Hungarian politics nor is it only found within western countries. Rather, this same 
pathology can be seen as a worldwide movement that has encompassed China, Russia, Egypt, 
Turkey, Brazil, England and the United States. Heller remained committed throughout her life to 
the task of deploying the full force of philosophical rigor against this pathology and the kind of 
tyranny she denounced in figures such as Orbán. 
But here we might take issue with Heller’s reluctance, in the passage cited above, to 
identify the populist element of what she calls Orbán’s mobilization of “hatred against the 
stranger and the alien,” which she argues “has nothing to do with populism”. In our view, Heller 
underestimates the way that contemporary authoritarian populism mobilizes and exploits 
contempt for those who are ethnically or culturally different from the hegemonic majority, not as 
an incidental route to power but as a formal definitive characteristic of the movement. As will be 
developed below, this exploitation is not as an incidental characteristic but rather is a necessary 
and defining methodology of the movement. Further, this appeal to the basest aspects within the 
human soul is inseparable from the particular kind of right-wing authoritarian populism that 
Orbán represents and goes to the heart of the entire tradition of exclusionary nationalist populism 
which can only comprehend social unity in terms of hegemonic cultural solidarity. 
 In discussing the kinds of solidarity which unite and divide the social order, we might 




well begin with the work of Émile Durkheim. While Durkheim is mostly known for his formal 
experimental sociology, he was a politically active scholar who, like Heller, deployed the full 
force of his academic research against the most serious political challenge of his day. For 
Durkheim, that challenge was the rising force of nationalism in the early part of the twentieth 
century. In the first part of this paper we will explore Durkheim’s very specific account of this 
particular pathology. In the second part we will attempt to orient how this pathology relies on an 
appeal to “elemental feelings” among the populace as an unmistakable component of past and 
present forms of exclusionary nationalist populism. 
Durkheim Against Nationalism 
 As one of the founders of classical sociology, Durkheim was primarily preoccupied with 
the dynamic forms of social solidarity that rise and fall with historical and cultural changes. 
While his work rarely addresses the particular political manifestations or exploitation of these 
kinds of solidarity, we can see how these elements converge in his brief 1914 (republished in 
English in 1915) propaganda pamphlet “Germany above All,” written against rising German 
Nationalism at the outset of the First World War and. There, Durkheim elaborates a view of a 
particular kind of nationalistic politics that persists today in contemporary forms of 
authoritarian populism. Dominick LaCapra explains the context of the pamphlet within 
Durkheim’s thought: 
One important problem which the propagandistic World War I pamphlet Germany 
above All emphasized was the crisis generated by a conflict between legal 
imperatives and the demands of a humanistic ethic. Although the severity of this 
conflict challenged his optimistic evolutionary assumptions about the non- 
authoritarian and democratic course of law and government in modern society, 
Durkheim's answer was unequivocal. In contrast to the school of juridical 
positivism in Germany, which had exercised some influence on his early thought, 
Durkheim without hesitation placed the humanistic conscience collective of modern 
society above legal duties to the state (LaCapra 2001, 87). 
This interest in the conflict between legal obligation and ethical obligation is a vital theme that 
gets to the heart of the mentality of contemporary nationalism. This mentality harbors a deep 
belief that the ethical order of human life can and must be subordinated to a conception of legal 
accountability, which is more easily manageable by the State’s legal apparatus. What this means 
is that ethics presents a threat to the authoritarian State as a realm that exists beyond its complete 
control, unlike the legislative and judicial realms which remain within the self-contained logic of 
the authoritarian State. Durkheim’s rejection of this absolute conception of the State rests on an 
account of the primacy of collective moral consciousness, which he develops in great detail in the 
pamphlet. Durkheim advocates for an almost Kantian position of European cosmopolitanism 
against which Germany had rebelled. He emphatically accuses Germany of leaving the great 
family of civilized people that comprises European society: 
It is beyond belief, they say, that Germany, which yesterday was a member of the 
great family of civilized peoples, which even played amongst them a part of the 
first importance, has been capable of giving so completely the lie to the principles 
of human civilization. It is not possible that those men, with whom we used to 




consort, whom we held in high regard, who belonged without any reservation to 
the same moral community as we ourselves, have been capable of becoming those 
savage creatures, aggressive and unconscionable, whom we hold up to public 
indignation (Durkheim 1915, 3-4). 
Durkheim goes on to examine the way in which this withdrawal from collective civilized morality 
can be understood through a particular German mentality embodied in the work of Heinrich 
Treitschke. Durkheim explains Treitschke’s views of an exaggerated independence released from 
all limitation and reservation that culminates in the absolute State. Relying on this conception of 
exaggerated independence of the absolute State, Durkheim notes that for Treitschke, “the State is 
autarkès (self-sufficient), in the sense which the Greek philosophers gave to that word; it must be 
completely self-sufficient; it has, and ought to have, need only of itself, to exist and to maintain 
itself; it is an absolutism (8, translation modified). This definition of the State as absolute self-
sufficiency, of the utter closing off to the critique of exteriority, is the foundation of Treitschke’s 
political theory and serves as the forerunner to contemporary populist movements of radical 
exaggerated nationalist sovereignty. 
Durkheim focuses on Treitschke’s rejection of international law, or more specifically, his 
view that international law or treaties cannot be binding since a State cannot admit an authority 
superior to itself. Unlike contracts between individuals, who can and must yield to the superior 
authority of the State, contracts between States can have no such external force of law. Durkheim 
summarizes this point in Treitschke’s view of the State: 
Whilst in contracts between private persons there is at the base a moral power 
which controls the wills of the contracting parties, international contracts cannot 
be subject to this superior power, for there is nothing above the will of a State. This 
follows not only when the contract has been imposed by force, as the sequel of a 
war, but not less when it has been accepted by a free choice (Durkheim 1915, 10). 
Durkheim’s point is that while relations between individuals are guided or at least limited by 
ethical responsibility, no such mechanism exists in international relations. The Kantian 
cosmopolitanism of European morality, the great family which Germany has decided to leave 
behind, offered one way of solidifying a trans-national morality, which has subsequently been 
lost due to German aggression. Durkheim diagnoses the imminent threat to all of western 
civilization within Treitschke’s doctrine of the absolute State as the inevitability and necessity of 
war which necessarily accompanies this mentality. Because competing interests and rivalry will 
undoubtedly arise between States that are equally unrestrained by the moral power which 
compels contracting parties, the inevitable result will be war since the States cannot yield to the 
arbitration of any external authority. Moreover, those nations incapable of imposing their 
collective will onto other nations cannot rightfully be called States, he continues: 
Without war, the State is not even conceivable. Again the right of making war at 
its own will constitutes the essential quality of sovereignty. It is by this right that 
it is distinguished from all other human associations. When the State is no longer 
in a position to draw the sword at its will, it no longer deserves the name of State 
(Durkheim 1915, 12). 
Thus, in Treitschke’s view of the State, since there is no distinction between politics and war, the 




essential quality of sovereignty is the power to make war. But Durkheim diagnoses the pathology 
of Treitschke’s absolutism as not only the inevitability of war, but in the sanctity with which 
warfare becomes invested. Warfare itself becomes sacred in two ways: first as a necessary 
condition for the existence of the State, which is in turn necessary for the survival of its citizens, 
and second as the actual embodiment of moral virtues. Durkheim explains, quoting Treitschke at 
length: 
War is not only inevitable, it is moral and sacred. It is sacred first because it 
represents a condition necessary to the existence of Slates, and without the State 
humanity cannot live. "Apart from the State, humanity cannot breathe". But it is 
sacred also, because it is the source of the highest moral virtues. It is war which 
compels men to master their natural egoism; it is war which raises them to the 
majesty of the supreme sacrifice, the sacrifice of self. By it, individual wills, instead 
of dissipating themselves in the pursuit of sordid ends, are concentrated on great 
causes, and "the petty personality of the individual is effaced and disappears 
before the vast perspective envisaged by the aspirations of the State". By war, "man 
tastes the joy of sharing with all his compatriots, learned or simple, in one and the 
same feeling, and whosoever has tasted that happiness never forgets all the 
sweetness and comfort that it yields". In a word, war connotes "a political 
idealism", which leads a man forward to surpass himself. Peace, on the contrary, 
is "the reign of materialism;" it is the triumph of personal interest over the spirit of 
devotion and sacrifice, of the mediocre and sordid over the noble life (Durkheim 
1915, 12-3). 
This inversion of morality functions in accord with the logic of Durkheim’s account of the sacred 
in that it makes war itself sacred and selfless while peace is seen as profane and egoistic. 
Durkheim could not have anticipated the degree to which war propaganda would be 
perfected during the twentieth century in order to ensure this moral inversion, although his work 
already explains the fundamental principles by which it will function. Following this “political 
idealism”, the State itself becomes a personality, which Durkheim notes is necessarily “a 
personality, imperious and ambitious, impatient of all subjection, even of the appearance of 
subjection : it is only really itself in proportion to the measure in which it belongs completely to 
itself” (13). The State’s inability to admit a power beyond itself, to close over into totality, forces 
the State to collapse all conception of power into the State itself. Weaker States are inevitably 
dominated as their dependence on others negates their absolute sovereignty. Durkheim 
continues: “A weak State naturally falls into dependence on another, and, in proportion as its 
sovereignty ceases to be complete, it ceases itself to be a State. Whence it follows that the element, 
which essentially constitutes a State, is Power. Der Staat ist Macht — this axiom, which constantly 
falls from the pen of Treitschke, dominates all his teaching” (14). This view that the State is Power 
is the underlying logic to all of Treitschke’s politics and ultimately collapses the distinction 
between politics and war at a fundamental level. This necessarily implies that smaller countries 
who lack the physical strength to defend and maintain themselves in conflict against their 
stronger or more aggressive neighbors, cannot properly be understood as States. Thus, powerful 
States who are “true” States by virtue of that power, have no moral or legal obligation to respect 
the rights of weaker non-States who have no legitimate claim to their own sovereignty. 




Durkheim is especially interested in the way the State subordinates and must subordinate 
all morality to its own immediate necessities. One of the central claims of Durkheim’s pamphlet 
is that German nationalism in particular harbors a notable aversion to any morality which resides 
beyond the totality of the State. Any external or universal morality, such as Kantian 
cosmopolitanism, which could serve as a critique of the State, would be a threat to the absolute 
sovereignty which Treitschke insists is the essential characteristic of the State. Durkheim 
elaborates that the way that Treitschke responds to the potential challenge to the sovereignty of 
the State posed by morality is via a return to Machiavelli as a thinker who “did not hesitate to 
maintain that the State is not under the jurisdiction of the moral conscience, and should recognise 
no law but its own interest” (18). This view of the State as a closed totality, unbound by any 
external morality is rediscovered by Treitschke and other German nationalists seeking to solidify 
the absolute sovereignty of the State which is above all moral critique. Of course, acting in a moral 
way may well suit the interests of the State, to gain a reputation for trustworthiness might 
enhance the political power of the State, for example. But Durkheim makes clear that in this 
Treitschkean-Machiavellian conception of the relation of morality to the State, all morality serves 
the single purpose of reinforcing the State’s authority, which is to say, to increase the Power of 
the State. Increasing the Power of the State becomes the Supreme Good, above all else within the 
moral schema dictated by the exaggerated independence of the absolute State. Durkheim notes: 
Here we have a logical demonstration of the famous formula the German learns 
to repeat from his earliest childhood : Deutschland über alles; for the German there 
is nothing above the German State. The State has but one duty : to get as large a 
place in the sun as possible, trampling its rivals under foot in the process. The 
radical exclusion of all other ideals will rightly be regarded as monstrous 
(Durkheim 1915, 23). 
Because the absolute self-sufficiency and autonomy of the State can admit no higher power, this 
would seem to necessarily enter into conflict with any claim of universal values, especially those 
of religion when not subordinated to the State. Monotheism presents an especially problematic 
challenge since the God of monotheistic religions does not refer to a particular God of a tribe or a 
city, but to the God of the entire human race, a universal lawgiver and guarantor of an absolute 
morality which applies to all of humanity. It is in respect to this monotheistic conception of the 
divine that Durkheim writes: “Now the very idea of this God is alien to the mentality which we 
are studying” (24). While nationalists like Treitschke often claim divine or religious moral 
grounding of their political ideology, Durkheim views any admission of a divinity beyond the 
State as merely a “formal reservation.” 
For Durkheim, this denotes the total inversion of the sacred dimension of human life, the 
interconnectedness of social solidarity, which is entirely supplanted by the political objectives of 
the State. But this is not a suspension of morality in a Kierkegaardian sense of obligations to the 
State forcing us to renounce or suspend conflicting beliefs that we know to be morally right. 
Rather, this “political idealism” represents a new morality taking the place of the old morality, 
which is then cast as weak and decadent since it contributes nothing to the one true duty of the 
State, which is to increase its power. This new morality does not only guide the actions of the 
State at the international level, but also in terms of the regulation of the internal life of society. 




Thus, Treitschke represents not only the elevation of the State over morality, but more 
fundamentally over civil society itself. Durkheim makes clear the source of this antagonism: 
To designate what we call the People as distinguished from the State, Treitschke 
and a number of other German theorists prefer the term Civil Society (die 
bürgerliche Gesellschaft). Civil Society includes everything in the nation which is not 
immediately connected with the State, the family, trade and industry, religion 
(when this is not a department of the State), science, art. All these forms of activity 
have this characteristic in common, that we embrace them voluntarily and 
spontaneously. They have their origin in the natural inclinations of man. Of our 
own free will we found a family, love our children, work to satisfy their material 
wants and our own, seek after truth, and enjoy aesthetic pleasures. Here we have 
a whole life which develops without the intervention of the State (Durkheim 1915, 
27).  
This voluntary spontaneity cannot be incorporated into the mechanism of the State, and thus 
presents a necessary antagonism. This civil society is what resists the pressure of the State’s 
single-minded pursuit of its own totalization. This realm of civil life which is prior to the State, 
and thus exists outside the purview of its authority, Durkheim describes as: 
… a mosaic of individuals and of separate groups pursuing divergent aims, and 
the whole formed by their agglomeration consequently lacks unity. The 
multiplicity of relations that connect individual with individual, or group with 
group do not constitute a naturally organised system. The resulting aggregate is 
not a personality; it is but an incoherent mass of dissimilar elements. [Treitschke] 
"Where is the common organ of Civil Society? There is none. It is obvious to 
everyone that Civil Society is not a precise and tangible thing like the State. A State 
has unity; we know it as such; it is not a mystic personality. Civil Society has no 
unity of will” (Durkheim 1915, 28, translation modified). 
As an “incoherent mass of dissimilar elements”, the diverse mosaic of civil society presents an 
antagonism with the absolute morality of the State, which demands unity, order and organization 
above all else. Because civil society lacks a kind of spontaneous harmony or the authoritarian 
imposed harmony enforced by the apparatus of the State, each of its competing interests will 
invariably enter into conflict, resulting in the chaos of disorder, which is anathema to the 
objectives of the State. The State, in turn, must inevitably resort to coercive action and 
commanding obedience to impose order, making obedience to the State the first civic duty. This 
does not require the coercion of belief, for Treitschke, merely the coercion of action, since the State 
has no interest in the private lives of citizens, only external obedience to the formal law. He quotes 
from Treitschke: “[The State] says: what you think is a matter of indifference to me; but you must 
obey. Progress has been made when the silent obedience of citizens is reinforced by internal and 
well considered acquiescence; but this acquiescence is not essential” (32). The silent obedience of 
the masses, yielding to the power of the State not out of agreement but out of coercion, supplants 
moral solidarity and fraternity. Since the first task of politics, in Treitschke’s view, is to assert its 
own Power, this requires the overcoming of mere sentimentality and aversion to harshness on 
the part of the sovereign. Durkheim further quotes, with evident distaste, Treitschke’s view that 




“Politics cannot be carried on without harshness; that is why women understand nothing about 
them” (33). 
It is this logic of Germany Above All, the logic of the State above morality, that allows for 
unrivaled levels of brutality, as Durkheim describes German conduct up to that point during the 
First World War. Durkheim notes: 
… the individual atrocities committed by the soldiery are but the methodical 
application of these principles and rules. Thus the whole system is homogeneous 
and logical; a pre-determined concept of the State is expressed in rules of conduct 
laid down by the military authority, and these rules are, in their turn, translated 
into action by the individual (Durkheim 1915, 39). 
At the level of individual action, atrocities are carried out not out of any particular malice or 
hatred, but out of a systematic and methodological application of the self-sufficient mentality of 
the State. Durkheim points to a connection between the State placing itself above both morality 
and civil society in such a way as the actions of its agents (specifically soldiers in this case) cannot 
be judged by any logic external to the State. Put another way, if the only good is the good of the 
State, moral agency must be oriented around the single goal the State can have, which is to 
increase its power. Thus, overthrowing weaker States, who are not “real” States in the sense they 
are incapable of exerting their own Power, is the inevitable outcome of this radical autonomy. By 
orienting all citizenship around the goal of increasing the power of the State, Treitschke opposes 
the very concept of nationality in terms of the collective of social groups living under a set of 
established laws. Powerful States, in pursuit of greater power, desire to impose order on these 
non-States, via coercion rather than their consent. This, for Durkheim, explains German 
aggression: “Hence the passion of Germany for conquest and annexation. She cares so little what 
men may feel or desire. All she asks is that they should submit to the law of the conqueror, and 
she herself will see to it that it is obeyed” (40). 
Durkheim concludes the essay by making clear that the fundamental pathology of this 
mentality is not simply collective insanity or brutal sadism, but rather lies in defining the State 
via “a morbid hypertrophy of the will, a kind of will-mania” (44). For Durkheim, this idealism of 
exaggerated sovereignty leads to the inability of Germany to accept the legitimacy of 
international law, of the right of “lesser” States to exist, or even accept the existence of “equal” 
States which might serve as rivals. This produces a “frenzied race to power” (43) which will 
inevitably oblige Germany to attempt to outgrow any possible challenge which might come from 
any external forces. This is the task set forth by the political idealism that Durkheim describes, 
but remains impossible to realize for the individual. Rather, it is only achievable through the 
State, in Treitschke’s formulation, due to its unique ability to harness these disparate individual 
wills in order to direct them to the “supreme end” (45). Durkheim then pronounces the 
philosophical underpinnings of the German mentality: 
The State is the sole concrete and historic form possible to the Superman of whom 
Nietzsche was the prophet and harbinger, and the German State must put forth all 
its strength to become this Superman. The German State must be “über Allés” 
(above all). Superior to all private wills, individual or collective, superior to the 
moral laws themselves, without any law save that imposed by itself, it will be able 




to triumph over all resistance and rule by constraint, when it cannot secure 
voluntary acceptance (Durkheim 1915, 45). 
This absolute superiority of the State, above all other individual or collective wills, admits no 
possibility of the critique which emanates from exteriority. By subordinating all wills, even 
morality itself, to the one task of increasing its power, the State not only becomes a personality 
characterized by its desire for unity, order and organization, but it becomes the only possible 
concrete personality. 
The association of the German mentality of aggressive nationalism to the philosophy of 
Nietzsche is, at best, a highly selective reading of Nietzsche’s concept of will to power, and must 
necessarily ignore Nietzsche’s critique of mass culture and the herd mentality that would 
subordinate individual wills to any kind of collective will, including the State. Clearly Durkheim 
is not offering a particularly nuanced reading of Nietzsche as a social theorist, but this does reveal 
an important dimension of Durkheim’s reading of Treitschke as the culmination not only of a 
particular political ideology but more fundamentally as the conclusion of a particular line of 
philosophical thinking. This mentality, which Durkheim associates with both Nietzsche and 
Machiavelli, rests on the subordination of all individual wills to a general will for the sake of 
increasing the power of the State. 
Ultimately, Durkheim concludes his essay optimistically, noting: “When all the nations 
whose existence it threatens or disturbs — and they are legion — combine against it, it will be 
unable to resist them, and the world will be set free” (47) That optimistic view, in 1915, could not 
have anticipated the events of the next three years of the First World War, let alone the horrors 
that played out over the rest of the first half of the twentieth century and still persist in similar 
forms of “political idealism” well into the twenty-first century. 
“Elementary Feelings” and the Degenerate Germanic Ideal of Man 
Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke’s nationalism takes on renewed relevance when we 
observe that contemporary forms of authoritarian populism have merely substituted Donald 
Trump’s “America First” for Oswald Mosley’s “Britain First” or Jair Bolsonaro’s “Brazil Above 
All, God Above Everyone” for the “Germany Above All” embodied by Treitschke. But in order 
to understand the deep pathology at play within the xenophobic and jingoistic rhetoric deployed 
by these authoritarian figures, which has historically been deployed with extraordinary success 
by nationalistic populist movements, we can turn to the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas, 
like Heller, lost much of his family in the Holocaust and his work bares the mark of his own 
internment in a Nazi prison camp. Levinas’s work is especially important for this task because 
he addresses politics at the level of underlying philosophical commitments, specifically focusing 
on the way philosophy has come to be singularly consumed with questions of ontology, which 
has left it vulnerable to this particular pathology. Levinas’s work also emphasizes, as did 
Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke, that political manifestations of this ideology cannot be 
addressed purely at the level of political rationality but must rather engage it as a matter of social 
metaphysics.  
The influence of Durkheim’s thought on Levinas’s phenomenological project has been 
thoroughly documented by Howard Caygill in his 2002 book Levinas and the Political, which 
stresses the role of Durkheim’s conception of the sacred on Levinas’s later phenomenology. 




Caygill relies largely on the widely circulated interviews with Philippe Nemo from 1981, in which 
Levinas addresses not only his mature philosophical positions but the range of influences which 
contributed to his unique approach to philosophical questions. These interviews represent an 
especially important moment in Levinas’s reflection on his own thought and are an indispensable 
resource for interpreting the political and social context of the pluralism evoked in the conclusion 
of Totality and Infinity. 
One of the important characteristics of the largely informal interviews, which were 
subsequently collected and republished as Ethics and Infinity, is that Levinas makes a clear 
connection between his metaphysical project and the broader social context to which that project 
attempts to respond. This brings him to address the social dimension of his philosophical thought 
in much greater detail than in his more formal philosophical writings. It is in this context that in 
response to Nemo’s question “Do you put the sociological thought of a Durkheim on the same 
level as the properly philosophical thought of a Bergson?,” Levinas offers effusive praise for the 
famed sociologist: 
Apparently, Durkheim was inaugurating an experimental sociology. But his work 
also appeared as a ‘rational sociology,’ as an elaboration of the fundamental 
categories of the social, as what one would call today an ‘eidetic of society,’ 
beginning with the leading idea that the social does not reduce to the sum of 
individual psychologies. Durkheim, a metaphysician! The idea that the social is 
the very order of the spiritual, a new plot in being above the animal and human 
psychism; the level of ‘collective representations’ defined with vigor and which 
opens up the dimension of spirit in the individual life itself, where the individual 
alone comes to be recognized and even redeemed. In Durkheim there is, in a sense, 
a theory of ‘levels of being,’ of the irreducibility of these levels to one another, an 
idea which acquires its full meaning within the Husserlian and Heideggerian 
context (Levinas 1985, 26-27). 
That Levinas considers Durkheim to be a great philosophical thinker on par with the titans of the 
philosophical canon can help us understand how to deploy his work practically in the context of 
populist exclusionary nationalism that occupies us here. Levinas even seems to suggest that he 
remained skeptical as to whether the phenomenological approach of his mentors could function 
without the import of concepts more accessible via Durkheim’s experimental sociology. For 
Levinas, Durkheim provides the foundation for a critique of phenomenology itself by insisting 
on the irreducibility of levels of sociality, that is, on the irreducibility of social life to the actions 
or consciousness of individual subjects. It is exactly this irreducibility, the radical alterity which 
cannot be accounted for within the frameworks of Husserlian or Heideggerian phenomenology, 
that Durkheim’s work lays bare. This helps clarify the context in which Levinas evokes Durkheim 
against Heidegger in Totality and Infinity, when he utilizes Durkheim’s social metaphysics as a 
way to escape from Heidegger’s solipsism. Levinas notes: 
… for Heidegger intersubjectivity is a coexistence, a we prior to the I and the other, 
a neutral intersubjectivity. The face to face both announces a society, and permits 
the maintaining of a separated I. Durkheim already in one respect went beyond 
this optical interpretation of the relation with the other in characterizing society 




by religion. I relate to the Other only across Society, which is not simply a 
multiplicity of individuals or objects ; I relate to the Other who is not simply a part 
of a Whole, nor a singular instance of a concept. To reach the Other through the 
social is to reach him through the religious. Durkheim thus gives an indication of 
a transcendence other than that of the objective (Levinas 1979, 68). 
Levinas will go on to oppose Durkheim’s reduction of religion to observable and quantifiable 
practices and rituals, which is necessitated by the positivistic methodology of his experimental 
sociology. But Durkheim’s central insight which Levinas identifies and praises in Totality and 
Infinity, and again 20 years later in the Nemo interviews, is that this social metaphysics avoids 
the solipsistic trappings of existential phenomenology by viewing the social as beyond the scope 
of ontology. 
As such, it might not be surprising that when faced with Heidegger’s embrace of National 
Socialism in 1933, Levinas evoked terminology drawn directly from Durkheim’s conception of 
“elementary forms” in accounting for “elementary feelings” which had been awakened by 
populist discourse directed at the German people. As one of Heidegger’s most thoroughly 
devoted disciples, Levinas was especially shaken by his mentor’s political commitment. But while 
his work never addresses Heidegger’s politics commitment directly, his entire philosophical 
project can be read as an attempt to rehabilitate thinking itself in such a way as to avoid its 
vulnerability to the particular pathology that engulfed the German people and even Heidegger 
himself. To this end, the crucial text that provides the key context to Levinas’ later formal work 
is his 1934 “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.” This text is especially relevant for our 
purposes here as it draws out the crucial connection between the pathology diagnosed by 
Durkheim in Treitschke’s nationalism and the particular manifestation of that nationalism two 
decades later under the banner of National Socialism, which has emerged again in our time under 
various terms for authoritarian populism. 
The short text of Levinas’s reflections is remarkable for a number of reasons. With the 
benefit of historical hindsight, it is easy to underestimate the penetrating nature of Levinas’ 
perception of the pathology of Hitlerism early in its development. At a point in history in which 
western democracies were unsure what to make of the emerging politics of fascism, and a full 
decade before the full extent of the horrors of the Holocaust began to come to light, Hitler was 
widely seen to be a somewhat aggressive politician fighting against the political and economic 
woes of the Weimar Republic, not unlike many aspiring tyrants of our own contemporary 
political climate such as Orbán. In the same sense as current movements in nationalist or 
authoritarian populism are commonly perceived, at the time there was no general sense of 
urgency as the horrors that would come to light after the war were unprecedented and 
unimaginable. Even as the nation-States of western Europe pursued a doomed strategy of 
appeasement, naively hoping for the “Peace for our time” which would be prematurely declared 
by Neville Chamberlain in 1938, Levinas immediately perceived the threat and underlying 
pathology within the rise of Hitlerism. 
Still drawing heavily on Heidegger’s language from Being and Time, Levinas writes in his 
Reflections on Hitlerism: “Time, which is a condition of human existence, is above all a condition 
that is irreparable. The fait accompli, swept along by a fleeing present, forever evades man's 




control, but weighs heavily on his destiny” (Levinas 1990, 65). Levinas emphatically opposes the 
subordination of individual freedom within the logic of Hitlerism, but also outlines the 
problematic conception of freedom within liberal politics as placing “the human spirit on a plane 
that is superior to reality, and so creates a gulf between man and the world” (66). This radical 
division of man and world is at the heart of what Levinas will go on to denounce as “the Germanic 
ideal of man” which is the necessary framework of Hitlerism’s false promise of sincerity and 
authenticity (70). Levinas’s denunciation of this degenerate Germanic ideal is undertaken in the 
name of defending civilization itself. He notes that under the spell of this degenerate Germanic 
ideal, “Civilization is invaded by everything that is not authentic, by a substitute that is put at the 
service of fashion and of various interests… Such a society loses living contact with its true ideal 
of freedom and accepts degenerate forms of the ideal” (70). 
At the core of the short essay we find a compelling case against not only the politics and 
philosophy of Hitlerism, but Levinas’s attempt to describe a conception of the social which 
opposes this degenerate Germanic ideal. Skepticism and nihilism are attributed to this same 
mentality and are seen as the awakening of elementary feelings and “secret nostalgia” within the 
German soul. Levinas would later write, in a 1990 prefatory note to the article, that his interest in 
writing these reflections in 1934 was to oppose the tendency of understanding the rise of 
Hitlerism as some sort of collective madness or anomaly within human reason, but rather to 
expose the “elemental Evil into which we can be led by logic and against which Western 
philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself” (63). Clearly in 1934 Levinas could not have 
anticipated the scale this elemental Evil would reach over the next decade, but his early account 
of Hitlerism already anticipated the way in which the degenerate Germanic ideal necessarily 
undermines “the very humanity of man” (71). The fundamental core of Hitlerian racist ideology 
is not primarily anti-Semitism, but rather a skepticism towards “[a]ny rational assimilation or 
mystical communion between spirits that is not based on a community of blood…” (70). For 
Levinas, the core of racism lies in accepting the principle that “[u]niversality must give way to 
the idea of expansion…” (Levinas 1990, 70) If we are to read Levinas’ work as an attempt to create 
an ethical response to the problem of evil, as suggested by Richard Bernstein (2004), it is important 
to understand that the specific kind of evil that Levinas opposes is exactly what he refers to here 
as the degenerate Germanic ideal. While his earlier work did not elaborate this critique in the 
context of opposition to Heideggerian ontology, there is a clear overlap in the way he views this 
Germanic ideal as the negation of social pluralism and Heidegger’s ontology as the negation of 
metaphysical pluralism. 
Levinas’s article on Hitlerism, which we should remember was written only 19 years after 
Durkheim’s pamphlet on Treitschke, offers both condemnation of the rise of fascism as well as a 
lamentation of liberalism’s failure to resist the pathological Germany mentality. Levinas 
demonstrates a remarkable interest in the political reaction to the fundamental social changes 
which accompany the shift from pre-modern to modern society, or to use Durkheim’s technical 
vocabulary, in the shift from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. Levinas does not 
approach this question as a strictly sociological or political problem, but rather something which 
is pervasive in the philosophical foundations of all modern society. Liberalism and fascism are 
addressed as political movements derived from the modern conception of the human subject, 
which is to say they both seek to understand the human condition strictly in terms of separation, 




or more specifically, in terms of their separateness from one another. Levinas notes: 
The whole philosophical and political thought of modern times tends to place the 
human spirit on a plane that is superior to reality, and so creates a gulf between 
man and the world. It makes it impossible to apply the categories of the physical 
world to the spirituality of reason, and so locates the ultimate foundation of the 
spirit outside the brutal world and the implacable history of concrete existence 
(Levinas 1990, 66). 
For Levinas, Hitlerism signifies a rediscovering of a primal aspect of human existence that he 
calls, in terms that echo Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke, “the secret nostalgia within the 
German soul” and represents “an awakening of elementary feelings [sentiments élémentaires]” 
which “questions the very principles of a civilization” (64). This stirring of primal drives, 
however, is not simply a matter of a return to a more primitive human nature as Freud would 
have it, but rather is itself a product of social forces. Again, it is crucial to understand Levinas’s 
philosophical analysis of Hitlerism in light of his affirmation in the 1990 prefatory note that 
western ontological philosophy has left us unequipped to respond to the barbarism of this 
elemental evil, especially in regards to Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology. 
This interest in “elemental forms”, both in the prefatory note and the original article, 
indicate profound connection to Durkheim at the core of Levinas’s understanding of the political 
sphere. Levinas repeatedly evokes Durkheim’s phraseology in referring to the elementary force 
[force élémentaire] of the simplistic [primaire] philosophy of Hitler, and the way it awakened these 
elementary feelings [sentiments élémentaires] within the German people. The way in which these 
repeated references derive their terminology from Durkheim’s examination of “elementary 
forms” has been extensively explored by Caygill, emphasizing Levinas’s insistence on the 
paganistic religiosity at the core of social life within Germany. Levinas notes: “For these 
elementary feelings harbor a philosophy. They express a soul's principal attitude towards the 
whole of reality and its own destiny. They predetermine or prefigure the meaning of the 
adventure that the soul will face in the world” (64). By returning to the language of Durkheim’s 
social metaphysics which he had encountered prior to studying under Husserl and Heidegger, 
Levinas attempts to pronounce a fundamental conflict of modern society of which Hitlerism is 
merely one instantiation. The philosophy of Hitlerism, he is clear to point out, cannot be reduced 
to the philosophy of Hitlerians alone, but necessarily draws on the entire western philosophical 
tradition leading up to that point. While Levinas required another 30 years to develop his critique 
of ontology in Totality and Infinity, it is clear that he was already engaging at a fundamental level 
with the themes that would go on to motivate his work throughout the rest of his life. 
Conclusion 
One of the defining features of contemporary forms of populism is a distinct attempt to 
appeal to nationalist sentiment. Nationalism, as the antithesis of globalism or universalism, rests 
on a conception of the state as inherently self-contained and isolated from its neighbors in a 
radical way. The most recent rise of authoritarian populism is fundamentally inseparable from 
the constant appeals to national heritage or cultural identity that are declared to be under siege 
by nefarious forces of globalist hegemony. It is unsurprising that this global hegemony is often 
presented in anti-Semitic tones, often focusing specifically on the role of George Soros in global 




politics. This paper has argued that we can understand the dynamics at play in this emergence of 
nationalist identity politics by examining the way this pathology has been diagnosed and 
addressed in the sociological tradition by Durkheim and in the philosophical tradition by 
Levinas. 
Heller’s observation on the difficulty in identifying Orbán as a populist, with which we 
began this investigation, rests on a conception of populism which distances its philosophical 
meaning from its historical manifestations. In illustrating that while Orbán uses nationalistic 
vocabulary and rhetoric, to mobilize hatred against foreigners, Heller remains clearly aware that 
these are traditional methods that authoritarian populists have long used to gain and maintain 
power. But, continuing her analysis, Heller notes that it is difficult even to describe Orbán as 
“right-wing” because his naked pursuit of power is not beholden to any political ideology beyond 
his own ambition and lust for increased power. But this is crucial to understanding the populist 
mechanism at play in the work of an aristocrat like Treitschke, who deploys anti-Semitic 
nationalist rhetoric instrumentally to achieve a particular end, which is increasing the power of 
the State. Levinas’ work helps us understand not only how this rhetoric is deployed in a specific 
attempt to manifest resentment by drawing on the “elementary feelings” of tribalistic 
nationalism, but also how this degenerate mentality is deeply rooted within western philosophy 
itself. 
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke, at least for the 
context of contemporary questions of populism, is the necessary union of social solidarity and 
consequent political forms of exclusionary nationalism. To be clear, Durkheim’s interest in 
Treitschke is not limited to a strictly political conception of the State, but rather addresses the 
interplay between social hegemony and the concrete political incarnation of this phenomenon as 
the unrestrained sovereignty of nationalism. While it might be tempting to exclude this social 
order and draw a direct connection between the State’s lust for power and the fascist movements 
of the twentieth century, that would necessarily risk ignoring work of nationalists like Treitschke 
whose work predates fascism by decades. This is precisely why Durkheim’s sociological analysis 
of pre-fascist nationalism is so vital to the current historical moment as contemporary populist 
movements demand their disparate nation-states abandon international accords and reject all 
forms of solidarity other than “blood and soil.”        
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analyst at Political Research Associates (PRA), a non-profit think tank in the United States that 
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Despite a lack of a college degree, Berlet has served on the advisory board of the Journal of 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions (now Politics, Religion & Ideology); and the 
advisory board for the Center of Millennial Studies at Boston University. He also served for over 
twenty years on the board of predecessor groups of what is now the Defending Dissent Foundation. 
He is active in the American Sociological Association in the sections on Collective Behavior and 
Social Movements and Marxism. Berlet’s main website is at http://www.researchforprogress.us/. 
 
Chip, could you talk a bit about how you found yourself interested in activism? How did you come to 
involve yourself with this type of work? 
CB: I started out really wanting to be a sociologist and a journalist. It was my hope when I entered 
college at the University of Denver that I was going to be a journalist and use sociology to report 
on social movements. When I was in school, I took a position on the school newspaper, which 
pulled me out of classes probably more than my professors would have liked. While the balance 
between the appreciation of sociology and journalism was a conflict, I really enjoyed reading 
sociology and being in sociology courses. I was one of the people promoting student strikes with 
the school newspaper, the Denver Clarion. It was messy looking back. I ended up still hanging 
onto the sociology/mass media major, but I found myself getting more and more involved with 
the national radical student press, called College Press Services, based in Washington D.C. Some 
of us in Denver were interested in helping it from going under.  
 





I tried to stay in sociology, but I also felt compelled to continue with my activist work. 
The final nail was when I took a class, the Black Experience in America, taught by Dean John Rice. 
This reframed my understanding of activism during this period, especially when [Rice] brought 
in guest speakers to speak on issues related to black civil rights. He was a veteran of the Korean 
War and came to speak about his indictment of American warfare. In the speech by Rice, there 
was a line that I will never forget—"What are you going to tell your children when they ask what 
you did to stop this immoral war?” This blew me away. My brother is fighting in Vietnam, and 
he knows what I am doing as a peace activist. But as student editor for the school newspaper, I 
felt like I had to do something more. Then, an instructor in the Speech Department turned in his 
Korean War medals, writing in a letter that he no longer valued them.  So, I dropped out of school, 
but I stayed in touch with Dean Rice, especially since [Rice] loved my work with the student 
newspaper. So at least with some folks, I left on good terms. Dean Rice, I can say, had a significant 
impact on my life even though I did not continue at the University of Denver. Both Dean Rice 
and Chancellor Maurice Mitchell later wrote me letters urging me to return to finish my degree. 
Can you go into detail on how you got involved in studying the far-right? When did you first encounter 
these groups during your reporting? 
CB: [After I left the University of Denver] I entered the world of alternative journalism. I kept 
reading sociology, as well as some political science. I moved to Washington to be the Washington 
correspondent for College Press Service. I moved into a small apartment with three other people 
that were all Washington correspondents for some obscure and penniless news outlet or another.  
So, I began to do some writing about far-right movements that were in the area. There 
was a Nazi group that had their headquarters in the area, and I decided to confront them. They 
were the sort that very much enjoyed putting on the uniforms and marching on members of the 
mixed-race community, getting them [beaten up], and then going back home to celebrate their 
manhood. I thought this was pretty pathetic, but I wanted to investigate further.  
At the same time, there was a group called the National Caucus of Labor Committees that 
was bothering these far-right people. Counter Spy magazine sent a group of writers down to 
investigate for a story. They were interested in calling this group the new Brown shirts of the 
1970s. They did not want to say that this group was openly fascist, but they were going around 
and beating up leftists. So Counter Spy wanted to find someone to look into this group, and they 
chose me. They were worried of being sued if they were not using the term “brown shirts” fairly. 
So, I said that I knew someone that could help answer this. I contacted Gabriella Simon-
Edgecombe, a poet and Holocaust survivor, who worked as an academic activist. I knew she had 
a large knowledge of the Nazi movement during the early stages of Germany. So, I asked her if 
she could help me work on this story, and she said that I had to let her tutor me. She had books 
on the early Nazi movement, and she assigned things for me to read, including books in English 
and books in German written in Germany during that time. We did a significant amount of 
excavation into the history of the Nazi party to learn about the historical origins of these 
movements. I eventually went back to Counter Spy and said that I, as well as Gabriella Simon-
Edgecombe, would be happy to call these people the brown shirts of the 70s. We felt that we 
 





would be able to put together a pretty good defense, even if we could have been sued to oblivion 
[laughs]! It was after that event that I became known as an intellectual for the activist left. 
 
How did you put this information to use? Can you talk a little about your early work investigating right-
wing groups? 
CB: I began working with people that did undercover work within right-wing groups. There were 
lawyers, private eyes, and other investigators. We were trying to unravel how the FBI was 
tracking some of these right-wing groups, as well as why the FBI thought it was worth their time, 
outside of the obvious overlap with the John Birch Society. Some of their files were appearing in 
the congressional record, so I began working on this to unravel the undercover operations within 
right-wing groups. Together with another group of people around the country, we were able to 
crack this right-wing spy network that was working with the FBI and working through the John 
Birch Society. There was an information flow that was going from the Birch Society to undercover 
right-wing agents, the Church League of America, and other evangelical groups. We discovered 
that there was this whole network and that these groups were connected to a spy network in San 
Francisco, so it just kept unraveling.   
So, my wife and I decided to move to Chicago, Illinois. There we decided to buy a house 
in an integrating neighborhood. It was a predominantly white working-class neighborhood with 
a few black neighbors, but most had been chased out by those in the area. This was the 
neighborhood where Martin Luther King led an open housing march and had something [thrown 
by right-wing protestors] bounce off his head. This was a famous neighborhood that was 
determined to stay all-white, but we moved in, bought a house, and began working with an 
existing anti-racist, multiracial community organization. The goal of the Southwest Community 
Congress was to prevent attacks against black people moving into the neighborhood. I had 
stereotypes about how all of this worked from following social movements and right-wing 
movements, like how people in the community related to [neo-Nazis]. So, we began organizing, 
and for the first three years we were completely outorganized by Nazis in uniform, and it was 
embarrassing. We just were not getting any leverage, and it became frustrating. We knew there 
were people in the neighborhood that worked in integrated businesses and jobs, but they would 
come home and work during the weekend to keep black people out. Well it turns out that there 
was an economic aspect to this. These people owned all these bungalows on the southwest side 
of Chicago, and they put all of their investments into them. So, their entire retirement is based 
around selling their house for more than they paid for it, so they can then go fishing in the Ozarks 
(laughs). And everyone was telling them, ‘If the blacks come into the neighborhood then the 
housing prices will go down, and you will not be able to retire after all of these decades of hard 
work.’ This was not a narrative I heard from just ten, fifteen, or twenty people, but everyone who 
was white was familiar with this narrative. So, one of the things the blockbusters did was to sell 
the homes to families they knew would not be able to make the mortgage payments, thus the 
local bank was stuck with all of these mortgages. So, this was a scam that was designed to put 
money in the pockets of real estate developers. They would sell a house two to three times the 
 





rate to a black family than they would a white family, watch that family fail, and then be happy 
knowing that the black family would have to go back to a black neighborhood.  
Sociologically, this came as a major shock to me. I had no idea this dynamic was going on. 
But more importantly, these white people in the neighborhood also did not like the Nazis. As a 
multiethnic neighborhood, plenty of them were disgusted with the Nazis that came through in 
the area. Many of them came from nations in Europe that were run by Nazi collaborationist 
governments during WWII. 
 
What was one of your earliest examples of organizing in Chicago? 
CB: There was the Southwest Community Congress, which was organized by progressive social 
movement standards, and the Southwest Parish and Neighborhood Federation, organized by 
more left-center groups like the Alinskyists. The Alinskyists and the Southwest Parish and 
Neighborhood federation wanted to create an “ethnic village” with all of these four and five story 
apartments. But they specifically blocked off a road that would keep black people in the area from 
driving through to get to a good grocery store in the area. So, my wife and I ran into some young 
people that were trying to advertise the ethnic village to us. We confronted them and asked if 
black, Mexican, or middle eastern families were allowed in the ethnic village. And it became 
obvious to us that this “ethnic village” was only designed to be “ethnic” enough to include 
versions of white ethnicities, such as Latvian, Lithuanian, and German.  
A friend of mine, Curt Koehler, decided that we should endorse the ethnic village. We 
thought we should endorse it with a press conference with a black woman who owned a sewing 
store, a Mexican butcher shop owner, and a Middle Eastern restaurant owner. Anyway, these are 
not white people in the eyes of our neighbors. And so, we staged this event, and the press comes, 
and some people from the Southwest Parish and Neighborhood Federation came, because they 
had to. And this woman gets up—this black African-American intellectual—and announces it is 
so important in America to have a respect for different ethnicities and to have them tell you their 
stories. And she introduced these three people, and each one is in on it, and they come up on 
stage and say things like, “I came here to get my family into a place where we can make a living,” 
and one of them—a black speaker—says “the only store I could find that really had what I needed 
was here, just a block from Western Avenue and the patrons have been wonderful.” And two 
weeks later there is no “ethnic village.” It is gone. It evaporates, there is no statement, it is gone. 
So that’s good organizing! 
 
In your past, whether in your work as a journalist or as a scholar, were there experiences with subjects or 
interviewees that really stand out? 
CB: A guy pulling a gun on me was very memorable. I thought it was a “manhood” test, which I 
did not want to fail… He was someone I had met because I was writing about the militia 
movement, and he was in the militia movement. He knew that I am writing about them, and it 
got back to me that in a bar somewhere he threatened to kill me. 
 





Later, the leader of the New Hampshire militia movement and I are on a television 
program together, and in our conversation, I happen to say, “one of your guys threatened to kill 
me in a bar!” And he says, “Ah, he does that every week!” I go, “really?” He says, “yeah. I will 
set you up with a meeting. He’ll apologize.” And he set up the meeting and they gave me a militia 
hat. 
  I met another man who was the leader of the militia movement in New Hampshire a 
couple of times, and he introduced me to one of his militia members who had threatened me in 
public. The man apologized and said he threatened to kill people all the time when he was in 
taverns. I interviewed him a couple of times, and I wrote about him in the book Right-Wing 
Populism in America. And I talked about him critically, but, I thought, fairly. Journalism being 
what it is, I thought I now have an obligation to tell him that I am going to put this in print. 
Because he is going to be hurt. He knows who I am, but he will still be hurt. So, I make an 
appointment to go up and have lunch with him in [Dartmouth] New Hampshire. And at the 
lunch he is all nice, saying, “we’re going to have to agree to disagree. But I have some stuff back 
at the house I want to show you.” Well, stupid me. I have been trained by these private eye 
women who say, “never do that!” All these shows where people walk alone into a warehouse. 
“Never do that!” So, I go back to his house, we go upstairs, and he is sitting at his desk and I am 
on the other side of the desk. And we are talking, and he says, “I have thousands of pages of files 
on you as an agent of a Jewish group. You can’t fool me anymore.” And then he begins to rail at 
me, and he opens his desk drawer, and then he puts a handgun on the desk in between us. What 
do I do now? I thought, okay. First thing: do not reach for the gun. He will be faster. Second thing: 
do not provoke him. Talk slowly, calmly. I say, “I’m not really who you seem to think I am, but 
that’s a great gun.” So, I get him diverted by talking about the gun and how it is small but 
powerful and well-made, and he seems to forget that he wants to off me. I get up, and I walk out. 
He unfortunately never paid income tax and is now in prison for many years. 
  I always felt bad. If you really believe there is a conspiracy against America, what is your 
obligation as a citizen? These people think they are on to this conspiracy, and now President 
Trump tells them that it is real. It cannot get worse than that. And that is why I am so worried 
about what could happen. 
In 2015, I interviewed Professor Paul Bookbinder, who studies the German Weimar 
period. I interview him, and I think he’s going to say there are some vague parallels between the 
United States now and Weimar Germany, but I get him on the phone and he says, “things are 
really bad here—there’s a crisis! I’m so glad you called!” 
  That ruined my whole week. I wanted him to be the guy who says, ‘well, there are some 
similarities….’ But no. He says that the United States in 2019 is so similar to the German Weimar 
period it’s scary. He says, “I’m glad you’re writing about it, and I hope we get through this.” That 
was not what I wanted to hear at all. 
  So that is what I have been doing. Running around, telling people that there is some really 
good social science that says things are much worse than the Democrats or the Republicans want 
to say. And what the Democrats are saying is so not based on social science. It is just demonizing 
an other. I know Richard Hofstadter did some great social science work, but these people in right 
 





wing movements—whom I have interviewed hundreds of—are not stupid, and they are not 
crazy. They are well-meaning people who believe a narrative. A narrative that they think requires 
them to act in certain ways. And, yes, it is white nationalism, and, yes, it is anti-Semitism. But 
that is not all it is. And this is what Arlie Hochschild wrote about in Strangers in Their Own Land—
these are people who feel they’ve been disrespected on a massive scale, who thought they did 
everything they had to do for the America dream—they worked hard, raised kids, went to church, 
and thought they would go retire to go fishing in the Ozarks. But it is not going to happen. Their 
kids will not be able to go to college, they will be lucky if they can save their house, and some 
have already lost it. So, of course, they are pissed off. Who in American culture, history, or society 
can they blame?—black people, gay people, immigrants, Mexicans, Muslims. It is the other. The 
Democrats do not understand that they could reach these people if they would stop saying that 
they are stupid or crazy, and instead started talking about jobs. These are not disposable people. 
They can change their minds if they have a good organizer talking to them. There are alternatives 
to a collapse. But neither political party wants it. 
It sounds like there is something hopeful in that theory you described just now, as opposed to the idea that 
people who buy into these extremist ideas are deluded or ignorant or whatever else. If people are ultimately 
rational, feeling human beings who have bought into a narrative, then there is hope for a successful 
counternarrative. Could you talk more about how we could work to reach across the aisle, so to speak, and 
talk with people in a way that would, hopefully, transform their views to something more positive? 
CB: You can do it on a small level, in a community, a workplace, a church. There are small, defined 
places where a skilled person can go in and acknowledge their pain, which is real, but say that 
their solution currently is not going to work. But there is a way they can find a solution that will 
make them feel better about themselves [and their problems]. It could be religious or secular. 
There are all kinds of community leaders who can talk to people and say, “We can’t let this 
community be torn apart.” The biggest impediment to turning this around is the Democratic 
party, under their current leadership. They are surrounded by people who cite Hofstadter and 
treat these people like dirt. I used to go on MSNBC, but now I will not go on there anymore. They 
are part of the problem. Nor have they asked me since I started saying they are! The system is so 
broken that the democratic party is part of the problem and the liberal national media is, too.  
I find allies in conservative evangelicals who say, “My flock is going down the tubes 
financially, and I cannot pull them away from this blame game. I need to find a way to talk to 
them.” I know religious people, union leaders, scholars, activists, all of whom have been able to 
reach into small settings and turn these problems around over time. But there is no magic fix. You 
have to be a part of a community to change it: if you’re going to work with a church, you have to 
join the church; if you’re going to work with a union, you have to be in the union; if you’re going 
to organize in an industry, you have to work in that industry. You have to have skin in the game. 
This is especially important in dealing with racism and antisemitism.  
Another thing is to call people out, or to own your mistake if you are called out. Legendary 
Civil Rights activist Ruby Sales keeps me in line. For example, if I say on Facebook, “Trump is 
having a childish temper tantrum,” she will respond, “Chip, you know that’s just not true. He is 
a full-grown man who is using his power to crush us. So don’t you go calling him a child.” I will 
 





think, “Wow, she’s right.” I always respond to these criticisms publicly. I’ll say, “I hadn’t thought 
about that. It was a bad use of terms. You are right. Sorry.” For me that is a teaching moment, to 
say to people, “No. You get called out for making a mistake. Own it.” That is how I continue to 
grow. People on my Facebook page, no matter what identity they have, will challenge me based 
on their knowledge of their own selves and say, “I don’t agree with that.”  
Of course, we have a rule on my Facebook page that if you are impolite you get thrown 
off after three times that you degrade somebody on any level. You are out, and you do not come 
back. The discourse is really powerful. There are a lot of different people who interact on that 
page. As long as I keep throwing off people who are rude, it works. Of course, I go back and 
delete any rude things. 
 
It sounds like that aspect of hopefulness is very community-focused, intersectional. 
CB: It has to be! It has to be, by nature. If you go to do work in a community, no one gets left 
behind. If you’re in a white community organizing so black people can live there, and someone 
says something antisemitic, you point out, “You know, in our organization, there are a lot of Jews 
that have been working really hard on this project.” You do not have to be a genius just to stare 
at someone and say, “That was over the edge.” However, that kind of criticism requires the 
distance of having made many mistakes in the past. 
  
Right, it is not antagonistically calling people out, but letting them know that what they have said is highly 
inappropriate and offensive. 
CB: For me, anyways, if you want my respect, then you cannot say those kinds of things—you 
have lost my respect at that point.  
During an organizing effort in Oregon, Loretta Ross, Suzanne Farr, and I developed a list 
of things to do when you go into a state. Do not build a narrative that is going to put another 
group at risk. It was really an operational strategy for organizers of intersectionality. You do not 
do any campaign that does not look at who is on the ground there, and you hold them in your 
hands. You are to respect them, but you hold them in your hands—this is very rural kind of talk, 
right?—you don’t let them drop. It is that simple, and it works. There were multiple, very 
complex coalitions that were built after that to stop some of these problems. A lot of people who 
were at that meeting went on to major positions in foundations and professional organizations, 
because they understood that intersectionality is not a tactic—it is a necessity.  
 
Do you feel that more scholars need to be more involved with the methodologies of journalists and activists? 
You are talking a lot about this discrepancy between the top and the bottom—do you think there is a more 
effective way of approaching academic work? 
CB: Go back to Street Corner Society, one of the foundational books about looking at small 
communities—there are all of these books by scholars who went into a community and merged 
into it as observers, but who were eventually welcomed as a part of that community. Rafael 
Ezequiel—The Racist Mind—studies racist skinheads in Boston. He starts out just sitting there 
 





until someone asks, “What are you doing here?” He says, “Well, I’m a scholar. I’m working for a 
health study of what it’s like to be on the street in the group you’re in, how you survive, and get 
through this and that.” And they say, “Ah, fuck off.” But, little by little, they become part of the 
community. All good street-level sociologists become a part of the community, but, of course, 
knowing that they are not integral to it. Still, they become part of the communal furniture!—and 
eventually, because they treat the community with respect, which a lot of these marginal 
communities long for, they begin to talk to them, and at some point, there are honest 
conversations between a scholar and the person being studied. Everyone knows what the 
dynamic is, that this is a scholar, a person who studies XYZ, but they feel that the scholar has 
granted them the opportunity to say what they think and not be judged badly, that their persona, 
ideas, presentation of self in everyday society are acknowledged as being important to them—
and the scholar recognizes that and records it.  
I have had that experience repeatedly, talking to people who know fully who I am. I can 
call up leaders in various extreme, right, racist, antisemitic movements and check a quote with 
them on the phone or over the internet. They’ll say something like, “Chip, you fucking commie!” 
I will say, “Look, I need to know this.” They will say, “Okay, well, this is what I think.”  
One good example, Art Jones, strategist for the Nazis, and I, a strategist for the anti-Nazis, 
got to know each other. One time, we were both at a demonstration, which completely fell apart. 
I got run over by mounted cops saving a group of Communists from 500 screaming white youth 
at one of these rallies in Market Park. I got run over. I am a city boy. I am there with my Nikon, 
waiting to get the best picture, and a horse rump twists me around on my knee. There was a very 
loud sound. I no longer can walk. So this Communist group I know comes over and says, “You 
look like you’re in bad shape. We’ll drive you over to your car,” which they did. So later, I’m in 
this knee cast, and both Art Jones and I were standing in line for a program with several leaders 
of White Nationalist and neo-Fascist and neo-Nazi groups. We had been invited on an Oprah 
Winfrey show about white supremacists in the Midwest, and I’m an audience plant. On the stage 
are all these people I have organized against, some of whom know me. I certainly know them. As 
we are waiting to go in, Art Jones sidles up to me, and I know he is not a threat. He looks at me 
and says, “Chip, what happened?” I say, “Oh, you remember that demonstration we were at, I 
had my camera up, and a horse rump hit me and twisted me around, and I’ve been in a cast for 
months.” He says, very seriously, “Chip, how’s the horse?” How can I not laugh? It was so 
deadpan! I know he is a Nazi, but it was funny! What can I tell you? He is a funny guy. 
 
As you think about your long career as an organizer, why do you do what you do? As in, do you enjoy 
working with these extremist individuals? What gets you up in the morning when you are working with 
such upsetting ideas? I imagine it can be depressing, bring you down. Do you see yourself stopping any 
time soon? 
CB: Yeah, I will probably die at some point! But I do not think I am going to stop any time. I find 
it much too interesting. I keep getting asked to write things. I get up in the morning and I think, 
“I can do a little bit to make the world a better place by treating everyone as having a basic 
humanity, and it is my skill level that will determine whether or not I can move them an inch 
 





toward human rights.” I have moved some people really far toward human rights. But I think 
my greatest efforts have been in communities to help people learn how to create a peaceful 
environment even in a group of people who will never get along.  
Can you reach a kind of peace treaty in the neighborhood? Is there a way to explain to 
people that they are never going to get everything they want? That they are right that the 
American government has treated them badly, but their solution is not going to help? I think it 
helps to be someone who can say, “Yes, you’ve been screwed. But other people have been, too. 
So why would you turn on them?” It is partly that I am a Christian. I think we are put on this 
planet to do good. I have found a way to do good, and that satisfies me as an intellectual, a scholar, 
a journalist, an activist, but also as a person. I think I’ve done some good, and I hope I can do 
some more good. And I will still say I know a Nazi who can crack me up with a good joke. That 
does not mean I think he is doing good stuff. I just recognize that, somewhere in him, is a spark 
that can tell a funny joke. That means that someday, maybe someone will reach him. 
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Nationalpopulism, Right and Left: The Social-National 
Synthesis Today. 
Daniel Rueda, King’s College London 
For most of the postwar period the idea of merging socialist (or popular) and nationalist 
elements was marginal in Europe. But in the last two decades we have been witnessing a new 
form of social-national synthesis: nationalpopulism. This article examines this resurgence by 
comparing right-wing nationalpopulism and left-wing nationalpopulism. In order to do so, it 
focuses on four European countries: France, Italy, Greece and Spain. While there are both policy 
and discursive similarities between these two forms of nationalpopulism, this article argues that 
they are fundamentally different and belong to antagonistic ideological factions. Keywords: 
populism, nationalism, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Syriza, Podemos. 
 
Introduction 
‘Populism’ is undoubtedly one of today’s most disputed political terms. The 
proliferation of literature on the topic has led to a semantic inflation that threatens the 
possibility of reaching an operative definition. Its overuse in the mass media, as well as the 
fact that it is generally employed in an illocutionary, rather than descriptive, way only adds 
to the problem. Moreover, the different forms of populism are often mistaken for one another, 
causing a problematic assumption of homogeneity. 
This paper does not intend to contribute to the blossoming literature on generic 
populism. It will instead examine a variant of populism, nationalpopulism, in its two main 
forms, by focusing on the European context. Analyzing the differences between right-wing 
nationalpopulism (RWNP) and left-wing nationalpopulism (LWNP) requires a concrete 
framework, one that allows an understanding of these phenomena in depth instead of simply 
analyzing their surface features. In order to conduct such examination, this work will employ 
the theory of populism developed by the Essex School of Discourse Analysis (ESDA) in the 
last four decades. 
Populism will thus be understood as “a way of constructing the political” (Laclau 
2005), rather than as a political style (Moffitt 2016), a thin-centered ideology (Stanley 2008; 
Mudde 2014) or a political tactic (Weyland 2001). In order to examine the different faces of 
nationalpopulism, this work will thus go beyond ideational and functionalist approaches by 
engaging in a discourse analysis as understood by David Howarth (2013) and other members 
of the ESDA. Of course, the commitment to associate nationalism and left-wing, or social 
demands, is far from being a historical novelty. What is here referred to as the first social-
national synthesis took place between the end of the nineteenth century and the second half 
of the twentieth century, when both left-wing and right-wing forces sought either to use the 




power of nationalism for social purposes or to add social and popular elements to their 
nationalist projects (Sternhell 1994, 6). What we have been witnessing in the last two decades, 
in a context of neoliberal globalization, is the emergence of a second social-national synthesis 
in Europe, although this time in the form of an amalgamation of post-1945 nationalism with a 
non-revolutionary type of populism. 
Nationalpopulist discourses will be considered as contemporary phenomena, rather 
than as the return of any concrete political tendency. Yet referring to past attempts to creating 
a social-national or popular-national synthesis can be valuable. This paper will regard them 
as proof of a recurrent practice within modern societies that now takes new historical forms. 
Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès or Enrico Corradini therefore play the same role here that Joseph de 
Maistre could have in an essay on fascism or François-Noël Babeuf in an account of 
communism, that is, not as part of the object of study but as historical precedents that can help 
us to understand it. 
Both RWNP and LWNP are here considered forms of nationalism. It is certainly not 
the first time that nationalism emerges as a product of the hybridization between national 
consciousness and a concrete political tendency (Álvarez Junco 2017). After all, nationalism 
has been combined with ideals of liberty against absolute monarchs both in America and 
Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as the democratic struggles 
during the 1848 revolutions, with reactionary and imperialist goals between the nineteenth 
century and the fascist era, with socialism in the USSR under Stalin’s regime, as well as in 
Cuba, Yugoslavia, and China, with anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa, and with 
religious affiliations in countries like Iran and Israel. This is why Anthony D. Smith describes 
nationalism as a movement “with chameleon-like adaptability” (Smith 1998, 44). 
This paper is divided in two sections following the section on methodological 
clarifications. The first explores RWNP by analyzing a series of contemporary political 
discourses. It will mainly focus on two European countries that have been witness to the rise 
of right-wing populist parties in the last decade: Italy and France. The second part examines 
LWNP by focusing on two European nations which are at the origin of the two most successful 
left-wing populist parties of the continent: Spain and Greece. This case selection allows for an 
exploration of the differences between the two forms of European nationalpopulism in 
heterogeneous contexts. 
Methodology: the Essex School of Discourse Analysis 
This article employs the theory of populism formulated by the Essex School of 
Discourse Analysis since the eighties as its framework. Its key constituents are Ernesto Laclau 
(the author of On Populist Reason), Chantal Mouffe (co-author of Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy), David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, Yannis Stavrakakis (editors of Discourse Theory and 
Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change) and Jason Glynos (co-author of Logics 
of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory). 
Their framework questions the division between linguistic and extralinguistic realities by 
formulating a notion of ‘discourse’ influenced both by post-structuralist authors such as 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and by linguistic pragmatists such as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105-108). It starts from the premise 
that “every object is constituted as an object of discourse,” which in no case implies 
questioning the existence of social or material reality (108-110). It is thus a rejection of 
epistemological formalism that emphasizes the importance of political and social aspects of 




the production of knowledge. 
Using this theoretical frame, Ernesto Laclau analyzed the way collective political 
identities are formed in his seminal work On Populist Reason (2005). He did so through an 
examination of populism, a way of constructing the political that he, as an Argentinean who 
witnessed the rise and fall of Peronism, knew well. According to Laclau, the unit of analysis 
when scrutinizing political groups should not be the class or the individual, but rather the 
different demands which, once articulated, compose a collective identity (Laclau 2005, IX). 
The process of articulation is defined as ‘‘any practice establishing a relationship among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985, 105). Laclau designates two types of demands: democratic and popular. 
Democratic demands are those which remain isolated, while popular demands are those 
which are part of a populist formation (Laclau 2005, 74). 
The result of the articulatory practices is the emergence of a discursive formation 
(Laclau 2005, 87). Here, Laclau refers to the populist movement or party (but more broadly to 
any political identity) by using a linguistic metaphor, following David Howarth’s definition 
of discourses as “concrete systems of social relations and practices that are intrinsically 
political, as their formation is an act of radical institution which involves the construction of 
antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between insiders and outsiders” (Howarth 
2000, 9). The content of any particular element (for example, a demand, a word, a stance…) 
depends on the discursive formation in which it is inscribed. In other words, the signifiers 
‘our nation’ or ‘the people’ can only be understood as parts of the political structure they are 
part of. This approach avoids the misconception that right-wing and left-wing populist 
movements must be similar since their discourses sometimes semantically overlap. 
The construction of equivalential links between the demands, essential for the 
cohesion of the movement, depends on the production of empty signifiers. This is a concept 
borrowed from Jacques Lacan’s work. Laclau (2005) defines the empty signifier as “a 
particularity embodying an unachievable fullness” (71). In this context, ‘signifier’ is 
understood in its widest sense. It can be a symbol, such as a word, a flag, an icon, or a leader, 
and in any case it will have to be the product of a “radical investment,” which means that 
there will be an important affective relation between ‘the people’ and that empty signifier (97). 
The operation whereby a particularity takes an “incommensurable universal 
connotation” is what Laclau calls ‘hegemony’ (70), an important term with several meanings 
in the history of Marxist thought (Anderson 2017). Therefore, “in a hegemonic relation, one 
particular difference [for example, a national symbol] assumes the representation of a totality 
that exceeds it,” which leads us to the notion of synecdoche, a rhetorical device whereby the 
part of something represents its totality. According to Laclau (2005), the synecdoche “is not 
simply one more rhetorical device, simply to be taxonomically added to other figures such as 
metaphor and metonymy, but has a different ontological function” (72). In populist 
movements ‘the people’, although it logically cannot represent the totality of the population, 
presents itself as the populus, that is, as the entirety of the polity. 
According to this approach, populism will thus be defined as a political movement 
that: 1) articulates heterogeneous unsatisfied demands, thereby creating an original discursive 
formation and a new ‘collective will’; 2) is based on the construction of equivalential links and 
dichotomic frontiers as well as on the universalistic pretension of representing the totality of 
the populus; and, 3) has an antagonistic and metapolitical approach, inasmuch as it seeks to 




question and transform the political landscape, both in terms of who is the hegemon and how 
the political map looks like. 
           Thus, we shall define nationalpopulism as a type of populist movement in which the 
nation acts as the key empty signifier, and in which hegemony is achieved thanks to a 
nationalist stance which serves as a bonding agent for several, heterogeneous demands. 
Nationalpopulism stems from a fusion of popular and national elements and sees the ‘national 
people’ as the main political actor, a collective identity threatened by its generally foreign 
antagonists and linked thanks to national symbols and common historical traits. 
Inasmuch as nationalpopulism promotes “a sentiment or consciousness of belonging 
to the nation” and it can be considered as “a social and political movement on behalf of the 
nation,” it can be defined as a form of nationalism according to Anthony D. Smith’s classical 
characterization (Smith 2001, 5). It also fits Alberto Martinelli’s definition of nationalism as an 
ideology that “fosters specific collective movements and policies promoting the sovereignty, 
unity, and autonomy of the people gathered in a single territory” (Martinelli 2018, 14). 
Right-wing Nationalpopulism: the Plebeian Nation 
This section seeks to dispel the myth that right-wing nationalism has always been 
either related to socially conservative stances, or simply indifferent to any kind of social 
policy. This perception is probably linked to the idea that nationalism is an ‘outward-looking’ 
ideology concerned with international affairs rather than with public policies, but also to a 
general lack of knowledge about the several historical attempts by right-wing nationalist 
movements to integrate social, economically illiberal concerns. 
The most important examples of this social-national synthesis can be found in France, 
Germany, and Italy during the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
century. In 1898 Maurice Barrès, a French novelist and politician, coined the term ‘national-
socialism’ and called to fight against an alleged political alliance between the Jewish people, 
bankers, leftists, Germans, liberals, and cosmopolitans of any kind. Barrès was a fierce 
supporter of Boulangism, a movement with both nationalist, revolutionary, populist and 
Jacobin roots (Sternhell 1973, 1). A decade later, Oswald Spengler—one of the main exponents 
of the Konservative Revolution—published “Prussianism and Socialism,” in which he offered 
his idea of socialism as “a way of life” inseparable from authoritarianism, communitarianism, 
and nationalism (Spengler 1908, 32). Around the same time, one of the most influential 
thinkers of Nazism, although not a Nazi himself, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, defended his 
idea of a “German socialism” based on social corporatism and revolutionary conservatism 
(O’Sullivan 1983, 144-147). 
In terms of political praxis, Charles Maurras, the leader of radical right party Action 
Française, was one of the most ardent proponents of “embracing socialism after extricating it 
from its cosmopolitan and democratic elements” (Sternhell 1994, 119). In Germany, a worker-
based branch of Nazism called Strasserism, along with the hybrid movement of the National-
Bolsheviks created by the former socialist militant Ernst Niekisch were the most prominent  
expressions of the national-social blend during the interwar period. 
But the climax of the social-national synthesis took place in Italy during and after the 
Great War (1914-1918). As Massulli (2014) explains, the Italian revolutionary syndicalists had 
an enormous influence in the advent of fascism. Both nationalists (such as Gabriele 
d’Annunzio and Enrico Corradini) and former socialists (such as Michele Bianchi and Benito 
Mussolini) understood the necessity of somehow associating both worldviews. The Italian 




socialist Arturo Labriola argued in 1910 that there were two types of nationalism: the 
nationalism of the workers—popular and equalitarian—and the nationalism of the elites— 
dishonest and imperialist (Sternhell 1994, 250). In the aftermath of the war the fasci di 
combattimento and Associazione Nazionale Italiana, the embryos of the Partito Nazionale 
Fascista (1921), were the main proponents of this form of national socialism whereby the ethnos 
is a plebeian political subject opposed to unpatriotic elites. 
Apart from Alceste de Ambris, the majority of Italian revolutionary syndicalists 
(Agostino Lanzillo, Angelo Olivetti, Sergio Panunzio, Alfredo Rocco among others) reached 
important positions within the fascist regime by promoting a plebeian, social and 
revolutionary variety of nationalism that had also succeeded on the other side of the Alps, 
although by taking a different form. The core idea running through this ideological 
articulation can be summed up by Ramiro Ledesma’s famous statement (today surprisingly 
parroted by the Spanish far-right party Vox): “Only the rich can permit themselves the luxury 
of not having a homeland” (Jones 2019). There are thus two key elements: the articulation of 
the social and the national and the idea that the motherland is a protection against anti-social 
and alien disruptive forces. 
This historical period, from the late nineteenth century to 1945, ‘the first social-national 
synthesis’ ended up calamitously with the defeat of the Axis in 1945. It is not until the last 
decade (with the exception of the surprisingly popular Movimento Sociale Italiano) that we 
can find a serious attempt to articulate social and nationalist stances from the right in Europe. 
Instead of a corporatist, revolutionary nationalist, or national-syndicalist force, it has emerged 
as right-wing national populism (RWNP). 
Here again it is necessary to start in France. In 2012 the Front National (rebranded as 
Rassemblement National in 2018) became a party that rejected the left-right classification and 
promoted a distinction between ‘the people’ (sometimes referred to as “the forgotten” who 
“suffer in silence”) and ‘the elites’ (both French, European and global). Both elements were 
part of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s discourse as well, especially during his last years as president of 
the party when he flirted with populist strategies, but the difference is that in his case those 
were rhetorical devices that didn’t represent the ethos of his Front National (Eltchaninoff 
2017). In Marine Le Pen’s genuine populist project, however, the commitment to build a 
dichotomic frontier between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites,’ and the preference for an ambiguous 
discourse that ventures into traditionally liberal and leftist semantic domains, is of paramount 
importance. This nationalpopulist stance, which includes many social elements, was mainly 
envisioned by Florian Philippot, her former right-hand man (Fernández-Vázquez 2019). 
Marine Le Pen often engages in RWNP discourses, and she does so in two ways. First, 
she and her populist party seek to articulate a plurality of democratic demands that are social, 
territorial, and cultural, and which are then presented as national problems from which the 
‘French people’ is suffering. Second, the now popular demands are often deemed to be 
solvable only by confronting an international, rather than national, antagonist. This 
international antagonist has many faces—immigrants, Muslims, ‘global elites,’ European 
bureaucrats and its French allies—but because populist discourses not only create 
equivalences between demands but also between their opponents (that is, ‘the people’ and the 
‘elite’ are both the product of discursive bricolage), the antagonist appears as an alliance 
between different groups with shared interests. The idea at the heart of RWNP discourses is 
that the nation and its people, who are here one and the same, are oppressed by non-national 




actors. Marine Le Pen provided good evidence of this when she accused the then French 
president François Hollande of being “the vice-chancellor of the province of France for 
Germany” and imposing austerity measures that only benefit Berlin (Bogani 2015). 
Italy, probably the most important nation when it comes to social-national syntheses, 
has also witnessed the emergence of RWNP stances. In reality, the social-national position did 
not abruptly end in Italy in 1945, for it was to some extent defended by the neo-fascist 
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) until decades after. But Matteo Salvini’s Lega is far from 
being a fascist movement, unlike the MSI or CasaPound, which are contemporary genuine 
examples of such current (Gentile 2019). After all, it is clear that this former Padanian 
secessionist, who has shifted his party from regionalism to Italian nationalism (and from 4% 
to more than 34% of the vote), has espoused stances that are closer to Marine Le Pen than to 
Giorgio Almirante. 
Although at the moment Salvini seems to have opted for an alliance with other right-
wing forces (mainly Forza Italia and Fratelli d’Italia) due to the incentives derived from the 
architecture of the electoral system of his country, between June 2018 and September 2019 he 
was Minister of the Interior in a coalition government with the Movimento 5 Stelle. It was 
during that period that he adopted a RWNP discourse. In December 2018 he claimed that he 
preferred “a government trusted by the people rather than one trusted by the international 
markets” (Il Fato 2018). The problem of Europe, according to him, is that it is ruled “by the 
finance oligarchy and those who permit mass immigration” (L’US 2019). After the European 
Union rejected the 2018 Italian budget, which sought to introduce a universal basic income 
and lower the retirement age, the so-called “people’s budget,” he urged EU leaders to “respect 
the Italian people” (France24 2018). In October 2019, shortly after the end of the coalition 
government, Salvini said he represented “the people against the elite, the squares against the 
palaces” (popolo contro elite, piazza contro Palazzo) (ReggioSera, 2019). 
 Mirroring his ally Marine Le Pen, Salvini stated in 2018 that the power of banks, the 
EU, austerity, mass immigration and economic precariousness are part of the same ‘regime’: 
“the next elections [the European elections of 2019] are a referendum between the Europe of 
the elites, of banks, of precariousness, of immigration, of austerity and the Europe of the 
people and the workers” (Valenti 2018). Political elites, immigrants (and NGOs), banks, the 
Left, EU bureaucrats… all conspire against ‘the (national) people,’ victims who just want good 
jobs and a sovereign state that can protect them from the dangers of globalization. In a rally 
in Milan with Le Pen and other leaders of the Western European radical right, Salvini cried 
out against “this immigration which has submerged our nations, putting our people at risk” 
(CGTN 2019). 
Those who serve foreign elites are thus ‘traitors against the motherland,’ which is 
exactly what Salvini accused Giuseppe Conte of being, because according to him he used 
Italian money to rescue German and French banks (Salvini 2019). It is important to highlight 
that the problem does not consist in using taxpayer’s money to rescue a bank, but to do so to 
rescue a non-Italian bank. It is interesting to note that this nationalist momentum has prepared 
the ground for the emergence of LWNP forces as well, such as Patria e Constituzione or VOX 
Italia (created by the self-declared Marxist thinker Diego Fusaro). 
Salvini and Le Pen claim to confront both mass immigration, Islamism, and the 
economic and political elites. This is why the idea of RWNP as a discourse that focuses on the 
construction of vertical frontiers instead of horizontal, ‘people versus elites,’ held by 




Hameleers (2018, 6) and by Gilles Gressani (2019, 77) is a misconception. If anything, it could 
be said that it promotes a diagonal frontier, including both ‘the establishment’ and non-
nationals, who are somehow part of the same group of interest (this is why the conspiracy 
theory of le grand remplacement, formulated by Rénaud Camus, is so appealing for RWNP 
militants). The idea that there is an alliance between the economic and political elites and 
ethnic minorities might seem extravagant, but it is certainly not an innovative view in the 
history of the radical right (Hanebrink 2018; Baker 2006). 
Therefore, the basic idea is that ‘the people’ has been left behind and its social and 
cultural demands are not satisfied by a political system that would rather serve the interests 
of immigrants, Muslims, and foreign elites. This inevitably reminds us of nationalist or far-
right movements. Yet RWNP is different from these at least in two ways. First of all, it is not 
just a reactive and xenophobic movement, and contrary to other radical right forces, neither 
Rassemblement National nor La Lega are niche parties. As a populist movement, RWNP 
formulates “a certain historical horizon” (Laclau 2005, 116), that is, it presents a socio-political 
alternative and promises to bring a new state of things into existence. And secondly, it links 
popular discontent not only with an ‘unpatriotic elite’ (co-opted by foreign actors) but also 
with the need of reinforcing or at least defending the social assistance that was built during 
the trente glorieuses, thereby fueling the so-called Welfare chauvinism (Ennser-Jedenastik 
2017). 
RWNP is certainly popular and plebeian but, so to speak, in a völkisch way. It offers a 
vision of its country as an underdog in the international arena while including social concerns, 
which inevitably reminds us of Enrico Corradini’s idea of Italy being a “proletarian nation” 
both morally and materially (Corner 2012). It bases its vision on the idea that both 
international relations and the distribution of social resources are highly competitive, and that 
the nation and its people must be protected from such a hostile world. This had led politicians 
like Salvini or Le Pen to subscribe to realist positions, flirting both with China and Russia 
while at the same time acknowledging the economic importance of the EU (Lafont 2017). 
Today’s proponents of the right-wing social-national synthesis are inspired by 
economists such as Maurice Allais (a fierce critic of globalization and ‘the free-trade 
ideology’), Bruno Lemaire and Louis Alliot (who consider that sovereignty and social 
expenditure are interconnected), and Bernard Monot (who praises state intervention and 
seeks to find a third way between liberalism and anticapitalism). In Italy, Alberto Bagnai (who 
defines himself as a Eurosceptic post-Keynesian left-wing populist despite being La Lega’s 
main economist) claims that only the nation-state can guarantee social dignity to workers 
(Petti 2013). Bagnai declared himself nationalist, populist, and socialist (Bagnai, 2013). His 
colleague Claudio Borghi, who shares Bagnai’s hard Euroscepticism, associates monetary 
sovereignty with social well-being (Carli 2018). 
          All of them are critics of the current economic state of affairs and are clearly concerned 
with social welfare. They oppose neoliberal arrangements and the ‘end of politics’, two key 
factors of the emergence of populist forces, as Chantal Mouffe noted (Mouffe 2004, 48). Yet 
their anti-globalization stance must be nuanced: as was the case with interwar fascists 
(Paxton,2004, 10), their rhetoric against the markets, the finance and international treaties is 
always selective. RWNP forces do not pretend to replace the current economic system, but 
rather to reinforce the possibilities of their nations to compete in it. In a highly competitive 
world, only by protecting their economies from immigration and globalization, they think, 




they can also protect ‘their people’. 
Left-wing Nationalpopulism: the Nationalization of the People 
The idea of associating social and nationalist elements as a leftist strategy was much 
less popular than the opposite during the first social-national synthesis. It can be considered 
as a punctual and calculated strategy rather than as a genuine and enduring political 
articulation. For example, in the context of the rise of fascism in Germany the KPD understood 
during a brief period of time the utility of being at the forefront of the national opposition 
against the “imperialist Versailles Treaty” (Moreau, 2018, 161). Leon Trotsky, referring to the 
same country in 1930, encouraged the German proletariat to strategically “put itself at the 
head of the nation as its leader” (Beetham, 2019, 205). 
Yet there are historical examples of left-wing social-national syntheses, especially at 
the beginning of the 20th century, a period marked by a profound crisis of Marxism and the 
resulting frustration of some socialist militants (Sternhell 1994, 15). The French philosopher 
Georges Sorel, author of Réflexions sur la violence (published in 1908), paved the way for the 
idea that the Left had to find new mobilizing myths instead of focusing on rationalist and 
economist discourses. The already mentioned Italian revolutionary syndicalists, deeply 
influenced by Sorel, saw in national consciousness and war mobilization the opportunity to 
appropriate powerful myths and symbols. “The motherland shouldn’t be rejected, but seized” 
(La patria non se contesta, ma se conquista), were the famous words of Edmondo Rossoni, leader 
of the Unione Italiana del Lavoro in 1918, a sentence later repeated by a still socialist Benito 
Mussolini. 
But the post-colonial world was and remains certainly a much more appropriate 
context for this type of social nationalism. In Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the national-
building process took place at the same time as the anti-colonial struggle. It was also impacted 
by Marxism and by Soviet support, both before and after the Second World War (Young 2001, 
161-167). Ernesto Laclau himself took an active part in a LWNP Argentinean party, the Partido 
Socialista de la Izquierda Nacional, during the sixties. Today, in the majority of Latin-
American countries (Bolivia, Argentina and Venezuela are probably the best-known 
examples), it is possible to find left-wing political parties which advocate nationalist positions, 
both against their national adversaries and against Washington. The case of Europe is exactly 
the opposite, inasmuch as since the end of nineteenth century nationalism in this continent 
has conservative, authoritarian and xenophobic connotations (Hobsbawm 1990, 101-107). 
This is why the rise of the Greek party Syriza at the beginning of this decade was such 
a surprising phenomenon. Syriza was created in 2004 as a coalition of different radical left 
groups (with Synaspismos, a Eurocommunist organization, as its major member), but around 
2010 it shifted toward a populist strategy (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). The populist 
turn proved successful; Syriza climbed from 4% of the votes in 2009 to 16% in 2012 and 28% 
in 2015. Alexis Tsipras, the leader of the coalition since 2009, was inspired by the 2010-2012 
anti-austerity movement (the so-called Aganaktisménon- Politón, ‘movement of the outraged’) 
and by the several work-based mobilizations of the period, which included several general 
strikes. He then realized that there was a possibility to articulate a plurality of demands that 
neither PASOK (the socialist party, in government between 2009 and 2011) nor, of course, the 
conservatives could satisfy. Syriza never became a nationalpopulist party, nor can it be 
compared with Salvini’s Lega or Le Pen’s Rassemblement National. However, it did engage 
in LWNP discourses, although only in certain circumstances. It is significant that both during 




the first and the second Tsipras governments (2015-2019), Sryiza’s junior coalition partner was 
Independent Greeks, a Greek nationalist right-wing party. 
This unnatural alliance took place in a context in which austerity and economic crisis 
were associated by many Greeks with foreign interference. After all, the European Union, led 
by Germany, was perceived as the political actor behind the public spending cuts and the 
several tax increases. A wave of Euroscepticism swept through the country, to the point that 
in January 2014 Nigel Farage became highly popular among many anti-austerity Greeks 
(Smith 2014). Still, today Greece maintains a less favorable view of the EU (Pew Research 
Center, 2018) and of Germany (Pew Research Center, 2019). The narrative supported both by 
the German government and by some German media only worsened the situation (Kutter 
2014). Moreover, Greece was continuously discredited by the three main rating agencies 
(Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings), all of them American. 
This was obviously a favorable environment for Greek ultranationalism. The neo- 
fascist party Golden Dawn won 7% of the votes in 2015 and became the country’s third 
political force, whereas the Independent Greeks (Syriza’s partners) won almost the 5%. 
During the strikes and the anti-austerity marches, both European and German flags were 
burned on several occasions. However, Tsipras was always careful not to fall into the trap of 
xenophobic discourses, and Syriza’s relationship with nationalism from 2012 to 2015 is very 
different than that of its far-right partner. Analyzing it will provide us with valuable 
information to understand LWNP. 
First of all, it is important to analyze the role of nationalism and of national 
consciousness in shaping the political identity formed from the links between the different 
social demands. Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014, 10) draw attention to how Tsipras and 
Syriza continuously employed the word ‘people’ in order to identify their supporters and 
create the idea of a homogenous and united group, ready to oppose ‘the establishment.’ Yet it 
is important to note that, at least since the January 2015 Greek legislative election, Tsipras 
started to refer to ‘the people’ as ‘the Greek people,’ ‘our people,’ and ‘our country’. The 
nation, and not the leader or the signifier ‘people,’ became the empty signifier of Syriza’s 
discursive formation. But here the nation is not an ethnic entity, but a popular one. Because 
both RWNP and LWNP discourses employ the signifier ‘the people’ we can be lead to 
confusion, but in Syriza’s case it is clear that he refers to the people as plebs (as a subaltern, 
popular group) and not as ethnos (an ethnic or racial group). Therefore, instead of the nation 
being ‘popularized,’ the people, meaning here the economically subaltern, are ‘nationalized.’ 
And so here the nation and the plebs are one.  
This ephemeral nationalist turn was probably inevitable, since the Greek 
government’s main adversaries were at that moment international, or foreign, actors. A few 
days after Syriza’s victory, Tsipras and other members of his government paid homage to the 
Greek communists who fought against the Nazis during the war. In a moment of increased 
tensions with Angela Merkel’s government, Panos Skourletis, spokesman of Syriza, declared 
that the symbolic act “represents national resistance to occupation, but also the natural desire 
of Greeks for freedom, for liberty from German occupation” (Smith 2015). It is therefore hardly 
surprising that the Syntagma Square was filled with national flags during the June 25, 2015 
referendum, when Greek voters rejected austerity proposals from the country’s creditors. 
Secondly, during this brief period from 2014-2015 the antagonist was no longer the 
national elite or establishment, but foreign powers. Certainly both PASOK and New 




Democracy, the two main parties prior to Syriza’s dramatic ascendancy, were denounced as 
the culprits of the malaise of the people, but the Greek elite were now presented as allies of 
European and German actors. Yanis Varoufakis, the Minister of Finance from January to July 
2015, claimed in August of that same year that “the European leaders” act collusively with 
“Greek oligarchs” in order to allow them “to maintain their stranglehold on Greek society 
while punishing ordinary people” (Inman 2015). The tension between Varoufakis and the 
German government only increased when 2013 footage of him saying that Greece “should 
simply default on its debts and stick the finger to Germany” became viral (The Economist, 
2015). 
Syriza undoubtedly embraced a nationalist discourse that emphasized national-
popular resistance against foreign, and powerful, enemies, with a focus on Germany and, to 
a lesser extent, the European Union. The movement had no problems with making 
problematic historical analogies. Is there really any difference with Salvini’s or Le Pen’s 
approach? In fact, and despite what some media commentators may think, there are at least 
three. First of all, Syriza’s LWNP discourses were always internationalist, or at least 
regionalist. Tsipras and Varoufakis always underlined that their struggle was a European one, 
inasmuch as they genuinely intended to “free Europe” from austerity (Konstantinidis 2015). 
Secondly, Syriza, understanding the importance of the European project beyond its economic 
aspects, was always reluctant to fall into hard Euroscepticism. Its critique of the EU was 
always self-limited and hardly survived the year 2015. Finally, and this might be the key 
difference between European and Latin-American LWNP, Syriza’s nationalist stance was only 
situational and, contrary to RWNP forces, it was never part of the party’s discursive essence. 
Instead of being the product of the union of different pre-existing left-wing parties, the 
Spanish party Podemos was created in 2014 as a self-conscious populist force opposed both 
to the socialists and to the far left. Pablo Iglesias’ party abandoned to some extent its populist 
strategy during the year 2016, when the Spanish political system began to rearticulate and he 
decided to form an alliance with the far-left party Izquierda Unida, thereby changing its name 
to Unidas Podemos (United We Can). Prior to that, Podemos was a very particular example 
of populism, for it consciously operated by using Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s works 
as its strategic guideline (Errejón and Mouffe 2015, 7; Alcántara 2015), so much so that it could 
be described as a ‘Laclauian party’. The main founders of Podemos, including Iglesias, also 
drew inspiration from several Latin-American nationalpopulist movements. This prepared 
the ground for a political force eager to articulate all kind of heterogeneous demands and very 
calculating when it came to language and discourse. Its capacity to transcend the discursive 
milieu from which it comes from (the Spanish Left) is probably only comparable to Marine Le 
Pen’s. 
Podemos’ LWNP momentum overlapped with that of Syriza (2014-2015) with the 
creation of the party in January 2014, although as we shall see, some nationalpopulist elements 
persist today within the party and surface from time to time. Pablo Iglesias and Alexis Tsipras 
were close allies during this period. Iglesias travelled to Athens the day before the Greek 
legislative election and claimed that “the Greeks won’t bow the knee before Germany, they 
don’t want to go back to the past [a reference to the Nazi occupation of Greece], they know 
Tsipras is a lion (sic) that will defend its people despite everything” (Velasco 2015). A few 
months before, he stated that Greece deserved “to have a patriotic president who can protect 
the interests of the people” (Gil 2015). After Syriza’s victory, he basically paraphrased Marine 
Le Pen’s abovementioned remark on François Hollande being Merkel’s vice chancellor by 




saying he was happy that Greece “will have a Greek president and not a representative of 
Merkel” (Carvajal 2015). 
Iglesias, always willing to flirt with positions unfamiliar to the Spanish left, went as 
far as to declare that he didn’t want Spain to be “the country that serves beers and tapas to rich 
people from northern Europe” and that “it is clear that Angela Merkel wants us to be a colony” 
(Berlunes 2014). This eagerness to engage in LWNP discourses cannot but seem strange in a 
European context and it is probably due to the enormous influence that some Latin-American 
political experiences exerted on Podemos. 
But Brussels is not Washington, and Spain is not Argentina or Venezuela. Even if Spain 
is, along with Greece, the only European country in which people on the ideological left are 
more likely to give the EU negative marks (Pew Research Center 2018), Podemos hasn’t been 
able to successfully articulate a nationalpopulist discourse, among other things because, like 
Syriza, it has been reluctant to fall into Euroscepticism. Not to mention the fact that for 
historical reasons in Spain the national symbols are associated to the Right. This is actually far 
from being anomalous: it is also the case, for example, in countries such as Japan and England, 
whose national symbols have problematic connotations. In fact, the whole approach seemed 
somewhat artificial and, to some extent, the result of the lack of alternatives. For as Errejón 
himself declared: “there are only three great political aggregators in modernity: religion, class 
and nation” and only the third is available today (Neyra 2017). 
Be that as it may, Podemos’ nationalpopulist discourse is a good example of the two 
traits that have been here identified as the core of LWNP—the merging of the plebs and the 
nation and the construction of a dichotomic frontier against foreign powers. The first is an 
attempt to ‘nationalize the people,’ which consists of associating popular demands with a 
defense of the nation. In February 2015, Iglesias said that “the fatherland is having a good 
public healthcare system, the fatherland is having the possibility of sending your son to a good 
school, the fatherland is having a good economy so you don’t have to emigrate” (Jiménez 
2015). His then right-hand man, Iñigo Errejón, accused the Spanish socialists of being “false 
patriots” when they organized a rally with an enormous national flag: “you are traitors, 
because you gave Spain’s sovereignty to Merkel…if you really want to be patriots, that has 
nothing to do with flags, it has to do with defending the hospitals, the schools, the workers” 
(Aroca 2015). This very calculated nationalpopulist approach began to fade after 2016 
(although Iñigo Errejón tried to refloat it recently with his new party, Más País), but LWNP 
stances are still present in Podemos, especially since it has now to face a far-right adversary, 
Vox. 
The second key characteristic of LWNP discourse, the shift from a national to an 
international dichotomic frontier, was only possible during the height of the Greek 
government-debt crisis (2014-2016), when Syriza opposed Germany and the European Union 
even though Greece ultimately accepted their conditions. Thus, Podemos’ nationalist attitude 
(which went further than Syriza’s) necessarily overlapped with that of its Greek ally. After 
that brief moment of European division and apparent north/south confrontation, the 
‘nationalpopulist moment’ was over for left-wing European parties. Their right-wing 
counterparts did not have to face that issue because the type of nationalpopulism that they 
formulated did not depend on economic crisis or regional clashes. European LWNP, on the 
other hand, remains a rare and occasional type of political stance. It was probably only 
possible in a very particular context in which a huge economic crisis coexisted with austerity 




measures, economic international interference, and Angela Merkel playing the role of an 
arrogant northern ruler against southern subaltern countries. 
In order to draw a parallel between today’s national-social synthesis and the several 
experiments carried out by right-wing nationalist forces, we mentioned political figures such 
as Enrico Corradini and Charles Maurras. This section will end with the words of Emmanuel- 
Joseph Sieyès, whose 1789 reflections on the people and the nation fit with such accuracy with 
this section that it is impossible not to quote him. The abbé unwittingly describes two staples 
of LWNP as it has been analyzed here: its consideration that only the plebs is part of the nation 
and its aspirations to represent the totality of it. 
The nobility, however, is also a foreigner in our midst because of its civil and 
political prerogatives. (…) The Third Estate then contains everything that 
pertains to the nation while nobody outside the Third Estate can be considered 
as part of the nation. What is the Third Estate? Everything. 
 
Conclusions 
RWNP can be defined as a sort of plebeian nationalism, while LWNP is a form of 
nationalization of the people. In the first, the nation is victimized, and the ethnos is 
popularized. In the second, there is an isomorphism between the plebs and the nation. Whereas 
RWNP is one of the contemporary forms that the radical right can take, European LWNP is a 
punctual strategy embraced by political forces that are part of the democratic socialist and 
post-communist sphere. Podemos and Syriza were eager to criticize the EU and the German 
government at a certain point, but they were reluctant to support Eurosceptic postulates. On 
the other hand, both Rassemblement National and La Lega have Euroscepticism as one of 
their main ideological traits. 
In Europe, RWNP is less an anomaly than LWNP, a political stance more common in 
the third world, especially in Latin America, for historical reasons. While the synthesis 
between nationalism and popular or social positions has been historically successful in Europe 
when it was carried by right-wing movements, the opposite is generally not the case. 
However, the example of Greece and Spain during the Eurozone debt crisis shows that the 
possibility of articulating a LWNP discourse exists in our continent. 
The points of departure of RWNP and LWNP are thus different, and so are their 
intentions and their ideological forebears. It is important, both for political scientists and for 
citizens, to be able to distinguish between these two tendencies. We are already witnessing 
the spread of the misleading idea that left-wing and right-wing populism are pretty similar 
phenomena. Insofar as nationalpopulist forces employ a similar vocabulary and propose 
similar policies, there will always be a risk of confusion. Only an in-depth discourse analysis 
can avoid it. 
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How did you come to study populism? 
Dr. María Pía Lara (PL): As you know, many people think that in Latin America populism is the 
big thing. I mean especially since the governments of Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela (with 
Chávez first and then Nicolás Maduro).  Chávez from Venezuela as the worst that can happen to 
any country, and he and Maduro are supposed to be the populists. Yet Chávez always said that 
he was a socialist and look to Cuba as his most admired model. And this can be thought of as a 
conceptual mistake while I actually think now that it is a well-crafted distortion. If you take the 
example of Bolivia, when Evo Morales was its president, you could find that his government 
helped to build up a constitution that responded to the specific needs and rights of many different 
ethnic groups. Bolivia has a very diverse and majoritarian ethnic groups, and there is a minority 
of white people there, but they belong mostly to the upper class and they were the ones who now 
orchestrated the coup against Morales. And Brazil is another different example. First with Ignacio 
Lula, who was one of the most beloved presidents of all times. He was accused of corruption on 
charges that were never proved, by the same judge Sergio Moro who instructed the prosecutor 
on the legal procedure to accuse Lula of corruption. We know about these exchanges of emails 
because they were leaked. Moro is now a Minister of Jair Bolsonaro. But before that, Dilma 
Rousseff had to be impeached, and she ended up not finishing her term. The strategy then turned 
to impede Lula to become again a candidate as president and it was all orchestrated by the 
oligarchy with much support from the United States.  





Argentina is also a different case. As Fernando de la Rúa, the then President resigned, 
Néstor Kirchner (a famous lawyer well-bred in the Peronista party) won the next election. While 
being president he finally concluded with all the trials of the murderous militaries involved in 
the bloody coup of 1976, where around 30,000 Argentinians disappeared. His was a democratic 
government and it invested heavily not only in  social programs of health, education, culture, but 
also in backing the efforts of organizations like the mothers and grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo 
to do justice to those whose families whose children were abducted and placed in military 
families. When he decided not to run for the second time, Cristina Fernández succeeded him as 
she won the next election. She pursued many good policies as well, but her attitude was certainly 
described as authoritarian. However, both Kirchner and his wife finished for the first time in the 
recent history of democracy their terms as presidents. Now Cristina Fernández is back again as a 
Vice-President after the economic collapse brought by the neo-liberal policies of Mauricio Macri.  
So my interest in South American politics was connected with the idea of trying to focus on how 
the general distortions on the describing all these different people and experiences, by putting 
them on the same level with a pejorative concept such as populism, will actually never allow 
other people to  understand what happened there in recent years with what was called the Pink 
Tide. It is called the pink not because of anything regarding something “feminine” but because 
these different political leaders came to government through democracy by winning the elections, 
through democracy. Pink is a different color from red and red was the color used to describe 
socialists. See how subtle changes on the uses of our expressions can impact directly to 
connections to the past?  
    So, I think that part of my interest in the topic was also to create some sort of conceptual 
separation from what is happening in Europe. I think there are a lot of theorists today who are 
trying to just say, well these phenomena are all just populism, right or left do not exist anymore. 
Latin America’s experiences are not only not well understood, people tend to underestimate some 
of these new experiences. So, I just wanted in the paper that you have read - I wanted to be 
especially provocative in the sense I have explained above, by saying that if they think it is 
possible to put all different experiences and ways of doing politics as the same, they are plainly 
wrong. These examples that I just describe dealt with issues about social justice, better 
redistribution, judicial and material justice and they built up new ways of constructing 
constitutional changes that were so powerful that it would be unfair to them just to brand them 
with a pejorative label. I did not mentioned José Mujica, the former president of Uruguay, who 
had been imprisoned for decades because of his earlier activism, but he was one of the most 
interesting politicians of today too. So, this is the main point: using the concept of “populism” 
erases any specificity in terms of understanding what happened in each one of these countries. 
So, my main point first is to signal that there must be a separation between what is going on in 
Europe with nationalism, chauvinism, xenophobia, and what happened recently in South 
America. And I am not even including now the United States. That said, there is something else 
happening in the United States and now in Mexico. Each deserves careful examination and 
historical basis. So, all I want to say is that by this concept indiscriminately one describes all which 
is nothing at all. It is a barrier on our understanding and lead us into many mistakes. I want to 
have the kind of very careful, sort of analysis of each one of the countries and to focus on their 
specific problems. 





The word populism is an umbrella term and it can potentially overlook the very specific social, economic 
and political circumstances of each country in which a populist regime come to power. When we use the 
term populism as kind of catchall umbrella term, it could be considered a paradigmatic insult. Do you think 
we are painting populism with a broad brush and could we consider it, on either the right or left, a critique 
of liberalism? 
PL: Yes. That is a very good point. I think that what we have to focus on is: the ultra-right critiques 
use the weapons of the problems that have become routinely presented such as the loss of jobs, 
the post-industrial global world, the lack of sovereignty, the loss of jobs to promote their own 
white supremacist views. While the progressive left has understood that the agenda of neo-liberal 
has only brought poverty, the precarious ways of losing social rights, and only the 1% has gotten 
richer. So, we must ask what the problem is with the neoliberal policies and why have they lost 
hegemony, while the critique runs the danger of being used for very opportunistic reasons. 
Caution with this. Yes. Yes. It's a very good point. 
With that, when I think of what has been considered either neo-populism or right wing populism, it is a bit 
ambiguous that this style of populism is a critique of neo-liberalism because I see it as advancing the neo-
liberal agenda. 
PL: Well, one of the interesting question for us is to focus on how the logics of contingencies that 
Ernesto Laclau observed in his book when right-wing social movements learn to use and adopt 
some of the claims from the progressive critique and with the purposes of expropriating the 
present unrest of many people. A good example of that is how Marine Le Pen claims that they 
are the ones who actually worry about the how the middle class has lost ground in economic 
terms and how climate change has become now part of their own agenda. Even these radical right 
movements are against neo-liberalism, but their goals are the opposite of those progressive 
movements who questioned the status quo of neo-liberalism. First of all, they hate globalization. 
All of them hate globalization. That is because they hate immigrants and refugees and mostly this 
argument of recovering sovereignty has been used in Europe in Hungary with Victor Orbán, and 
in Italy with Matteo Salvini, in England with the Brexit and Johnson, and then in the United States 
with Donald Trump. I think that when Trump realized at the very beginning how when he talked 
about the wall his followers multiplied, a strategy he learned from Steve Bannon and his advisers, 
he has followed it through and through in an even more radical fashion (white supremacist). So, 
in the end, it's all about how the precarious ways in which middle classes have been thrown into 
poverty where people want to blame the immigrants. But in fact, this is how neo-liberalism works. 
The opened discussion about state sovereignty can be framed as “Make America Great Again” or 
as the Brexiteers say “Take Back Control”. It is true, with globalization sovereignty has lost 
ground, but neo-liberals discarded long ago that the state’s main goal is to protect the people, 
these social policies are costly and therefore the economic institutions do not want state 
intervention. The global financial institutions are the ones who are really making the policies for 
the states. One of the things about neo-liberalism, the primary agenda of neo-liberalism, is to cut 
out all social programs and their agenda is to make the state as thin as possible. State spending 
was all about austerity in Europe. And when Obama helped the recovery of the economy from 
its crisis, they took the people’s taxes to pay and bailed out banks and financial institutions but 





failed to demand accountability from them. It helped the economy, but mainly those institutions 
went back to their vicious practices. This has been experienced in all these societies like Europe, 
especially, but also in the United States because they did not create regulations against financial 
gains. We cannot take this decision too lightly because, every decision let us say in Europe, every 
decision of the economy lacks a political connection and when a government like the Greeks 
wanted to improve social spending, and it was sanctioned by the European Union. But the 
European Union is not a political identity, it is only an economic identity. So, when you consider 
Greece, they had spent a lot of money (with the advice of Global financial institutions) and they 
were in great debt. When Syriza won the elections, they wanted to recover social programs: to 
have social healthcare, to restore the pensions for all people which had been drastically cut. And 
when Tsipras won the elections, he won because people wanted to recover some sense of 
sovereignty, with good social programs for their society. So, on the one hand, the global 
institutions allow people to perceive a loss of political sovereignty. On the other hand, the so 
called “populists”-- like the Syriza government in Greece --wanted to recover their possibility of 
social spending but were forced to comply to the demands of the rescue by financial institutions. 
And most of the European right-wing social movements have emerged or have appeared as 
making the demand to recover what they think they have lost due to immigrants and mobility. 
Especially working people, who for them, globalization meant that most of the so called, well 
developed countries de-industrialized themselves resulting in job loss because it was cheaper to 
move industries to poor countries with less social rights for the workers. To have these big 
industries, these maquilas in Mexico, in Tijuana, in India, and in China, meant that the people 
from these countries could work in very poor conditions, with very low salaries, and in the places 
where the enforcement of workers’ rights is almost inexistent, like my country or in India, etc. 
People are working under horrible conditions. For very low salaries. So, the money goes all the 
way back to, not to the country where the workers are situated, but back to the person who owns 
the industry, to the so called elite who are the real owners of businesses like Ford, Chrysler, etc. 
So, what has happened in places like Detroit is that many white workers became unemployed. 
So, the workers were left with nothing. For them it seemed like the immigrants are getting their 
jobs, their claim was "oh, they're, they're stealing our jobs!" A lot of this kind of reactions 
happened in England where English workers thought that the Polish workers were stealing their 
jobs because of the European Union mobility. So the Brexit was a movement fed by ultra 
conservative right wing organizers like Nigel Farage or Boris Johnson (the actual Prime Minister) 
who thought Europe had eroded  United Kingdom’s sovereingty and they wanted their “control 
back” (that was the slogan invented for the Brexit). The English workers were all also against neo-
liberalism, they want something different than what has been their sense of loss in their 
precarious lives. Instead of making claims that have to do with justice and inclusion, they are 
easily manipulated, and their claims appeared as wanting to exclude the foreigners. I mean, they 
feel excluded, but they also want to get rid of immigrants, get rid of refugees, and think that they 
can get back some sovereignty with the Brexit. And in their view, women have taken a lot of 
power also - they felt that they should do something about this. These expressions just tell you 
how the ultra-right has learned to use some of the grievances to procure the worst kind of 
exclusionary claims. Just look at how Donald Trump incited people in a meeting to scream when 





he asked: “What should we do with the immigrants who are rapists and drug dealers?” and the 
people replied “killed them” (sic). 
Would it be fair to say that populism on the left is about social justice and equality and populism on the 
right is a social and economic agenda focusing on restrictionism as far as restrictionist economic policies? 
PL: You know, going back to the past with –” Make America Great Again”, or “Take back 
Control” as Brexiteers claimed that England needed – are expressions that belong to a mythical 
tale of greatness from the past in the case of the USA, and in the case of England, it was inspired 
by a long history of thinking that The United Kingdom is not really Europe but something else, 
nobody knows what that is anymore. That is one of the problems. The questin is trying to figure 
out how the shadows of manipulation from the “populism on the right” expresses hatred and 
sees itself as a closed entity. Populism is better thought of as a logic of coincidences on what is 
not working, but then, the goals begin to clarify themselves to us as people are easily manipulated 
when their situations have worsened. As a concept, populism loses density when it is applied to 
all social movements from the right and the left. Understanding means something like making 
distinctions in the sense of how Hannah Arendt thought that historical analysis is one key element 
to our contextual understanding. We must follow the trail of experiences and structural changes 
that lead these different social movements here, because sometimes as they have made alliances 
with other groups that are right wing we learn to see that something horrible can happen. The 
left  side of movements must be careful to make alliances because of these same goals.  
A good idea is to see how they conceive the state’s policies: either as right wing with the claim of 
“law and order” or  the state spends on social programs of social inclusion and craft policies to 
help the redistribution of wealth. The state has to be involved in social health care, in public 
education, and all of these kinds of problems relate to how the budget of the state is organized 
with a public view of needs. I think that the young people in the United States see these problems 
more clearly than ever, especially, after Bernie Sanders has run for a second time for the primary 
elections of the Democratic Party. He retired from the candidacy, but his agenda is clearly now 
less questioned even among the some of the people in the Democratic Party. So, I think that the 
left in the past was very suspicious of the state. Again, there was a lot of anti-statism mainly 
dealing with how Marx was interpreted. So, one part of what is happening today is that the social 
movements that are progressive want to be elected, to have the power to enact agendas of social 
justice. The only way to gain power is through elections. So, the state has gained track among 
those who were first suspicious about it because without structural and systemic change there is 
nothing that we can do to alleviate our present needs. 
In your article you mentioned how the use of populism as a concept has deterred theorists from really 
analyzing the difference between progressive and regressive groups. I was wondering if you had any 
predictions or ideas about the upcoming US election, what route it might take. So will populism become a 
topic of discussion this election cycle? 
PL: The Americans have one interesting tradition that is different from other countries and 
Americans and so do the Argentinians and the Russians. By the way, Americans have a past of 
progressive populism with Roosevelt. And it was a very important experience for the health of 





that society then. So, it was not something reactionary. It was not something to be scared of. 
Michael Kazin, who is an active historian, has written very good books on the subject. He said 
something like, you should not be surprised that in the United States there is this big legacy of 
populism. In the previous election, I thought that the progressive people were disappointed 
because Bernie Sanders did not win the nomination to become the candidate. And when Hillary 
Clinton won nobody understood why Mexicans were so scared that Trump was going to win. 
Hilary Clinton was not the good candidate to beat Trump, but the progressives thought that she 
would win because she was a woman. But that was not the point. She was a declared neo-liberal 
and the younger generations did not see real change with her candidacy. For many people there 
was no reason to worry, some of  them even voted for an independent candidate or did not vote 
at all. Right now, I think that what is happening in the United States could have been a very 
interesting moment.  I think that the word populism now appears with Trump. A scarier word 
appeared behind Bernie Sanders since they all said that “he is a Socialist”!!! Trump had big 
possibilities because the economy was well and he made sure to take a great deal of protective 
measures against the mobility of capital outside of the United States. But he has helped the elites 
in terms of what Andrea Bernstein’s new book calls them “oligarchs”. He has also stirred and 
supported the ultra-right claims of White Supremacy. Trump has not really been a populist in 
every way, he is an authoritarian who lacks any interest other than his own agenda. And this is 
something that confuses people but it should not. As I have explained before, the grievances from 
people make them very manipulative so feeding their sense of victims allows him to stand behind 
horribly cruel causes. He is an authoritarian, vindictive oligarch, corrupted to the bone, and 
willing to destroy each and every possible institution that impedes him to do as he wishes. It is 
not only Charlottesville, it is his selection of the judges appointed to the Supreme Court, it is 
William Barr interfering with prosecutions on the charges of corruption, his staff, and the way he 
corrupted the entire Republican Party by erasing any trace of decency in them. It is scary. We are 
now entering a site of unprecedented experience with the crisis of the coronavirus. So now that 
Biden is the clear candidate of the Democratic Party, but it will be interesting to see how much of 
Bernie Sanders’ agenda will become the visible claims against the debacle in public health and 
education now that the United States is living one of the worst crisis of its history. It is very 
difficult to make any sort of prognosis as things stand now. Trump has tried to manage the crisis 
to help his campaign, but that does not mean that all people can see themselves as before the 
crisis started. Again, we are now in a logic of possible contingent choices and it is difficult to see 
what Americans can learn from this horrible time.   
During the 2016 election in the United States, we saw a push on the Bernie side for economic redistribution 
and social equality and then we saw on the right, Trump’s campaign. The election in 2016 was, arguably, 
a situation in which the political center was shaken. Do you think this a symptom of capitalism in crisis? 
PL: Yes, very good. I gave a plenary lecture on the concept of crisis in August 2019. Today we are 
confronting the full face of how countries have been challenged because of their poor spending 
on social health programs, but this is fundamentally linked to the problem of an unprecedented 
crisis of capitalism. 





So, what do you think are the long-term implications for world as a result of both politics and capitalism 
being in crisis? 
PL: First of all, I think that Marx already thought that crisis of capitalism was going to go one 
after the other and that is why in his theory, he thought capitalism would be self-destructive. But 
his prognosis of it being self-destroying was that something else was going to emerge. And that 
is as far as he got in predicting what a post-capitalist society would look like. But with Karl 
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation we see something much more complex because he understood 
a different moment of history that Marx had not seen at all. Marx lived in the industrialization of 
England, but he was right: capitalism lives through new contingent historical crisis. The concept 
of crisis means, in the Greek, to decide, to make a separation, to have a previous collective 
deliberation between two different choices or possibilities. That is how the Greeks used the 
conception of krisis. So, Marx was right in the sense that it is self-destructive, but Polanyi then 
thought that there always come social movements fostering upheavals, demanding social rights, 
and demanding better salaries. These are social rights as we know them, or social entitlements if 
you want to call them that. Marx never talked about the development of rights, rather he focused 
on better conditions for workers in every way, better conditions for life. Capitalism has been so 
incredibly malleable that it has integrated some of those criticisms in order to reproduce itself. 
You introduce measures and reforms and according to Polanyi, the Great Transformation is the 
development of what we call now the welfare state. Which means the state had the task of making 
possible a redistribution of wealth, but also to force enterprises, companies, etc., to give workers 
some social entitlements or social rights. So, what happened was that in Europe and in other 
countries such as the United States, Australia, etc. workers were having better lives, so they did 
not want to create a revolution. Why? Because they all had their apartments, their cars, all these 
things that capitalism got involved in creating and making for consummer’s society. Karl Polanyi 
was right by arguing that without any social upheaval and struggles by different actors, 
capitalism would have remained the same. But, when capitalism reacts, it accommodates some 
of the criticisms to keep going. So, we are now in a moment where we are leading an 
unprecedented crisis and at this point, what will come of it is not very clear. We do not have any 
assurance of anything. But if anything needs to be learned is what have been the priorities of 
countries who did not want to spend on ample social health care for all and we are now seeing 
how vulnerable their people are because of those very bad decisions. It is also important to 
reconsider that many of the consumers’ choices now seem so irrelevant when you realized that 
hospitals do not have enough resources to cope with this terrible pandemic. Health care for all 
now seems something very different from how people saw it before. And the people in hospitals 
have also began to be regarded as more important than we ever thought. So, what you’re seeing 
in the United States depended on the things that Bernie Sanders’ brought with his agenda and 
people might not be seeing him anymore as scary “socialist”, but as making health care a  
necessity and the only proper thing to do after this global experience. We might learn to consider 
care not only as a given and women as being the primary responsible for doing this very badly 
paid job. A policy about care should not be a private possibility, but a public right for all. 
  
 





In thinking about capitalism in crisis. How would a crisis affect Venezuela or Nicaragua? 
PL: Nicaragua is a country where his leader has lost its track. Their authoritarian past (Somoza 
was the famous dictator for many years) has returned with a different political actor. We need to 
contextualize how each country deals with their past and to understand how their particular 
experiences are opened or not by the way they handle their past experiences. In the case of 
Venezuela, like in the case of Cuba, because they bare some similarities, in the very beginning it 
was the problem of the sanctions from the United States and Europe which were imposed on 
these countries and has led them to face very difficult conditions. Cuba was almost strangled 
economically, but their social health care system worked well and they have education free for 
all. Venezuela is a very poor country and compared to Cuba is  bigger and more complex. Chávez 
declared himself socialist and immediately George W. Bush imposed sanctions and worked to 
get rid of Chávez. He was beloved and daring, but he also had to deal with difficult decisions. 
Chávez was confrontational and in very open terms as I remember one of his speeches at the 
United Nations when he came right after Bush and exclaimed in public: “The air smells like 
sulfur”. The reference is a mirror image of how the United States portrayed Chávez’s regime as 
evil. After his death, Nicolás Maduro had a difficult task to continue fighting not only against 
sanctions but with open help from the United States to organize a coup with Juan Guaidó. I know 
that Pompeo has worked very hard to make the life of Venezuelans impossible and they say that 
Maduro is trying to set a deal for a peaceful transition with the United States (sic). So, my 
experience is that the United States has always intervened in the affairs of Latin America, 
protecting themselves by making sure that those other countries remain governed by puppets 
rather than independent progressive leaders.  
     I was 13 years old when Allende was elected in Chile and before he had to endure a coup 
led by his General Pinochet, he committed suicide. The middle classes and the elites were very 
active in saying “take this government away from us” and the Americans fought all the way to 
help Pinochet’s accomplished his coup and accepted the bloody years of his dictatorship. 
Previously, they worked hart with many people and organizations to have all the goods of 
consumption taken away so that the people would be very desperate and when the coup came, 
of course, with a lot of help and organization form the United States, it was a massacre. Years 
after Pinochet still had tea with Margaret Thatcher until he was indicted for his crimes against 
humanity led by the Spanish Judge Baltazar Garzón. Chile became the first experiment of the 
policies created by the neo-liberal intelligence working in the universities. So, I have seen this 
tragedy happened.  
     The question with Cuba, is that even with all the sanctions they have never been able to 
take away the revolution for the Cubans. John F. Kennedy organized an invasion that failed but 
it was known as the invasion of The Bahia de Cochinos. So that is the point, if the involvement of 
the United States in Latin America had ceased for a moment, maybe things could have been 
different. United States involvement has returned now and my objection to Juan Guaidó in 
Venezuela is that he has been completely financed by the United States and this is a terrible 
alliance. So, to finish the point, yes, I think Maduro has inherited a legacy of difficulties and he 
has not been capable of reacting better, but who could under his circumstances? In spite of that, 
he is still in power and that can only mean that there are many people who still back them. He is 





also a very confrontational figure, and this kind of attitude does not help. This is why I am very 
much against Chantal Mouffe’s work on confrontational politics. Mouffe says that “agonism” 
means regarding your enemies as political adversaries framed in the conflictive political realm 
where some limits can be established. But the opposite is the case, confrontational attitudes like 
Trump’s behavior towards his opponents, for example, have made political life in the United 
States terrible, vicious, and plagued with perils.  Trump has given voice to those who did not 
dare to say what they thought and now they can say it, like the previous example where Trump 
asked his followers-- “What do we do with immigrants?”—and the people replied “kill them”. I 
think it is obvious that Donald Trump’s strategy constructs enemies as a way to bolster his image 
with his followers. It is not so obvious that the same strategy is done by Nicolás Maduro since he 
always relates his enemies to the strategies that the United States are doing to remove him from 
power.  But in Nicaragua’s persecution of the opposition by Daniel Ortega is something else. He 
and his wife Rosario Murillo, who is the Vice-president, betrayed the spirit of the Sandinista 
Revolution.  
  
And now, my understanding is that Ortega is a neoliberal representing a complete shift. 
PL: Ortega is getting much worse than Maduro in many ways. The openly spectacular question 
with regards to Maduro is that anything that helps us to visualize Venezuela as the rottenest place 
in the world, will help the United States to accomplish the end of that failed experiment. The 
recent power outages in Venezuela have been organized and financed by the United States and 
this is going to explode in the news soon. And all the military who left Venezuela are left out,  
they are abandoned in Colombia. Now they do not know what to do, and they don't receive any 
help from the U.S. or from Colombia. They were just used. Europe had Africa and the United 
States has South America. I think that we should recover here a critique of neocolonialism. I think 
that it is time for Americans and Europeans to realize how intertwined the fate of the political 
failures of Latin America or Africa are related to having been colonies. Of course, there were 
many mistakes made by Chávez, but we need time and space to criticize how and what happened 
there. He also had the charisma which Maduro lacks. And of course, politics is not always the 
realm of rationality that we could wish, it is a complex world because people who love their 
leaders can follow them blindly. And leaders can make big mistakes too and be pernicious, 
malevolent, authoritarian, etc. In a way that is a legacy that Maduro burned completely because 
if Chávez had not had cancer, he might have lasted longer and perhaps might have had a better 
chance to succeed in his project. And a lot of people would still be fascinated by him.  
The problem with Maduro is not only that he lacks charisma, his mistakes piled up with 
living on dire conditions due to the secret war organized by the USA. When he speaks, he sounds 
so cliché. So, the perseverance of the leaders depends a lot on their charisma. And this is one of 
the things that we have now to learn to consider a better understanding because I think that 
everybody thought we do not need the Hitler-like charisma anymore. Of course, we see all these 
movies and documentaries and we do not understand how so many people supported him, but 
he was able to capture the worst on people and he was regarded as a charismatic leader.  
Of course, sometimes Trump has been said to have some sort of charisma when he speaks 
to the people, that is why he loves speaking because he manipulates the needed reaction from the 





people. Nobody wanted to consider studying the charisma of leaders except for Max Weber, of 
course, because charisma has nothing to do with something that we cannot control or that we can 
learn rationally to set limits to it. But in politics we need to consider charisma as an important 
element and take it seriously. It is a very important element in populism as it is also demagogues. 
So, we should not close the door on how people react to the charisma of leaders and how people 
are manipulated by means that are not rational at all. 
So, I am going to talk about it today because I am going to propose a concept of the social 
imaginary. Because if we do not consider that we're completely closing ourselves to the most 
predominant element of political activism of a leader or leaders. Working with the emotions, 
make populists a special kind of leaders who employ emotions to surround their claims with a 
theatrical sort of performance. So, I think that understanding what charisma is should be 
important and we should learn from how it has been used in the past.  People who feel victims 
can be easily manipulated. Nothing is more hurtful than when you have been left out of the 
dignity of having a job or meaningful participation in society, especially for aging people. This is 
an important problem. Programs of social inclusion and justice are very different from those 
exclusionary ways in which victimization led to horrible outcomes. So, the main question is how 
do we discriminate among different claims and why? Consider, for example, how old people 
should be able to have some sense of meaningfulness and purpose in life. And when they do not 
have it if these things hurt. Claims about care and health should be the frame so that justice is 
what prevails. So yes, it is a moment that has a lot of things to do with justice, not hatred. We just 
have to be very careful on how we want to consider all these elements and carefully craft 
distinctions and contexts. I prefer being very delicate by separating conflicts and histories and 
then being able to learn something about these differences.  
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Some socialists criticize Bernie Sanders’s 2016 presidential campaign, taking issue with the 
senator’s nationalism, vague presentation of socialism and revolution, and seeming preoccupation 
with class at the expense of attention to racism. This article draws from Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe’s theorization of populism to depict Sanders’s campaign as a legitimately socialist 
project. Laclau and Mouffe claim that left populism may evolve into socialism under certain 
conditions. One may expect Sanders’s populism to empower previously uncommitted people to 
make socialist demands. Keywords: populism, democratic socialism, Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe, Bernie Sanders.  
 
Although the Vermont senator and democratic socialist Bernie Sanders energized 
scores of American progressives with his 2016 campaign for the Democratic Party’s 
presidential nomination, leftist commentators frequently criticized Sanders’s presidential bid. 
At the time, some socialists accused Sanders of appealing to shallow nationalism with his 
patriotic rhetoric and protectionist trade policies, presenting an economic reductionist 
explanation of racism, and failing to advocate genuine revolutionary socialism. This paper 
draws from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s theorization of left populism to explain how 
the 2016 Sanders campaign’s democratic socialism, despite its conceptual vagueness, was quite 
relevant to contemporary progressives’ most far-reaching aspirations. First, I argue that the 
senator’s rhetorical nationalism and conflation of economic inequality and racial injustice, 
which Sanders’s left-wing detractors found distasteful, correspond to a kind of socialism – 
socialist populism. Secondly, I argue that Sanders’s populistic language about democratic 
socialism may advance longstanding left-wing goals by opening more Americans to economic 
policy that breaks with conventional property relations. With Laclau and Mouffe’s insights, 
one may understand how Sanders’s vagueness about democratic socialism served a 
constructive purpose: the candidate was using populist rhetoric in an experimental way in 
hopes of developing a culturally appropriate socialist politics for the U.S. 
Borrowing from Laclau and Mouffe, I explain that socialist populism does two things: it 
redraws political identities and revives democracy. Populism redraws political identities by 
framing politics as an ongoing conflict between the people and the elite and equating the 
struggles of diverse subsets of the population. Populism revives democracy by provoking  
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robust confrontation between well-defined, oppositional political projects and multiplying the 
issues open to democratic intervention. Socialist populism forges social solidarity and 
invigorates democratic participation to such a grand extent that people independently begin to 
agitate for social control of production. Sanders’s 2016 populist campaign broached socialist 
populism because it sought to inspire democratic agitation for increasingly radical social 
control. As I explain how the candidate’s rhetoric dovetailed with socialist populism, I will 
question accusations that the senator’s 2016 campaign expressed uncritical nationalism, shallow 
class reductionism, and opportunistic faux socialism. Sanders’s populist presentation of 
American politics as a struggle between the people and the elite appealed to progressive 
nationalism by reclaiming the international socialist tradition and egalitarianism as part of the 
American identity. His discursive construction of the people drew a chain of equivalence 
between class issues and racial issues, which, rather than reducing race to class, illustrated how 
democratic citizenship mutually advances both racial and class struggles. Although Sanders has 
not called for the direct overthrow of capitalism or government seizure of key industries, his 
invocations of economic democracy paralleled Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of socialism as 
radical democracy. His appeals to economic democratization aimed to open the public’s 
imagination to economic policies that challenge managerial prerogatives. 
Socialist Criticisms of the Sanders Campaign 
Socialists accused Sanders’s 2016 campaign of espousing nationalistic trade policy, 
patriotic rhetoric, class reductionism, and vague definitions of revolution and socialism. 
Several leftist writers insisted that Sanders’s trade policies replicate the narrow nationalism of 
conservative isolationists by failing to back the foreign workers most harmed by free trade 
agreements like NAFTA. These critics claimed that Sanders seldom expresses support for 
strikes or higher wages in the developing world (McKean 2016; Yates 2016) and seems instead 
to have “abandoned [Eugene] Debs’s internationalism for a nationalist focus on U.S. workers” 
(Smith, A., 2015, 143). Other socialists suggested that Sanders’s nationalist viewpoint prevents 
him from adequately supporting the victims of U.S. militarism. Sanders’s anti-war messages 
have often revolved around bread and butter issues without thoughtfully addressing the 
nature of U.S. imperialism or calling for class internationalism (Martin 2016). The anti-war 
historian Rick Perlstein (2015) accused Sanders of appealing to nationalistic militarism by 
tweeting an image of the POW/MIA flag. It is unfair to suggest that Sanders never conveys 
internationalism: he praised a minimum wage increase in Bangladesh (Sanders 2011, 180), 
protested NAFTA by visiting Mexican labor organizers, and supported the Sandinista 
Revolution (Sanders and Gutman 2015, 80-85 and 225). With that being said, the critics did 
have a point. The Vermonter’s 2016 campaign did not lay out a comprehensive plan for 
opposing free trade without harming foreign workers (see Gilbert 2016) and Sanders has an 
unfortunate history of disappointing anti-war activists (Jaffe 2015, 158). 
The 2016 Sanders campaign’s language about the economic roots of racism failed to 
impress every socialist. Some left intellectuals claimed the Sanders campaign failed to 
foreground racial injustice. Critics say the campaign’s proposals to address problems facing 
black communities with job creation programs presented racial injustice as a direct outcome 
of economic inequality (e.g. Fletcher 2016). Angela Davis was among the most prominent 
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and eloquent critics of Sanders on this score. In an interview with Amy Goodman, Davis 
said that Sanders: 
engages in a kind of economic reductionism that prevents him from 
speaking…in ways that enlighten us about the persistence of racism, 
racist violence, state violence…It seems that he does not have the 
vocabulary that allows him to acknowledge the role and the influence 
that racism has played historically. He thinks that economic justice will 
automatically lead us to racial justice (2016a). 
There is truth to Davis’s critique. James Baldwin’s critique of the Henry Wallace campaign 
reveals that white American social democrats sometimes overlook the specificity of black 
struggles and their own racial blind spots while incorrectly assuming that their plans for 
entitlement expansion will resolve racism (1955, 73-84). Unfortunately for Sanders and the 
left in general, the Clinton campaign seized upon elements of this argument in a ham-fisted 
and cynical fashion (see Weigel 2016) that may obscure more nuanced interpretations of 
Sanders’s racial politics.  
Along these lines, the candidate’s decision to describe his campaign activity as part of 
a “political revolution” (Sanders 2016) peeved some socialists. Opinion pieces in Socialist 
Worker argued that Sanders distorts the very meaning of revolution, reducing it to 
opportunistic and “bogus rhetoric” (Katch 2016). Sanders has conceptualized his “political 
revolution” as a call for a broad-based coalition of average citizens to enter electoral politics, 
gain progressive control over public offices at every level throughout the country, and push 
American politics to the left (Nichols 2015). To Sanders’s critics, this depiction of revolution 
was at best narrow localism and at worst a cynical public relations campaign for the 
Democratic Party, doing little to serve mass movements oriented toward direct action or 
promote popular control of the economy. It goes without saying that Sanders’s presentation 
of revolution was quite different from historical violent revolutions like the French, Hattian, 
and Russian revolutions (Nichols 2015).  
Finally, Sanders’s critics said he diluted the concept of socialism by presenting left- 
liberalism and/or social democracy as socialism. Sanders disavows seizure of the means of 
production as a goal for his revolution and has hazily defined his socialism as a belief “that 
the middle class and the working families who produce the wealth of America deserve a 
decent standard of living and that their incomes should go up, not down” (qtd. Jaffe 2015, 
173). Yates (2016) writes that Sanders has said little about standard socialist demands like a 
proletarian revolution, the end of capitalist property relations, democratic control of 
production, social ownership of wealth, or a guaranteed minimum income. Even Sanders’s 
sympathizer Harry Jaffe claimed that Sanders is not a socialist at all, but rather a populist or 
just a very progressive liberal (2015, 173-174).  
But what if socialism and populism are not separate categories? Ernesto Laclau 
argues that all successful socialist projects require populist mobilization and that even 
populist projects that do not appear at first glance to resemble socialism may come to 
advance socialism. Laclau believes that all socialism requires deep rootedness in national 
political culture and that political relations vary dramatically from country to country. 
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Sophisticated socialists use populism as a tool to integrate their politics with local conditions 
and values. Mature socialist projects will look dramatically different in different places. It is 
thus useless to apply a cookie-cutter definition of socialism across various countries and 
historical moments. Movements that appear, from the outside, as anti-intellectual, 
ideologically incoherent, or opportunistic often contain a radically egalitarian energy and 
evolve in socialist directions over time. Populism draws people into radical politics and, 
even if many populists do not begin by espousing recognizably socialist politics, all populist 
mobilizations will eventually snowball into socialist demands for popular control of the 
economy unless right-wing populists co-opt them. The only things that make populism turn 
right-wing are racism and/or technocracy (Laclau 1979, 158, 165, 173-174, and 196-198). In 
what follows, I argue that the 2016 campaign used populism in an experimental attempt to 
develop a form of socialism most appropriate for contemporary, American political culture 
and open Americans’ minds to robust, interventionist economic policies that challenge 
conventional property relations. 
Laclau and Mouffe on Left Populism 
Laclau and Mouffe say populism has two main functions. Populism is, first, a way for 
political actors to redraw the frontiers of political relations by uniting as many people as 
possible against the elite establishment and, second, a way to reenergize and deepen 
democracy. Populist political projects redraw political frontiers by establishing hegemony over 
many diverse actors throughout complex societies. This process involves reclaiming popular 
issues and political symbolism and associating them with the demands of many different 
subjects and interest groups at once. In so doing, populists establish a new revolutionary 
subjectivity by forging equivalence chains linking many different groups together as one 
people. Populism regenerates democracy by inciting political passion and extending the reach 
of democratic politics beyond the public sphere’s traditional boundaries. Populist political 
projects become increasingly necessary as leftists respond to the social complexity of advanced 
capitalism. 
Before covering how and why populism redraws political frontlines and resuscitates 
democracy, I must briefly touch upon Laclau and Mouffe’s thoughts on capitalism and the 
revolutionary subject. Orthodox Marxism presents capitalism as a mode of production marked 
by wage labor and industrial production. This orthodoxy holds that capitalism will inevitably 
develop to the point in which an industrial working class is large and geographically 
concentrated enough to have immediately shared, recognizable political and economic 
interests. This mature, homogenized proletariat will have the ability to act as an independent, 
revolutionary subject to seize political power and recreate society (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 72- 
75). Laclau and Mouffe reject the orthodox view because advanced capitalism spreads social 
complexity, not social standardization. Laclau thinks that capitalism is not strictly a mode of 
production, but rather a complex, global array of interlocking economic, military, and political 
strategies. Capitalism, especially as it exists in the post-industrial West, does not rely on masses 
of factory workers with shared economic and political interests. It requires many different 
kinds of people, with many conflicting interests, to do its bidding (Laclau 2005a, 230-231; 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 159-160). 
Abraham                 disClosure, Vol. 29: Populism 
78 
 
Some politicians, activists, and intellectuals respond to the increasing complexity of 
capitalism by abandoning long-standing left formations, such as mass left-wing political 
parties embedded in the labor movement, on the basis that traditional left practices and 
ideology are irrelevant for countries without a clearly defined working class and a 
homogenous manufacturing base (Laclau 2005a, 85). Center-left democrats abandon old-
fashioned left parties and discourses in favor of milquetoast “third way” centrism. Anarchists 
may abandon left parties in favor of a politics based exclusively in civil society activism 
(Mouffe 2013, 119 and 135). Laclau and Mouffe respond to the fragmentation of class 
identities in the opposite fashion. Although there can be no singular revolutionary actor 
based in production, Laclau and Mouffe say that the left must retain centralized, long-
standing, stable institutions like mass parties to engage in the long- term process of 
discursively constructing a new left-wing identity.1 People will not immediately imagine 
themselves as part of a new revolutionary subject; they need to learn how to think of 
themselves this way by interacting with stable political institutions over the long term. This 
new revolutionary subject is the people. Populism is the process of uniting a very diverse set 
of groups displaced by globalized capitalism with contradictory interests under a common 
identity as the people (Laclau 2005a, 223-232). 
The people is not a preexisting force that politicians may awaken at will. The people is 
an imaginary category that political actors recreate in new contexts. Populists use floating 
signifiers, empty signifiers, and equivalence chains to establish the people. Floating signifiers 
are symbols and/or issues with no inherent ideological meaning that people vaguely associate 
with rebellion. These issues and symbols appeal to a broad cross-section of the public, 
including many people who identify as left-wing and others who identify as right-wing. 
Empty signifiers (which often overlap with floating signifiers) are singular issues and/or 
symbols that can represent many other issues and causes at once. Empty signifiers are the “tip 
of the iceberg.” Equivalence chains are broad coalitions of people who imagine their struggles 
as immediately linked, such that the victory of one struggle advances several other struggles 
at once. Left populists form expansive equivalence chains that unite a broad section of people 
by appealing to empty signifiers and floating signifiers to give popular causes a leftist 
connotation (see Laclau 2005b). This process redraws political divisions in society around 
new fault lines. Although left populism maintains and reinforces the division between the left 
and the right, it transforms what one associates with the left and the right: a “vibrant 
democratic politics can no longer be conceived in terms of the traditional left-right axis” 
(Mouffe 2016). 
Although left populism reinterprets popular symbols and issues to appeal to people 
who are otherwise right-wing, it is not non-partisan. Populism is a deeply partisan process 
that forms a people in opposition to an elite. Forging broad equivalence chains requires 
uniting as many people as possible in opposition to a narrowly defined enemy. Politics 
 
1 Laclau and Mouffe do not reject civil society activity and they have enthusiastically supported Occupy and the 
alter-globalization movement. Mouffe wants these movements to act synergistically with left parties, much as Syriza 
and Podemos have drawn energy from the Syntagma Square and Indignados protest movements. 
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involves “we vs. they” thinking and passionate, angry denunciations of opponents. In 
healthy, pluralist democracies, political parties compete for votes by developing well-defined, 
oppositional platforms and identities. However, in contemporary society, mainstream left 
and right-wing parties have forged a consensus around neoliberal economic projects. The left 
and right are now indistinguishable in the eyes of many disaffected voters. It is up to 
populists to restore passionate, polarizing conflict to democracy by appealing to the people in 
opposition to the corrupt elite (Mouffe 2005b). Doing so will encourage the public to 
reimagine themselves as the people and, in so doing, begin to create a new left-wing 
subjectivity to replace the international proletariat as the revolutionary subject (see Laclau 
2014, 172-176). 
The project of congealing a new identity of the people around a set of popular empty 
and floating signifiers does not happen overnight and does not require reinventing the wheel. 
It involves long-term work within the state and appeals to existing political traditions. Left 
populism involves radical democracy, which entails the constant expansion of the democratic 
state into more areas of social life, the proliferation of platforms for democratic decision 
making, and the creation of a new equivalential identity based on a shared identity of 
citizenship. Laclau and Mouffe embrace the welfare state and want to extend it, deepen it, and 
democratize it. They want to redraw the old division between the public and private spheres 
so that democratic decision-making and issue-formation may occur in so-called private realms 
like the family and the economy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 140-141 and 160-168). This extension 
of democracy into new territory need not require invasive state or party absorption of these 
fields. It may involve heightened synergy between political parties and protest movements 
focusing on economic and social issues (Mouffe, interviewed by Hackl 2014). Under radical 
democracy, various social groups relate to each other through the political tradition of 
democratic citizenship, which allows them to maintain a healthy degree of tension between 
solidarity and autonomy without sacrificing solidarity to autonomy. If left populists draw 
from the tradition of citizenship to equate the demands of racial minorities, feminists, 
environmentalists, and labor movements (despite the fact that these demands may not always 
harmonize), then people will consider all of these groups’ struggles relevant to democracy. 
Thus, a victory for each of these social groups will be a victory for all of them because each 
demand will advance the shared cause of democracy (Mouffe 1993, 18-20 and 70-72). Finally, 
Mouffe (2009) stresses that radical democracy occurs within and around the democratic state 
through a drawn-out process of identity formation and state consolidation comparable to 
Gramsci’s war of position. We have thus seen that left populism responds to advanced 
capitalism’s fragmentation and dispersion of social identities to form a new unified identity of 
“the people” by working within the state to polarize society, deepen and expand democracy, 
and forge a new equivalence that redraws the left around popular issues and symbols. 
Sanders’s Nationalism as Left Populism 
Political actors establish populist discourses to forge unity among broad swaths of 
society that cannot necessarily connect through any shared relationship to the means of 
production. In order to establish this broad unity and construct the people, populists 
frequently highlight popular issues and national symbolism with cross-class appeal. In Politics 
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and Ideology in Marxist Theory, Laclau explains that the inter-war German left failed to stem the 
rise of Nazism because both communists and social democrats refused to reach out to the 
middle class in any meaningful way. The left rejected patriotism as bourgeois, which led some 
socialists to do asinine things like express support for the Treaty of Versailles. The German 
left’s class analysis was so rigid that many of them refused to take up popular issues, such as 
the declining living standards of white-collar professionals, because these were not strictly 
working class issues. 
Laclau uses this history to suggest that the best way to fight the far right and gain left-
wing institutional power is to forge cross-class alliances through a left populist embrace of 
national dignity and attractive cultural symbolism. He objects to the idea that certain issues 
or symbols have an inherent class nature. The political meaning of an issue depends not on 
its content, but rather on which class hegemonizes the struggle over the issue’s 
implementation (Laclau 1979, 92-100; 113-114; 124-129; 162). If the bourgeoisie imbues national 
symbolism and popular issues with a bourgeois connotation, then nationalism will be 
conservative. If the proletariat imbues national symbolism and popular issues with a 
working class connotation, then nationalism will be progressive. 
Hence, it is entirely possible and even necessary for left populists to draw from 
nationalist symbolism and lay claim to issues with broad national appeal, even if these same 
issues resonate with people who do not consistently identify with the left. Take Sanders’s 
decision to tweet an image of the POW/MIA flag, which Perlstein found distasteful. Sanders 
embraces national symbolism because it unifies a broad group of people, including military 
veterans, whose interests the left cannot afford to abandon to the right. Sanders strives to 
bestow patriotism with a left-wing connotation. Sanders appeals to historical figures like 
Eugene V. Debs, Emma Goldman, and Mother Jones to show that his socialism is part of a 
grand American radical tradition. His left nationalism depicts economic justice as compatible 
with the inherent egalitarianism of the American spirit and the voting public’s true wishes 
(Foster 2016; Sanders and Gutman 2015, 20 and 27). His decision to embrace certain 
nationalistic themes, such as the middle class’s wellbeing, veterans’ issues, and the symbolism 
that accompanies these issues is a left populism compatible with socialist politics. 
Much like his appeals to military symbols, Sanders’s statements about globalization 
irked a few internationalists. Reflecting on Sanders’s critiques of global trade during the 2016 
campaign cycle, Tobita Chow (2018) regrets that Sanders usually fell “short of full-throated 
solidarity with Chinese workers” and did not advocate for a global minimum wage and 
technology transfers. While I share Chow’s frustration with American political discourse’s 
tendency to oversimplify trade policy, I find that Mouffe’s work lends itself to a more 
charitable reading of the senator’s rhetoric. Mouffe sympathizes with alter-globalist 
development policies like those Chow advocates. However, she is wary of cosmopolitanism 
and urges activists to ground global justice in efforts to build the democratic capacities of the 
nation state. Mouffe claims that left parties will have to expand popular identification with the 
democratic state and attain hegemony through the state’s institutions before they can 
successfully retool multilateral institutions to reconcile labor standards across borders (Mouffe 
2005a, 100-110). Much as Mouffe would have it, the 2016 Sanders campaign provided renewed 
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focus to the alter- globalization cause by demonstrating that once-marginal progressive critics 
of neoliberalism can and should attain state power (Denvir 2019). Sanders’s anti-austerity 
messaging linked together popular sovereignty, progressive nationalism, and internationalism. 
As undemocratic, neocolonial austerians failed to treat Puerto Ricans as full American citizens, 
Sanders explained that expanding elected Puerto Rican politicians’ abilities to negotiate debt 
restructuring with their creditors would serve as a blow to the same financiers who 
impoverished Greece (Sanders, interviewed by Goodman, 2015; Nichols 2016). Sanders thus 
implies that the way forward for alter-globalization is for activists to find concrete ways to 
connect their global concerns to the enhancement of democratic citizenship at home. 
Race, Equivalence, and Left Populism 
In addition to redrawing political fault lines by appealing to popular national issues 
and symbols, left populism forges new political solidarities by equating multiple social 
struggles. During political crises, populists can do more than form cross-class alliances. They 
may establish entirely new identities of people who believe their diverse struggles are 
inherently linked and think the progress of one group’s struggle advances the struggles of 
several other groups at once. According to Laclau and Mouffe, under normal circumstances, 
systems of differences frame social identities. When social identities have differential links, 
people understand their identities based on who they are different from (e.g. one knows that 
he is a man because he is not a woman; one knows that he is a worker because he is not 
unemployed). However, during periods of crisis, logics of equivalence may displace logics of 
difference. In these instances, one issue or symbol may gain such emotional appeal that people 
who embrace it feel as though they all share the same identity. Even if one group is not 
immediately impacted by the struggles of another group, they will equate their identities in 
such a way as to feel an instinctual, immediate connection to distant struggles (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985, 126-128 and 164). 
Equivalential logics only replace differential logics during political crises. Equivalential 
identities form in times of instability in which people realize how their social identities are 
areas of political conflict. Differential identities (e.g. women’s traditional roles in family 
institutions and blue-collar workers’ roles in corporate economic hierarchies) appear apolitical 
and neutral– they are just part of a natural order of difference. Differential identities become 
equivalential when social orders degenerate and the illusion of their neutrality disappears. 
When every social identity becomes a platform for political struggle, social movement actors 
are both more likely to reclaim their identities as autonomous groups with distinct political 
interests and more likely to equate themselves to other movements (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 
135-136). 
Consider two of Laclau and Mouffe’s hypothetical examples of equivalence overtaking 
difference during crises. They say feminist identities based on the supposed unity of women 
around their shared biological sex are differential, assuming sisterhood to stem from a natural, 
apolitical difference. However, during crises, feminists may come to recognize the political 
construction of the category of women and see themselves as divided by class and race. Crisis 
pushes feminists to better appreciate their connections to the struggles of other social 
movements, such as anti-racist and union movements. Crisis sparks partisanship and division 
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in previously apolitical social spaces and, in so doing, inspires more and more social identities 
to organize autonomously. In another hypothetical example, Laclau and Mouffe say black 
workers are more likely to organize autonomously as blacks when they gain experience and 
political connections by organizing as workers in labor organizations. These workers may 
come to equate conflicts between workers and capitalists with conflicts between racists and 
people of color while recognizing such conflicts’ autonomy. Crisis generates equivalence by 
uncovering the divisions within social groups, thereby foregrounding their connections to 
other social groups. Crisis encourages autonomy by pushing some social groups to organize, 
which in turn creates a ripple effect and causes other social groups to organize independently 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 130-134 and 140-141). 
Left populist projects are uniquely capable of responding to crises by articulating 
equivalence between broad, diverse struggles without threatening various social movements’ 
autonomy. Left populists use statism and partisanship to maintain very broad equivalential 
identities and autonomy. Left populists mark each social identity in their equivalence chains as 
political by relating them to citizenship and the democratic state. Left populists interpret the 
political conflicts shaping class, racial, and gender identities through the lens of citizenship and 
democracy, thereby marking these identities as spaces for the exercise of democratic 
participation. Populists cultivate the polarization and intense political conflict of crisis periods 
long after the crisis’s resolution by rhetorically projecting an ongoing conflict between the 
people and the elite and building lasting movements of the people within representative 
institutions. Shared commitments to defending and expanding political and economic 
democracy unite various social movements through the left populist discourse, allowing 
groups with conflicting interests to view themselves as sharing a momentous struggle (Laclau 
1990, 148- 153). Left populist discourse’s emphasis on citizenship encourages people to hold 
split identities that are simultaneously equivalential and autonomous. A white left populist 
feminist, for example, may relate to union workers and racial minorities as a citizen while 
relating to other women as a woman (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 62-63). 
Sanders is a left populist who fosters equivalencies between diverse groups of people. 
During his 2016 campaign, he constantly referred to economic inequality even while he was 
talking about racism. Sanders stressed democracy and civic engagement as unifying principles 
establishing an equivalential subjectivity. His language linked class and race through an active 
defense of democracy: 
We are facing a two-pronged attack on our democracy — unlimited money 
poured into the political process, paired with the systematic suppression of the 
vote. These are two sides of the same coin. Make no mistake: the billionaire class 
does not want Americans to vote…The fight for minority voting rights is a fight 
for justice. It is also inseparable from the struggle for democracy itself. When the 
votes of minorities are suppressed, it becomes easier for politicians who 
represent billionaires and corporations to win and hold elected office (Sanders 
2015). 
Sanders attempted to hold this equivalence chain together through a politically charged and 
divisive rhetoric of citizenship and democracy. The citizens in this chain have split identities. 
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They share an identity as citizens, but they maintain autonomous identities as racial subjects 
and workers. This autonomy does not preclude solidarity. For example, Killer Mike (2016) is 
a black separatist who advocates for black autonomy and self-sufficiency and his first tweet 
endorsing Sanders specifically appealed to the senator’s support for defending and 
expanding the Voting Rights Act (Holpuch 2015). Recall that Angela Davis accused Sanders 
of ignoring the specificity of black concerns. To understand how the 2016 Sanders campaign 
was relevant to black issues in their specificity, it is necessary to consider how black activists 
are responding to a political crisis – the legitimacy crisis of mainstream black leadership – 
and forming new equivalential identities in the process. 
Black Lives Matter (BLM) draws energy from the black community’s internal divisions. 
BLM activists are exhausted with the black political class’s hesitancy and moderation. They 
join with labor and left groups to work on issues long ignored and belittled by mainstream 
black political operatives and, in the process, establish a new political identity that is both 
autonomous and equivalential (Petersen-Smith 2015). Ferguson protestors developed their 
radicalism and militancy in part by joining the Fight for Fifteen in the months before Michael 
Brown’s death and view their work for racial justice as intertwined with their labor activism 
(Smith, B. 2015). Angela Davis has explained how BLM breaks with mainstream, pro-Israel 
Democrats to foster sympathy for Palestine as a central element of the struggle for racial 
justice. Moreover, Davis has shown that this sympathy is equivalential: many black activists do 
not just appeal to workers and Palestinians as potential allies for specific causes, but rather 
emotionally and instinctually interpret their struggles as inherently linked (see Davis, 
interviewed by Goodman 2016b). As BLM drew closer to Palestine and labor militancy, the 
divisions between the black activist left and black neoliberal Democrats became more visible 
and bitter (see Khalek 2016). 
The crisis of the black leadership class’s legitimacy welds together this equivalence 
chain between Palestinians, low-wage workers, and black victims of police brutality. The 
Sanders campaign’s left populism may have encouraged the long-term maintenance and 
expansion of this equivalence chain. Left populism is polarizing and spreads anger and 
political conflict throughout many layers of society. The 2016 Sanders campaign magnified 
divisions within the black community over the drug war, Palestine, support for centrists, and 
other issues. The campaign reverberated with black activists’ autonomous efforts to highlight 
these divisions, spurn a political realignment of the black community, and affirm solidarity 
with other oppressed groups. Sanders’s left populism gave an institutional voice to this anger 
with centrist liberals and sought to sustain this anger through long-term electoral politics, 
which might reinforce these equivalential identities over time. Cornel West’s statement 
endorsing Sanders illustrates how the campaign’s left populism enabled equivalence and 
autonomy through long-term, partisan organizing. West appealed to a state of crisis, anger 
with mainstream Democrats, solidarity with Palestine, and Sanders’s focus on long-term 
movement building all in one short statement: 
My endorsement of Brother Bernie in the primaries is not an affirmation of the 
neo- liberal Democratic Party or a downplaying of the immorality of the ugly 
Israeli occupation of Palestinians. I do so because he is a long-distance runner 
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with integrity in the struggle for justice for over 50 years. Now is the time for his 
prophetic voice to be heard across our crisis-ridden country, even as we push 
him with integrity toward a more comprehensive vision of freedom for all (qtd. 
Tesfaye 2016) 
West likewise lambasted mainstream black Democrats like John Lewis and Jim Clyburn for 
their opposition to Sanders and called them out for their neoliberalism (Mims 2016). Black 
Democrats’ exasperation with Sanders and West (see Kopan and Labott 2016) suggests that 
Sanders’s political revolution helped keep the political divisions BLM fomented on people’s 
minds for an extended period. From this perspective, Sanders’s appeals to the middle and 
working classes were not attempts to sidestep the issue of race, but rather statements of 
equivalence. Left populism’s statism, appeals to citizenship, and vigorous partisanship allow 
crisis to continue long enough for equivalential political realignment. Fighting, politicized 
equivalence reconciles tensions between autonomy and solidarity. 
One may argue that Sanders’s 2016 campaign experimented with populist rhetoric in 
an attempt to create an equivalence chain linking people of color facing police brutality and 
voter suppression, Palestinians and others disadvantaged by U.S. foreign policy, and 
organized labor. Although Sanders failed to secure most black primary voters in 2016, he did 
win over young black voters by a respectable margin (Bacon 2016). Laclau and Mouffe’s 
thoughts on populism lend themselves to an analysis of Sanders’s populism because the 
theorists stress how internal divisions within identity communities facilitate solidarity among 
oppositional groups seeking access to power. The Sanders campaign spoke to political 
divisions between young black critics of American policing and a more complacent older 
generation, black labor activists and neoliberal Democratic Party leaders, and defenders of 
America’s relationship with Israel and international solidarity activists.2 Sanders and his 
supporters within the black community appealed to citizenship and voting rights in an 
attempt to subsume and synthesize many issues related to the misuse of state authority at 
home and abroad. The experiment did not yield a political victory, but it did expose 
generational, class, and ideological rifts in black politics that will be of interest to political 
scientists and campaigners in future elections. 
Sanders on Revolution and Socialism 
In the 2016 election cycle, some socialists criticized Sanders for failing to define and 
apply the terms revolution and socialism clearly and consistently. Laclau and Mouffe’s work 
allows for a more generous interpretation of Sanders’s appeals to socialism and revolution. 
Sanders is a specific type of socialist, a left populist socialist. As a socialist populist, Sanders 
seeks to resolve advanced capitalism’s problems by extending democracy throughout many 
layers of society, both public and private. Sanders has called himself a “leftist populist” and 
sees his populism as a means to bring together broad and surprising coalitions, such as 
movements of “low-income people, hard-pressed working class homeowners, 
 
2 Jesse Jackson’s bid for the Democratic Party nomination similarly exposed deep rifts within the black community 
over U.S. support for Israel (see Marable 1984). 
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environmentalists, renters, trade unionists, college students, and now the police” (Sanders and 
Gutman 2015, 40). Laclau and Mouffe write that spreading democratic control over all sectors of 
public life provokes the masses to establish a type of socialism appropriate for their historical 
and political context. Even if the people do not consciously conceive of extending democracy as 
socialism, democratizing social spaces eventually encourages people to fight for decision-
making power over the economy. Left populists do not rely on the strictures of Marxist theory 
for a predetermined blueprint of what this democratic oversight of the economy will look like. 
Left populist approaches to revolution and socialist politics need not resemble violent socialist 
revolutions and actually existing socialisms of the twentieth century. Democratic agitation that 
leads people to seek decision-making power over the economy, even if it does not overtly call 
for recognizably socialist endpoints, amounts to a contextually appropriate revolutionary 
politics. 
Socialists have long aspired to gain working class control of the means of production. 
Laclau and Mouffe adjust this conception of socialism for contemporary realities of advanced 
capitalism. Socialism is not only government or union ownership of the means of production, 
but also the extension of democratic input into economic decision making for many social 
groups, including environmentalists, local communities, workers, and consumer advocates. 
Under complicated, contemporary conditions, handing complete control of production to the 
direct producers would amount to privileging special interest groups over many other social 
groups whose work maintains a diversified, globalized economic system. The specific 
mechanisms for democratically coordinating these complex interests will vary from country to 
country and sector to sector; people must learn which methods of economic decision-making 
are appropriate for their social spaces through grassroots struggles in contact with broader 
political movements and parties. Nationalizing all major industries can hardly serve as a 
standard goal for contemporary socialism. Laclau insists that one cannot judge how left-wing a 
government is by how many industries it nationalizes. Instead, the task is to reformulate 
socialism as broad-based participation in economic production along with government support 
for the well-being of all kinds of people. This includes policies geared toward supporting the 
underemployed precariat, such as a universal basic income, a shortened workweek, and 
government support for workers cooperatives and workers in the informal economy (Mouffe 
2000, 126; Laclau 1990, xii-xv; Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 178). Recall that Laclau says left 
populism, as it continually integrates more and more social groups into the democratic process, 
may evolve into socialism because these groups will eventually come to demand democratic 
influence over economic decisions. 
For Laclau and Mouffe, the revolutionary process is the process by which populists 
catalyze mass interest in radical democracy among extremely diverse sections of the 
population. Revolution entails long-term social change that transforms the identity of all social 
groups involved in production. They define revolution as “the overdetermination of a set of 
struggles in a point of political rupture, from which there follow a variety of effects spread 
across the whole fabric of society” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 177). In other words, 
revolutionary actions are those that ripple across the whole of society, polarizing and 
politicizing more and more social identities over time. Laclau and Mouffe conceive of their 
revolution as a continual, ongoing strengthening and deepening of historical democratic 
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revolutions, such as the French and American Revolutions. Just as the initial stages of the 
French and American Revolutions spread democracy to one social group, white men, these 
revolutions continue over many years as more and more people gain access to the democratic 
rights associated with these revolutions. The ripple effect not only broadens, but also deepens 
democracy as the areas of social life in which democratic participation is possible multiply. As 
the democratic revolutions culminate, citizen participants will no longer merely vote for 
representatives, but also engage in political decision making in so-called private spheres, such 
as the workplace and the family (Laclau 1990, 187- 188; 227-229). 
It is crucial to note that Laclau and Mouffe do not see this revolutionary process as a 
subordination of all social spaces and identities to formal state institutions. Rather, democracy 
spreads throughout all layers of the social as social movements proliferate across social life and 
generate democratic demands for their political representatives to fulfill. Centralized parties 
must not prioritize one democratic struggle over others or smother their development with 
preconceived conceptions of socialism (Mouffe 2013, 75-76). Populist parties should rather 
discursively equate variegated struggles. In short, revolution involves spreading democratic 
participation by more and more people into more and more spaces that society previously 
considered off limits for politics. Independent social movements work alongside and within 
representative institutions to push forward the democratic revolution that generates socialism. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s definition of revolution resonates with Sanders’s calls for a 
political revolution. He sees revolution as increased democratic participation among many, 
regular people from very different backgrounds. Sanders does not only intend for his 
campaigns to win him offices. The senator says that the purpose of his electoral bids are to get 
various underdogs who have been discouraged from political participation (e.g. minorities, the 
poor) to assert themselves. He frames his campaigns as attempts to get more working people 
involved in government, make political participation fun and interesting, and get more people 
thinking about the important issues (like classism and trade) that big news networks and 
mainstream Democrats typically ignore (Sanders and Gutman 2015, 32, 76, and 207). Sanders 
intended for his 2016 presidential campaign not only to advance his career but also to 
galvanize many people to run for office and participate in progressive social movements 
throughout the country. The campaign was a “political revolution” because it recognized that 
fundamental change does not come from one struggle on one platform at a time; many 
different movements (both electoral and non- electoral) must work in tandem to further deep 
structural changes (Jaffe 2015, 166-167). Echoing Mouffe, the Sanders campaign recognized that 
extending democratic participation throughout society must not only involve popular 
engagement with representative government. Revolutionary change entails active social 
movements. In his words: 
Real change – whether it is the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, 
the gay movement, or the environmental movement – real change never comes 
because some guy sitting in the Oval Office says: ‘Oh gee, I think that’s a good 
idea.’ Real change only happens when millions of people stand up and demand 
their civil rights (qtd. Roberts 2015). 
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Sanders therefore understood his 2016 campaign as a way to respond to democratic social 
movements without coopting or controlling them. He considered running for president only 
after witnessing how the Occupy movement had opened Americans’ minds to radical 
economic policy and insurgent leftist campaigns (Jaffe 2015, 162-163). Sanders’s decision to 
allow disruptive BLM demonstrators to take his microphone (see Hains 2015) also revealed his 
simultaneous closeness to and independence from radical social movements. Much like Laclau 
and Mouffe’s notion of the democratic revolution, Sanders’s political revolution has aimed at 
drawing more social groups into the democratic process by inspiring both grassroots electoral 
campaigns and active participation in left social movements. 
In 2016, Sanders’s conception of democratic socialism, much like his depiction of 
revolution, appeared rather vague. However, Sanders’s presentation of democratic socialism 
nonetheless parallels Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxist understanding of contemporary 
socialism. Much like Laclau and Mouffe’s insistence upon spreading economic decision-
making power to more people with various relationships to the means of production, Sanders 
calls for more layers of democratic participation over economic policy-making. Sanders 
expresses a vision of “economic democracy” that involves the participation of the poor in 
setting economic policy. Under economic democracy, the poor will not only thwart right-wing 
attempts to block their participation, but also be considered key voices and consultants in the 
crafting of economic policy. Sanders believes that the U.S. can only address major economic 
problems, such as inadequate health services and unemployment, by involving more people in 
the democratic process. The poor have the solutions; politicians need to listen (Sanders and 
Gutman 2015, 20-26 and 272). Like Laclau and Mouffe, Sanders has responded to the decline of 
the classical proletariat by proposing policies aimed at assisting the precariat. Sanders is 
deeply concerned with overwork, contingent labor, and low-wage labor in the post-Fordist 
economy. While his solutions are not exactly the same as Mouffe’s, he does say that the 
government should guarantee a job to any unemployed person who wants one, promote 
workers cooperatives, and advocate for policies like a fifteen dollar minimum wage to assist 
low-income people (Sanders and Gutman 2015, 289-291; Johnson 2015). This approach to 
socialism hardly fits with classical Marxism, but it does work with Laclau and Mouffe’s idea of 
contemporary socialism as a radicalization and extension of democracy. 
 Thinking alongside Laclau and Mouffe, one may generously interpret the Sanders 
campaign’s vague language about socialism and revolution as a rhetorical experiment aimed at 
opening Americans’ minds to broader conceptions of democratic participation than mere 
representative democracy. Sanders sees democracy as a broader category than just competitive 
elections for representative office. His 2016 campaign associated democracy with a renewed 
labor movement and vibrant social movements setting the national agenda. His campaign was 
thus attempting to overcome problems that have long hindered the American left. Gar 
Alperovitz, a prominent defender of worker ownership, argues that the U.S. middle class is too 
large and complacent to respond to a left politics that appeals to violent revolution. However, 
Alperovitz suggests that deep reforms at the level of American political economy may well be 
possible if political leaders manage to funnel Americans’ anger with corporate consolidation 
and wealth inequality into well-coordinated, practical, grassroots political initiatives and 
alternative workplace experiments (2011, xxv-xxvi and 226-228). Uniting the suburban middle 
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class with less privileged groups is an enormous difficulty facing efforts to cohere scattered, 
progressive, grassroots activists across the U.S. into a focused, effective political force capable of 
making a dent in economic inequality (Alperovitz 2011, 170-179). Building cross-class alliances 
for unorthodox economic proposals is tricky because the framers designed the U.S. constitution 
to prevent popular forces from coming together across geographic boundaries and deification of 
the founding documents often prevents Americans from looking beyond representative politics 
to embrace more participatory, expansive forms of democracy (Dahl 2003, 1-10 and 50-53). 
There are some indications that the 2016 Sanders campaign achieved marginal success in 
reaching unlikely groups and opening their minds to the possibility of more democratic 
participation in economic decision-making, more active cooperation between radical social 
movements and major political parties, and farther-reaching state interventions to support the 
underclasses. Some young people testify that the Sanders phenomenon has pushed them away 
from despairing apathy or mainline liberalism and toward a social democratic standpoint 
focused squarely on increasing the social wage (see McGreal 2017). Shortly after the 2016 
elections, many of Sanders’s backers challenged both the far right and the center left by 
mobilizing around a militant resistance movement inspired in part by the senator’s critiques of 
the Democratic Party leadership and mainstream liberal nonprofits (see Young 2018, 8-9; Knight 
2016). Some expect the Sanders-influenced resistance movement to advance economic 
democracy: 
The work of making a pivot to a twenty-first-century Democratic Party…will fall 
to the generation of Sanders activists who are clearly the Democrats’ future. 
Causes that go beyond those that Sanders have articulated—giving workers 
equal power on corporate boards; requiring employers to provide decent pay 
and benefits to all their workers, whether in traditional employer-employee 
relationships or not; greatly increasing the level of public provision for 
healthcare, child care, senior care and education; changing tax policy so that the 
share of income going to work increases and that going to investment 
decreases—these will be the kinds of issues that the young people activated by 
the Sanders campaign will raise, if they’re to go forward in the same spirit that 
led them to Sanders in the first place (Meyerson 2016). 
Given that Sanders’s attempt to bring the Democratic party closer to militant social 
movements may nudge forward far-reaching progressive economic reforms, those seeking to 
expand democratic participation beyond traditional representative democracy would do well 
to study Sanders’s 2016 attempt to use populist rhetoric to retool concepts of revolution and 
socialism for present conditions. 
Conclusion 
This article has responded to Sanders’s socialist critics by presenting Sanders’s 2016 
campaign as an experiment with left populism. Viewing Sanders as a left populist suggests a 
more generous interpretation of certain elements of the 2016 campaign that some leftists find 
disquieting, such as Sanders’s nationalist rhetoric, tendency to conflate race and class 
oppressions, and seemingly inappropriate uses of the terms revolution and socialism. I find that 
maintaining a focus on Sanders’s 2016 efforts helps highlight the senator’s populism: the 
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candidate’s 2020 campaign presented more specific, detailed explanations of democratic 
socialism (see Sanders 2019) and progressive internationalism (see Sanders 2018), so his reliance 
on populist speech to convey his socialist politics was even more apparent in 2016. Sanders 
used populism in 2016 to introduce international solidarity to American audiences unprepared 
for a clean break with patriotic nationalism. Sanders stressed citizenship to appeal to people of 
color by forging equivalential associations between opposition to neoliberalism and opposition 
to racism. Sanders spoke of revolution and democratic socialism to inspire popular interest in 
economic democracy and encourage Democratic Party leaders to be more responsive to 
progressive social movements. For socialism to become a mainstream political force in the U.S., 
socialists may first have to build on Sanders’s experiment by carefully constructing appeals that 
speak to American political and cultural divides. Doing so will require an openness to forms of 
socialist thought that speak to the possibilities open within the existing political system at the 
present moment. 
This article has not tried to claim that Sanders, or any other charismatic socialist, can 
overcome the longstanding obstacles to left politics under advanced capitalism with populist 
speeches alone. European left populist parties have had enormous difficulty holding together 
coalitions of educated, cosmopolitan young people and older blue-collar workers (see Jäger 
2019). A Sanders presidency would likely meet similar challenges maintaining unity among the 
democratic socialist’s base. Even as president, Sanders would have a rough time implementing 
his most ambitious policy proposals. Given that gridlock is a feature of the U.S. constitution, 
Sanders’s goal of amending the constitution to overturn the Citizens United (see Prokop 2015) 
decision may be unfeasible for even the most skilled of populists. Nonetheless, I find that 
paying attention to the Vermonter’s populism helps identify the Sanders phenomenon’s 
potentials. Observers who look beyond orthodox Marxism to appreciate Laclau and Mouffe’s 
post-Marxist outlook will have an easier time grasping the purpose and possibilities of 
Sanders’s populist rhetoric. 
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So how did you first become interested in studying populism? 
Ken Roberts (KR): (laughs) I did not set out to do that when I was in graduate school. It came 
shortly after I finished my dissertation research and had begun as an assistant professor. I was 
having lunch with a colleague, Kurt Weyland, from the university of Texas. We were in Chile at 
a little cafe talking about recent fieldwork that we had been doing. I had been in Peru, under 
Fujimori, and he had been in Brazil. We were both talking about the rise of these new political 
eaders on the right side of the spectrum that were implementing free market or neoliberal 
reforms, but they were very much anti-establishment kinds of figures who ran against traditional 
political parties and against the political establishment, and made explicit appeals to the people 
for their support, and tried to articulate a closeness to the common people. So Kurt and I were 
talking about this, and we were kind of struck by some of the similarities in their political appeals 
to traditional kinds of populist leaders in Latin America, but they were doing so in a context 
where they supported different kinds of economic policies. And so Kurt ended up organizing an 
APSA panel, the American Political Science Association, on new forms of populism in Latin 
America. He and I ended up writing and publishing some things that talked about the rise of new 
kinds of populist political leadership that were embedded in a different historical era in Latin 
America and adopted different kinds of economic policies, and yet it was a certain political logic 
that they shared in terms of challenging traditional elites and appealing to the people. So that was  
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for me the starting point. My core research at that time, I was working mostly on the 
reincorporation of the parties on the left into the new democratic arena in Chile. This was the  
early 1990s after the democratic  transition in Chile. So, I was not really working on populism per 
se, but I was doing some comparative work with Peru, and I was quite struck by the Fujimori 
phenomenon. It was in response to that and to this dialogue that I had with a colleague around 
the anomalies of this new kind of populist political leadership that we thought we were seeing 
within the region. 
 
We have seen a strong global surge in support for right-wing populist parties and actors. What do you 
attribute this to? Why now, and not ten years ago? 
KR: Certainly, some of the antecedents for this rise were underway ten years ago. You could see 
it, obviously some of these movements had a presence and were slowly gaining some strength. 
Why you see it now, I would argue it is probably a confluence of different events that are factoring 
in. It is long term, erosion of the ability of the traditional parties to align and represent different 
sectors of society. In some ways I think it is reflecting the detachment of traditional political 
parties from the grassroots. I think part of it is also a response to the progressive convergence of 
traditional political parties around a common set of economic issues. And in some ways it is a 
response to the larger rubric of European integration around common sets of policies on a fairly 
wide range of issues. And I think what that tends to do is open the doors to some sort of populist 
challengers who politicize issues that the mainstream political parties are neglecting. So, I think 
for the parties, the far right ethnonationalist kinds of populist parties, they’re clearly 
responding to the challenges of immigration and the social, political, and economic integration 
of immigrant communities, in particular the 2015 crisis. In some ways I think that surge in 2015 
drew public attention to the issues in ways that allowed those political parties to try to make 
strong appeals on the basis of anti-immigrant kinds of platforms. But at the same time, you also 
see in southern Europe for example, the rise of what many people would argue are new platforms 
on the left flank, politicizing not the cultural issues of immigration, but more economic discontent 
coming out of the 2009 financial crisis. In particular, in southern European countries, the main 
debtor countries that were having to go through very difficult austerity and adjustment policies, 
where you saw traditional socialist parties implementing what are essentially very neoliberal 
kinds of economic adjustment platforms. So in that way, similar to what we saw in Latin America, 
in the earlier decades, where in the aftermath of neoliberal reforms, where all the mainstream 
political parties converged around some version of neoliberal orthodoxy, you saw the rise of new 
left populisms challenging that. So, I think that sort of depending on what part of Europe or part 
of the world you’re looking at, you see different kinds of populist challenges emerging. But in all 
cases, they tend to be politicizing issue dimensions or issue positions that mainstream political 
parties have not been giving much attention to, or that mainstream political parties really don’t 
effectively differentiate themselves on. 
 
Do you also see a connection there because the refugee crisis in Europe has also been effective in mobilizing 
right wing movements in the United States even though the US was not as impacted by that? Would you 
say something about the transnational character of populist sentiments? 
KR: Yes, I think there is certainly a transnational dimension to this. I think there was an element 
Bohannon and Hechler              disClosure, Vol. 29: Populism 
96 
 
of that in terms of left-wing populism as well in Latin America and even southern Europe where 
you saw some of the new left alternatives in Spain and in Greece that looked quite explicitly to 
the so-called Bolivarian cases in Latin America: Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador. So, some sort of 
political learning or transnational influence is there. And I think there is some version of that on 
the right too. In this day and age, it’s easy to stay in touch with what’s happening in other parts 
of the world, and there’s sort of a demonstration effect. To the extent that you see one populist 
figure using certain kinds of discontents or prejudices and politicizing those, then that tends to 
spill over into other places. And so Bolsonaro in Brazil was clearly picking up on some of the 
politics and the same kind of resentments and prejudices that Donald Trump was picking up on 
in the United States. I think you see Salvini or other figures in Europe in some ways playing off 
of the same script. Even though different countries are obviously different and these movements 
and political parties and leaders come from rather different places, there’s a certain script that 
they’re able to play out according to the particularities of their own national situation, and I think 
some of them are doing that fairly effectively. 
 
We have spent a good deal of time this semester discussing a distinction between left- wing populism in 
Latin America, versus right-wing populism in Europe and the United States. Do you think there is a 
significant distinction between these two types of populism? Are we even talking about the same thing 
when we refer to those two types of movements? 
KR: Yeah, this is a very good question. I think it depends on what level of analysis you are talking 
about, whether there is some rationale for using the same label to refer to them. I think myself 
that if you’re thinking of populism as I do, as a political logic that structures political spaces, a 
binary divide between some sort of virtuous people, however you define the people, and then 
some sort of nefarious or corrupt elite, however you construct the elite...if populism is understood 
as a basic political division between the elite and the people, so that populism is evoking some 
sort of appeal to popular sovereignty, I think you can identify forms of populism on the left and 
the right. At that level of analysis, there is something they share. They are both making some sort 
of common appeal to the people against an elite. But of course, the devil’s always going to be in 
the details, and ultimately these are radically different kinds of movements or radically different 
kinds of populisms. There is much more that differentiates them, I would argue, than what they 
share. So, I think we have to be cautious in using the populist label. In fact, I would argue that 
the populist label is way too overused. In particular I’m cautious of using it without the adjectives 
that would define what kind of populism that we’re talking about. So, I am uncomfortable simply 
talking about populist parties in Europe because in Europe you do find populisms of the left and 
the right. I would always attach whatever other identifying labels, the far right or the ethno-
nationalist populists, or the left populisms in southern Europe. I think those adjectives tell you 
much more about the nature of those movements and what their impact is likely to be on the 
society where they emerge as opposed to simply referring to them as populism. At the end of the 
day I think what they share as populist is fairly thin and probably fairly insubstantial. What is, I 
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Americans who are fed up with politics as usual have recently flocked to populist political candidates. They 
see the rupture of the political establishment as a good thing. What would you say to someone who thinks 
that populist government would make life better in the United States? 
KR: (laughs) Yeah, it is a tough question because clearly a lot of people are unhappy with the 
status quo. I think that both of our traditional parties have limitations in terms of really being able 
to effectively incorporate and respond to the full range of interests that exist within American 
society. So, it’s very understandable that people are interested in new alternatives. It’s important 
to know when we talk about the kinds of figures that many people would label as populist in the 
US, which is Trump on the right or Bernie Sanders on the left, it’s striking that both of them in 
contrast to what you usually see in Europe or Latin America, they both emerge within traditional 
mainstream parties. Trump is not a traditional Republican by any stretch of the imagination, but 
he uses the Republican party as his vehicle to gain access to electoral office. Bernie Sanders is also 
not a traditional Democrat, but he also ran using the primaries. The primary system in the US 
opens the door for candidates who are not traditional members of the political party or members 
of the party leadership to appeal directly to the people for support, in essence to try to use the 
primaries then as an institutional opportunity to run as a populist figure against the political 
establishment. So, in some ways American political institutions are uniquely designed to create 
opportunities for this-- not just the primaries but I think other aspects of our institutions. I would 
argue that simply running against the establishment does not get you very far. I think there are 
very legitimate reasons to run against the status quo and the establishment in the United States, 
but on what basis are you doing so? When you look at the rationale for Bernie Sanders’s critique 
of the establishment, it is radically different in most ways than Donald Trump’s. Sanders is in 
particular going after the influence of private wealth on the democratic process in the US, and the 
extent to which the political establishment is dependent upon the sources of funding that come 
from private interests and the ways in which that distorts democratic representation. I happen to 
share a lot of those criticisms. I think that the fact that a populist candidate may be bringing those 
kind of issues to the table may be an important way of expanding the range of democratic debate 
in the United States, thinking about, are there things we can do to try to reform and improve our 
democratic institutions? It is easy to look around the world and identify places where populism 
creates real challenges to democracy. But I think we also must recognize that populism does bring 
in new voices, new interests, sometimes new issue positions into a democratic area in ways that 
can expand democracy and potentially reform democracy. I think that is what makes populism 
especially difficult for us because it can be a two-edged sword. Populism almost always means 
bringing in new people or giving new voices some sort of representation in the political arena. 
The question, is, can you do that in ways that amplify and perfect democracy as opposed to doing 
it in ways which end up whittling away traditional kinds of democratic levers. And that is the 
problem that we see in places like Hungary, Venezuela, where you see populist figures coming 
to power and concentrating power in ways that undermine the checks and balances of liberal 
democratic rule. I think that the challenge for democracy is, can you find ways to amplify 
democracy in positive ways without undermining those democratic checks and balances? This is 
not just a populism problem. This is an age-old challenge that democracy faces. 
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Trump’s Make America Great Again slogan successfully serves as an empty signifier onto which different 
groups project meaning. But he has also faced opposition within his own party. Why do you think other 
Republican candidates were unable to compete with Trump and his message during the 2016 primaries? 
KR: I think this is something that caught a lot of us by surprise, even those of us who take 
populism seriously and recognize that there are strong populist currents in American society. I 
think that many of us underestimated the extent to which the Republican party really has 
transformed itself in recent decades. And in some ways the party has been cultivating those kinds 
of populist currents for quite some time. But you had a party establishment that was always able 
to maintain control of the party at the top level and make sure that one of their candidates was 
the nominee for the presidency. And we saw that in 2012, where there were a series of grassroots 
populist type figures who channeled these currents within the party and challenged Mitt Romney 
in the presidential campaign in the primary season, but at the end of the day it was Romney who 
prevailed and those populist candidates fizzled out. What was different in 2016 was that Trump 
never fizzled out. He made it very clear that at the grassroots of the Republican party, this is the 
party. It has become an anti-establishment party that has deep populist tendencies, and he is the 
figure that pulls those different strands together. I would argue now that it is his party, and it is 
very much a populist political party, and it is less of mainstream conservative party than the 
Republican party was traditionally. So, you still have mainstream elements within the party, 
there’s still a party elite that remembers the old way of doing things, but the party has become 
very ideological, and it is also become very populist, and those things do not necessarily go 
together. But I think Trump has effectively knit together those strands within the party, so at this 
point it really is very much his political party. And in the absence of some sort of crisis within his 
administration, I see very little opportunity for any mainstream challenge to Trump from within 
the Republican party. 
 
And so you have business millionaires more in touch with the Republican base than mainstream politicians 
who have been doing this for years and who actually come from these districts and not from Manhattan. 
KR: Yeah, this is one of the classic contradictions of the Trump era. Populism almost always is 
riven with contradictions, and this is a classic one. How is it that a billionaire can take up the 
populist mantle as the representative of the common person, of we the people? But Trump is not 
a conventional billionaire. Obviously, he’s wealthy, but he was never fully integrated into the 
most elite Wall Street financial sectors of American capitalism. He represented a different branch 
of American capitalism. So even though he became quite wealthy, he was never really fully 
accepted within those elite networks. And in some ways, he sort of represented this place where 
wealthy capitalism intersected with pop culture, with the celebrity culture. He is in the 
professional wrestling hall of fame, not as a wrestler but as a businessman. It was casinos, it was 
the beauty pageants, it was professional wrestling. He was not a titan of Wall Street. So, in some 
ways he connected to a sphere of Americana as sort of a business celebrity more than a business 
tycoon himself. And in many ways as he remade his business empire, he did so as a celebrity 
more than as a businessman. But at the end of the day, whatever his wealth may be, he is an 
individual of rather common tastes. This is something in Pierre Ostiguy’s work on populism 
where he talks about the flaunting of the low, the ability to talk gruffly. For Trump, the kind of 
food he eats, his way of talking, his mannerisms, are not those of a titan of Wall Street. He has 
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sort of everyday man kinds of appeals. And there is a place in some ways that I think that helps 
to authenticate who he is to people at the grassroots. He’s sort of like them, just more successful. 
He is like them, but he has more money. And in the study of populist leadership there’s work 
that talks about this. Yeah, you must be like the everyday person, but the reality is the average 
worker doesn’t want someone just like them, just a worker in the White House. They want 
somebody who is more like them, but only somehow better or more successful or knows how to 
get things done. And in a sense, I think when Trump talks, they hear somebody who thinks and 
talks the way they do, and yet somebody who’s a billionaire and who they see as a very successful 
business person. I would also like to point out, to come back to this notion of the flaunting of the 
low, which Ostiguy defines in sociocultural terms. It’s sort of the ways in which Trump is 
deliberately politically incorrect, something that the establishment, the elite is directly offended 
by. Oftentimes populist figures like to make fun of the elites, they like to affront elites. And a 
leader who speaks in those terms, the kinds of things that many of us would be offended by, they 
tend to appeal to a lot of people who are angry with things, who feel that they have  been 
neglected, or worse, that they have been exploited somehow or been abused by those who are in 
power. And so, someone who they see as speaking the truth to power, they like that combative 
streak. And some of the opinion polls suggest that more than Trump’s policies-- and who knows, 
the policies are all over the map, there is nothing coherent or consistent about the policies-- 
what is consistent in Trump is this combativeness, and this willingness to be politically incorrect, 
and to not adhere to the basic norms and rules of the game. And that appeals to those slices, those 
sectors of society who feel left behind and resent their lack of power. And so again, this is one of 
the ways in which a billionaire can frame himself as someone who can really represent those 
groups in society. 
 
The 2018 midterm elections brought in Democratic freshmen legislators, some of whom have been pushing 
for legislation and positions that are left of the mainstream Democratic party. Do you see some similarities 
here to the change of the Republican party into a movement-based party going on? 
KR: I think there is an element of that and I think a lot of that is a very positive energy at the 
grassroots within the party. I think that there were a lot of things about the Democratic Party as 
a party establishment, or a party machine, that I personally would find objectionable. I think that 
there is a new, sort of renovation process that is underway at the grassroots. It is bringing a lot of 
new energy and new ideas into the Democratic Party in ways that are very very positive, and in 
some ways they are remaking the party into less of a party machine and more of a grassroots- 
based movement, which might be a very good thing for the party and for American democracy. 
It is important to keep in mind, though, that it does in some ways feed what people call 
the polarization in American politics, which in many respects, I think, has been a 
misinterpretation of what we have seen. I think we must be careful in how we use that term, 
because when you look at it from the two political parties, the polarization has been highly 
asymmetric. Until recent times in the United States, and by that, I mean to the extent that there is 
been polarization American politics, it's largely been the Republican party moving in a more 
ideological direction. We forget that the Democratic party clearly tried to not only move to the 
center, but in many ways was supporting very pro-market kinds of policies on trade and on 
financial deregulation. This was hardly a party of the radical left, and I think very few people 
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would even recognize the Democratic party as a party of the left - certainly not in any comparative 
perspective. The Democratic party could not be compared to parties of the left in European 
democracies. In a comparative context, the Democratic party would not be considered to be a 
party of the left. Now, with the rise of Bernie Sanders - arguably the Occupy Wall Street 
movement in some ways fed some  movement currents, which I think filter their way into the 
Bernie Sanders campaign of 2016 and which you see increasingly active at the grassroots within 
the party. You see movements becoming infused into the Democratic party, which have never 
been absent. We forget that the civil rights movement had a strong presence historically, [just as] 
the women's movement, the anti-war movements. There has always been at least some movement 
dynamic within the grassroots of the Democratic party, but I think there are new elements of that 
today. And I think they are pulling the party more to the left on a range of public policy issues, 
both economic and cultural. 
Now there was a version of that story, of course, that played out in the Republican party 
in recent decades as well. The Tea Party movement, certainly, pulled the party to the right, but 
you also had an infusion into the Republican party from the Christian evangelical movement, the 
anti-abortion sectors, the gun rights movements, and now, in contemporary times, anti-
immigrant types of movements. So there has been some mobilization at the grassroots that has 
pulled the Republican party further to the right. And until fairly recent times, I think, the story of 
polarization was largely a story about the conservative party. I think we are in a situation today, 
where you can see both parties moving towards their respective poles and taking more 
ideologically differentiated positions on the issues. That has certainly opened the democratic 
arena to a wider range of debates, which can be quite healthy and can be rejuvenating, but it also 
tends to intensify the conflicts. I think it creates a lot of uncertainty over how the institutions will 
manage this, because we're accustomed to the institutions being set up to function in a context 
where the two parties overlap in the middle and where both parties sort of compete in the center 
for what we call the median voter. And in a context where the two parties are moving towards 
their respective poles, the ways in which institutions like the Supreme Court, Congressional 
investigative commissions, or other kinds of institutions of American democracy work, becomes 
quite different. And so, I think that is some of the uncertainty that we see in contemporary 
American politics. 
 
That partly answers the next question, which was, if Trump’s brand of right-wing populism should be met 
with a new brand of left-wing populism. 
KR: I myself would probably not want to call it left-wing populism. But I do think that Trump's 
brand of populism should be met by a lot of energy at the grassroots from those sectors of 
American society that are troubled in terms of what Trump's presidency means for women's 
rights, for immigrants, for healthcare policies, for gun control, for a wide range of issues. Where 
we do see mobilization taking place is at the grassroots within the Democratic party, some of it 
to the left of the Democratic party. I think that mobilization at the grassroots creates some 
opportunities to bring new energy into the democratic arena in ways that can safeguard the 
institutions from some of the potential threats that could exist from forms of right-wing populism, 
and potentially even push the democratic process to make it more inclusive and more open to the 
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full range of interests that we see in American society. So, I see this energy at the grassroots as a 
positive development. I am reluctant to call it left-wing populism. I think there are new 
movements, and the challenge for them is to find ways to come together and to cohere into some 
sort of political platform that creates a real alternative in American democracy. 
 
In your article “Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay” you said that the two US political parties are 
differentiated more along the lines of social issues rather than economic issues. Do you think that populism 
is generally more concerned with one type of issue than others? Is differentiation regarding social issues 
more likely to mobilize populism than differentiation rather than differentiation based on economic issues? 
KR: I think that with the rise of Bernie Sanders within the Democratic party you can now see the 
new politicization of economic issues in ways that we have not seen for quite some time. The 
Clinton presidency and its supporters in the Democratic party were not a branch of the party that 
was especially close to blue-collar workers. Theirs was a branch of the party that very strongly 
supported free trade, a branch of the party that basically implemented financial deregulation 
policies. So those are all pro-market policies that left aside a lot of American citizens. And so I 
think what you see now is the politicization in particular of economic inequalities under Bernie 
Sanders and questions of the levels of taxation: what kinds of Health Care, what kinds of rights 
do we have as democratic citizens to healthcare? These are the type of issues that Bernie Sanders 
and others from the left wing of the Democratic party have put on the agenda now, and that has 
expanded the Democratic agenda dramatically from what it was in the era of Clinton, and even 
the Obama era. 
I think we see a very different debate underway over the range of policies on the economic 
axis. I think we are seeing a re-politicization of that economic axis on which the differences 
between the parties never collapsed in the U.S. The Republican party is so ideological on the other 
flank compared to Europe, but I think that the traditional understanding of polarization misses 
the fact that the Democratic party was not on the left pole, that it was very much in the center and 
even the center right on the economic axis, but that has changed considerably. 
There has been polarization between the parties on the social or cultural axis that goes 
further back. This is basically an axis, I would argue, between some sort of cosmopolitan/ 
multicultural/ universalist understanding of who we are as a country, and something that is more 
nationalistic, more ethno-nationalistic, and tends to have strong religious identities as well on the 
other pole. And that pole has really been heavily politicized in many respects going back to the 
civil rights movement, and then the countermovement on the right against the civil rights 
movement. This process of party polarization really begins in the 60s, when the civil rights 
movement leads the southern conservatives to break with the Democrats and move into the 
Republican party. Right before then, the two parties overlapped in the center. We forget that the 
Republican party was more liberal on civil rights issues than the Democratic party until the 1960s. 
So this is a fairly recent phenomenon, but what's happened in the civil rights movement in this 
sense, and then the counter-movements that followed and the other movements that came in its 
wake - the anti- war movement, the women's movement, the gay rights movement - those 
movements all politicized the social-cultural axis in ways which have pulled the parties further 
apart over time. I would argue that is the axis where we have consistently seen true polarization 
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between the parties in American politics. 
I think the economic polarization on that other axis is quite recent. Therefore, it's very 
problematic, I think, to talk simply about the left and the right in the United States. These are 
separate axes, if you plot them out spatially, they are orthogonal to each other. There is nothing 
about being an evangelical Christian, for example, that requires you to be a market 
fundamentalist on the economic access. These are separate axes, and what the Republicans have 
effectively done is pull these axes together and convince people that there is such a thing as a 
“conservative movement” that is defined in terms of market orthodoxy, Judeo-Christian 
identities, and gun rights and other kinds of things - but that's a product of effective packaging. 
It is a bundling of issue positions that really occupied different competitive axes and there are 
ways in which they can be broken up. You see that in part with Trump, because Trump is 
supporting a trade war - nothing could be more antithetical to a market orthodox position than 
trade wars. And what Trump's populism has done, is pull together strands that allow him to 
appeal to certain constituencies that he could not appeal to if he adhered to the ideological 
orthodoxy of the Republican party on the economic axis. Trump himself is sort of redrawing these 
alignments in American politics, as populism often does, because populism is rarely, if ever, 
ideologically orthodox. 
 
Talking about the two-party system in the US. In western European countries, populist parties have been 
maybe able to enter coalitions, but they have not been able to gain control of the national government. 
Would you say that a two-party system is inherently more susceptible to a populist takeover than a multi-
party system? 
KR: I think this is one of the places where the American institutions set us up for this unexpected 
turn, and in the absence of primaries you would not get this. In a parliamentary system, for 
example, it is the legislative block of the party that selects who is the Prime Minister. That 
obviously would not be Donald Trump in the Republican party - you would not have had Trump 
emerge in a parliamentary system. Proportional representation makes it easier for new parties to 
form, so far-right elements tend to form on the right flank of the mainstream political parties. 
What you see in Europe is that they start as very small marginal parties on the right flank. Now 
they have been growing over time, but they have not been able to access power directly in 
Western Europe. They have worked their way into coalition governments in a number of 
countries, but they have not directly taken the reins of power. 
In the U.S. case you have the combination of a presidential system with plurality elections 
rather than proportional representation, and then primaries which allow an independent outsider 
to come in and run as a Republican, even if they are not a traditional Republican. That 
combination of institutions, I think, has left us susceptible to this kind of populist takeover in 
ways that we did not really imagine. Without the primary system, Trump would have had to run 
as an independent. There are cases, like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, where the traditional 
establishment breaks down and somebody can run as an outsider against that establishment and 
win elections. We have not seen that in the United States. Instead, the populist outsider works 
within one of the mainstream parties and basically has now taken control of one of the parties. 
So, it's a very different institutional dynamic the way in which it is played out here. We 
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see this kind of populist leadership and power in a number of Eastern European countries, post- 
communist Hungary in particular and Poland now, but we have not seen this populist leadership 
take control and become the head of states in the Western European context. Salvini is sort of the 
strongman in Italy, but he is only the minister of the Interior. He is not the Prime Minister, but he 
clearly has a strong influence. In Austria and other places, you see these parties in coalition 
governments, but nowhere do they directly control the reins of state power yet in Western 
Europe. 
 
And lastly, what are any future projects that you are currently pursuing? 
KR: I am hoping to do a little bit of work that is new for me, which would be to look at the 
Republican party in a comparative perspective. I think we do not have a good handle yet on how 
the party has been transformed over time by the infusion of these movement currents into the 
party and its transformation into a populist vehicle. 
I think a lot of the American politics literature doesn't give us a good handle for 
understanding that process of transformation, and I don't think we have a good understanding 
of how the Republican party is more ideologically orthodox - or ideologically radical if you want 
to call it that - than any of the other mainstream conservative parties that you see in Europe or 
elsewhere. But while it has this ideological orthodoxy, it also has this populist current that has 
now been grafted onto this ideological platform in ways that are very unusual. As a political 
scientist, I think the Republican party is a very unusual case that needs to be understood in 
comparative terms because that gives you a different vantage point on what's taking place than 
what you can do just by studying it from an American politics perspective. So that is what I am 
hoping to move towards. 
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We Are Right, They Are Wrong: The Antagonistic Relationship 
Between Populism and Discourses of (Un)truthfulness 
Michael Hameleers, University of Amsterdam 
 
Populism maintains a specific relationship with discourses of (un)truthfulness. Yet, although a 
growing body of research has explored the nature and effects of populist rhetoric, populism’s 
cultivation of reality and dishonesty has been under-theorized. In this paper, we explore three 
relationships between populism and (un)truthfulness: (1) the cultivation of a conspiracy theory in 
populist discourse; (2) populism’s denial or discrediting of expert knowledge or empirical 
information, and the legitimacy of journalism and mainstream sources of knowledge and (3) 
populist constructions of alternative truths that resonate with common sense and the experiences of 
the ordinary people. We further explore the effects of discourses of (un)truthfulness, and ways to 
combat the potentially negative political consequences of populist disinformation. Together, by 
exploring the discursive relationship between populism and (un)truthfulness, this paper aims to 
provide more detailed insights in how populist versions of reality and dishonesty that attack 
mainstream knowledge and interpretations may impact society and political decision-making. 
Keywords: populism, disinformation, fake news, conspiracy theories. 
 
 
Populism has been regarded as a key threat to democracies around the globe (Aalberg et 
al. 2017; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008; Canovan 1999). Among other things, populism is in 
conflict with the principles of deliberative democracy as it emphasizes a Manichean outlook  that 
potentially contradicts the principles of reason, diversity, and a rational exchange of arguments 
between citizens with differing viewpoints (Waisbord 2018). Populist ideas may also foster 
polarized divides in society by activating or augmenting the perceived divide between the 
ordinary people and the corrupt elite and/or dangerous others (Müller et al. 2018). One crucial 
implication for deliberative democracy, central to this paper’s argument, is that populism’s anti-
elitist rhetoric delegitimizes established truths and factual knowledge (Egelhofer & Lecheler 2019; 
Tambini 2017; Waisbord 2018), which undermines the principles of a well-functioning 
deliberative democracy. More specifically, political disagreement should derive from agreement 
on the underlying factual reality (Arendt 1969), which is under threat when empirical facts are 
stripped from their epistemic status.  
Although some scholars have argued that populist ideas challenge established knowledge  
and emphasize distrust in the elite by introducing conspiracy theories and alternative facts 
 




(Bergmann 2019; Silva et al., 2017; Waisbord 2018), we know markedly little about how 
truthfulness and honesty are constructed in populist discourse. And, more explicitly, how 
populism as an antagonistic discourse (Jagers & Walgrave 2007) opposes its own alternative 
realities to established facts and expert knowledge. It is relevant to understand populism’s 
relationship to the truth as the increasing success of populist parties throughout the globe 
(Aalberg et al. 2017) implies that populist conspiracies and alternative realities find increasing 
support among citizens. The populist delegitimization of established knowledge, expert sources, 
and empirical facts may resonate with increasing levels of doubt and distrust in established facts 
among the electorate. 
Even though opinions provide the foundation for democratic decision-making, these 
opinions and political disagreement should have a factual basis (Arendt 1969). If populist 
constructions of reality undermine the foundations of shared truths on which political 
disagreement is based, increasing relativism toward facts and expert opinion can be cultivated 
(Van Aelst et al. 2017), which presupposes that lies are justified as they reflect opinions. In order 
to understand the implications of reality discourses for deliberative democracy, it is thus crucial 
to arrive at a fine-grained understanding of how reality is referred to in populism and framed in 
opposition to alternative realities that oppose established facts and expert sources.  
Populism, which can be defined as the cultivation of an antagonistic divide between the 
ordinary people and the corrupt elite (Mudde 2004), relates to discourses of (un)truthfulness in 
three important ways: (1) it oftentimes refers to a conspiracy theory or a hidden truth; (2) it denies 
expert knowledge, the veracity of empirical information, and the legitimacy of journalism and 
mainstream sources of knowledge; and, (3) it introduces alternative truths that resonate with 
common sense and the experiences of the ordinary people. It thus strongly resonates with the 
politics of disinformation. By attacking established facts and empirical evidence, factual reality 
becomes subject to manipulation and fabrication (Monot 2017). This attack on established 
knowledge is central to populist discourse: Populists throughout the globe label elite knowledge 
and expert opinion as fake news (e.g. Egelhofer & Lecheler 2019), and present citizens with 
alternative realities that circumvent established truths.  
These three factors are important to consider in today’s post factual information era (Van 
Aelst et al. 2017; Lewandowsky et al. 2012). Hence, the current media landscape is characterized 
by high choice, fragmentation, and algorithmic-driven selective exposure options. As a key 
consequence of these technological advances, the information people receive is largely driven by 
confirmation bias since people have a tendency to select and uncritically accept information that 
reassures their existing views, whereas they avoid or dispute information that is not in line with 
their ideologies, identities or issue attitudes (Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2017; Stroud 2008). 
These processes are not necessarily rational or conscious. People have a tendency to avoid 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) when selecting and processing information. Hence, 
incongruent information results in discomfort and is consequentially more likely to be avoided 
or counter-argued. Congruent information, in contrast, reassures a positive and consistent self-
image and is more likely to be approached and uncritically accepted (Taber & Lodge 2006).  
This information setting, and such biased processing by citizens, may facilitate the spread 
of populist ideas across society. In an era where the veracity of facts is less influential than 




information that reassures echo chambers or existing ideological identities, and in a digital 
information setting where non-professional communicators can express themselves without the 
interference of journalistic gatekeepers that verify statements or sources, fact-free and populist 
sentiments may not only reach the audience in increasingly more pervasive ways, but they may 
also have a strong impact on people’s beliefs and political decisions when they reassure the hopes 
and fears they are experiencing.  
In this paper, the relationship between populism and discourses of truth and dishonesty 
is explored theoretically. In addition, based on the conceptual connection between populism and 
discourses of (un)truthfulness, theses on the political consequences of spreading populist realities 
and accusations of dishonesty are advanced. By conceptualizing the connection between 
populism and the truth, this paper does not only contribute to a better understanding of the 
electoral success of populist parties around the globe, it also postulates practical 
recommendations on how different actors responsible for the supply of political information 
should deal with the challenge of populism. Can we actually think about practical solutions to 
mitigate the potential negative consequences of the rise of fact-free sentiments in a time where 
the truth has increasingly become more subjective? Can we re-connect truth and politics (Arendt 
1969; Manot 2017) by helping citizens to distinguish facts from alternative realities and 
conspiracies introduced by populists? Here, it should be stressed that political decision-making 
is not necessarily rational. Even though people may vote for populist parties because they feel 
that these parties are best able to represent their needs (Aalberg et al. 2017), they may not always 
be capable or motivated to find the truth. Emotions or prior attitudes and behaviors may motivate 
political action, and populist communication may intentionally seek to respond to these emotions 
and heuristics. The key contribution of this manuscript is to explore the role of reality and 
alternative facts in populist discourse, which may contribute to our understanding of increasing 
relativism toward facts in a post-truth world (Van Aelst et al. 2017) connected to the rise of the 
populist zeitgeist (Mudde 2004).  
Defining Populism as a Discursive Frame in Politics, Media and Society   
Populism has been defined in different ways. The most cited conceptualization considers 
populism to be a ‘thin’ ideology that revolves around the expression of a Manichean divide 
between the ordinary people and the corrupt elites (Mudde 2004). This ideology is thin or 
incomplete as it does not entail a full or all-encompassing frame of reference to comprehend socio-
political reality (Mudde 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). It simplifies political issues by 
filtering them through a perceptual screen such that society is divided by the ordinary people 
versus the corrupt elite that block the interests of the homogenous people. The thin core of 
populism may be supplemented by different host ideologies, such as nativism (right-wing 
populism) or economic inclusionism (left-wing populism). 
We regard populism as a set of ideas that can be communicated, experienced and primed, 
on both the supply-side (i.e., political parties) and the demand-side (i.e., voters). Taking the 
premises of the ideational approach as a point of departure, populism can be approached from a 
communication or stylistic perspective (Aalberg et al. 2017; Jagers & Walgrave 2007; Moffitt 2016). 
More specifically, the populist ideas of politicians become tangible through the language they 
communicate, and they need a medium to express their realities to the voters they claim to 




represent. On the demand-side, citizens gain familiarity with the issue positions of populists, and 
populist ideas of other actors, through the information channels they select and attend to. Hence, 
to comprehend the challenges of populism and the political consequences of populist rhetoric, 
we have to focus on populist communication as a starting point (Aalberg et al. 2017). 
Indeed, a growing body of research indicates how populist ideas are expressed by 
politicians via the media, and social media in particular (Engesser et al. 2017; Ernst et al. 2018). 
Social media channels allow communicators to circumvent mainstream elites and media channels 
that populists accuse of spreading lies. By circumventing journalistic principles, routines and 
roles that involve the verification of claims and sources, populists can use social media to their 
advantage and directly communicate to the ordinary people they claim to represent, whilst 
relying on a fact-free and hostile discourse that cultivates the boundary between the ordinary 
people and the culpable others. Hence, as populist voters are known to doubt the mainstream 
media and even regard the information spread by the media elite as Fake News (Fawzi 2018; 
Schulz et al. 2018), the direct communication of fact-free populist sentiments via social media 
channels is an effective channel to reach the populist electorate. 
Populism and the Hidden Truth: Conspiracy Theories and Populist Rhetoric    
Populists do not only attribute blame to the allegedly corrupt elite for failing to represent 
the ordinary people’s will, they also frequently point to a hidden reality, or conspiracy of different 
actors that are said to cooperate to deprive the people (Bergmann 2019; Silva et al., 2017;) This is 
most salient in the discourse of right-wing populist actors who, for example, claim that the 
mainstream elite and immigrants are collaborating to ‘replace’ the native population. On the left-
wing, such conspiracies mainly entail an alleged collaboration between the extreme rich (i.e., 
banks, the wealthy 1%) and the political elite that contributes to a widening gap between the 
extreme rich and the extreme poor (Aalberg et al. 2017). Indeed, extant literature has defined an 
important affinity between populist discourse and conspiracy theories (Bergmann 2018; Silva et 
al. 2017). Following the rise of populist movements in the 21st century, it can be observed that 
populist conspiracies have been connected to many different issues. Climate change policies are, 
for example, frequently referred to as a conspiracy between elite actors and the mainstream media 
that hide reality from the ordinary people in order to promote their own agenda. Right-wing 
populists oftentimes introduce an alternative reality (i.e. climate change is a hoax and a waste of 
resources) and blame the media and opposed political actors for lying to the people.  
But what are the key components of a populist conspiracy, and how is this connected to 
the discursive relationship between populism and the truth? 
Just as  populism cultivates an antagonistic divide between the ordinary people and the 
corrupt elite, a conspiracy theory is Manichean in nature (Barkun 2003; Oliver & Wood 2014). 
More specifically, conspiracy theories emphasize that an ‘evil’ elitist outsider is posing a threat to 
the in-group (Barkun 2003). Hence, in conspiracy theories, the powerful elites are blamed for 
hiding the truth from the people; they cover up reality in order to promote their own evil schemes. 
Conspiracy theories further highlight a severe sense of distrust and skepticism toward the 
established truth, and knowledge that is created by the established order (Barkun 2003). This 
element of conspiracy theories can be used to conceptually link populism to discourses of 
(un)truthfulness. More specifically, populist rhetoric attacks the established order, including the 




empirical evidence and experts that are regarded as part of the elitist enemy. These mainstream 
sources of verified information and realities are regarded as a tool of the powerful in conspiracy 
theories (Fenster 2008). Hence, the powerful elite are said to deliberately spread falsehoods and 
‘fake’ realities to maintain their own power positions, to silence the oppressed voices, and to 
prevent mobilization of the people. 
This worldview is shared by many populists. Hence, the elites are oftentimes accused of 
silencing the voice of the ordinary people, and for deliberately lying to the silenced majority in 
order to promote their own political agenda (Hameleers 2018). Populism therefore does not only 
involve the expression of a binary divide between ‘us and them,’ it also aims to reveal a 
perseverant struggle between the truth and honesty of the people and the fake reality forced upon 
the electorate by the elites. Populism’s understanding of these elites does not limit itself to the 
established political order, or to politicians in government. Indeed, the mainstream media, 
referred to as the Fake News media by many radical right-wing populists throughout the globe, 
corporations, or the corrupt monitory institutions that steal from the honest people (an idea that 
is also salient in left-wing populism), and supranational institutions, such as the unresponsive 
European Union, can all be scapegoated in populist rhetoric. European right-wing populists, for 
example, frequently blame the European Union and national governments for deceiving the 
ordinary people: Their global climate change and refugee policies are referred to as conspiracies 
intended to profit from the people’s welfare whilst depriving them of their identities.    
In many cases, populists explicitly point to a conspiracy between different enemies of the 
people (Bergmann 2019; Silva et al., 2017). For example, the political elites are accused of secretly 
collaborating with banks or corporations to fill their own pockets, whilst depriving the ordinary 
people. This ‘chameleonic’ nature of populist out-group constructions also explains why populist 
actors can remain populist when in power. Although they have become part of the political 
establishment themselves, they can distract their followers and continue to express their populist 
issue positions by shifting blame to other elites. Perhaps the most influential example of this 
discursive shift can be observed in the case of Donald Trump in the US. Prior to the elections, the 
Democrats and the political elites in government were his main target of blame shifting. Yet, after 
becoming president of the US, different out-groups were invented, among which the Fake News 
Media is the most salient (Hameleers 2018). Against this backdrop, cultivating a conspiracy that 
involves different elitist groups that are accused of posing a threat to the ordinary people becomes 
a very effective and adjustable communication tactic for populists that gain political power. 
Populist Disinformation: How Populism Delegitimizes Established Truths 
The centrality of attributing blame to the mainstream media and established truths in 
populist discourse links up to the politics of disinformation. Disinformation can be defined as the 
intentional spread of untrue or dishonest information (Freelon & Wells 2020; Tandoc Jr. et al. 
2018; Wardle 2017) and can be deployed to achieve electoral success or discredit the opposed 
party, for example. Disinformation has frequently been associated with the politics of the radical 
right-wing, a party family that may spread dishonest information to augment polarized divides 
in society and to raise distrust and cynicism in the established political order (Marwick & Lewis 
2017). Disinformation can be associated with many different topics and issues, such as the 
European refugee crisis of 2015, the pandemic coronavirus in 2020, or governmental 




communication related to climate change. Central to recent disinformation campaigns is that 
political actors manipulate or fabricate information in order to make it reflect their political 
agenda (Freelon & Wells 2020). This may not only be harmful as it can cultivate factual 
misperceptions, it may also have consequences on less rational perceptions by contributing to 
affective polarization and to negative out-group emotions (Marwick & Lewis 2017).  
Disinformation may involve different practices, such as the decontextualization of 
information to fit a certain (partisan) issue position, the pairing of different sources of multimodal 
information to present an alternative storyline, or the complete fabrication and manipulation of 
reality to communicate a new reality that is out of touch with the objective truth (Wardle 2017). 
One example of disinformation that relies on different modalities to fabricate often political 
stories is Deep Fake News, in which deep learning technologies and artificial intelligence are used 
to make real people say fake things. Such forms of manipulation may be highly persuasive as 
audiovisual content is typically perceived as credible and authentic. 
As argued by Waisbord (2018), we can identify a clear relationship between populism and 
the politics of disinformation. Disinformation is defined by its political intentions; actors who 
communicate fact-free or fabricated stories do so in order to change or disrupt the established 
order (Freelon & Wells 2020; Wardle 2017). Such tactics also underline populism’s references to 
(un)truthfulness. Populist actors attribute blame to the established truths and knowledge to 
delegitimize the status quo and established facts to create momentum for alternative worldviews 
that cultivate people centrism (Marwick & Lewis 2017). In doing so, they may contribute to 
increasing relativism toward established knowledge and expert sources. Such relativism may 
contribute to factual misperceptions among the electorate, but can also undermine trust in the 
authorities or official sources of information. As an example, right-wing populist actors across 
the globe expressed distrust in the WHO and other sources of expert knowledge during the 
coronavirus outbreak in 2020. For interventions proposed by the government to be successful, it 
is important that citizens trust factual information about the pandemic. 
Populist actors, and radical right-wing populists more specifically, often attack 
mainstream and established knowledge by casting doubt on the honesty and accuracy of the 
information spread by the mainstream. Hence, journalists of established media channels are 
frequently personally attacked for disseminating lies that hurt the ordinary people. By allegedly 
neglecting reality, and by not relying on accurate information, the legitimacy of the mainstream 
press is attacked, and voters are told that they should no longer trust the mainstream media that 
aims to damage the people. The same tactics are applied to empirical evidence and expert 
knowledge; by pointing to a conspiracy between elite expert and politicians, and/or by 
delegitimizing evidence as left-wing propaganda, populists emphasize that the sources of 
information spread by the mainstream are not trustworthy, and should not be taken into account 
in making political decisions. Such accusations have severe consequences. By delegitimizing 
established truths, populists cultivate momentum for an alternative reality that resonates with 
their supporters’ perceptual screens. Hence, motivated by the desire to maintain cognitive 
consonance and confirm prior held beliefs, people may be persuaded by information that 
resonates with their identities, values and beliefs,  irrespective of its veracity (Nyhan & Reifler 
2010; Van Aelst et al. 2017). Populist communicators are known to strategically respond to 




people’s perceived deprivation, anger, and fear. By tailoring their blame attributions in such a 
way that they respond to these sentiments, populists may be highly effective in communicating 
issue positions that lack any factual basis. But what are the central features of the ‘alternative 
reality’ that populists do convey to their followers? What reality do they contrast to the ‘fake’ 
reality propagated by the elites? 
Populist Reality: Prioritizing the People’s Experiences and Feelings over Reason and Facts 
Populist rhetoric strongly resonates with people centrism (Aalberg et al. 2017; Jagers & 
Walgrave 2007). This means that the experiences, interpretations, and analyses of the ordinary 
people should be the focal point of politics according to the populist rationale. Moreover, 
ordinary people should be regarded as more authentic and trustworthy sources than the 
dishonest elites. Indeed, extant research has shown that populist citizens have specific 
preferences for information in their daily news environment; expert knowledge and analyses 
should be circumvented, whereas the ordinary people and their interpretations should play a 
central role in the news (Hameleers et al. 2017). Hence, the ‘populist reality’ may be regarded as 
an interpretation of socio-political reality in which the people’s experiences and analyses are at 
the center stage, and expert knowledge and verified empirical evidence are received with doubt 
and skepticism. 
Such a populist reality resonates with the key stylistic features of populist communication. 
Hence, populists rely more on emotional language, common sense, conflict-coverage, and 
simplifications than mainstream actors do (Aalberg et al. 2017). More specifically, populists 
simplify reality into a power struggle between the good people and the evil elite, and rely on an 
emotional language to cultivate in-group identification and distance to the ‘evil’ outsiders 
(Hameleers et al. 2017; Wirz 2018). This populist reality further emphasizes that the ordinary 
people are part of an honest in-group, who are victimized by external pressures they cannot 
directly control. Hence, the ordinary people are depicted as pure and virtuous, and are much 
closer to reality than the elites that reside in their ivory towers. 
The reality of the ordinary people prioritizes feelings and common sense over empirical 
evidence, which is said to be fabricated or invented to support the status quo anyway (Hameleers 
2018). Hence, according to the populist rationale, when people are driven by their common sense, 
many pressing issues will be solved. Or even better, common sense may reveal that some 
problems do not even exist, but are rather invented or fabricated by the elites to maintain the 
power discrepancy between the established order and the silenced others (i.e., climate change). 
This again connects to an alleged populist conspiracy theory where the evil forces of power are 
accused of creating problems that do not really exist in order to maintain their position in power 
and silence the ordinary people. 
The reliance on the people’s knowledge and experiences in populist reality constructions 
can be extrapolated to the media preferences of populist citizens (Hameleers et al. 2017; Schulz et 
al. 2018). More specifically, people with stronger populist attitudes are found to prefer news 
coverage that quotes ordinary citizens instead of experts (Hameleers et al. 2017). These ordinary 
people, in turn, are trusted most when they describe their own experiences and feelings toward 
specific events or developments (i.e., refugees entering the native people’s country or crime rate 
developments). Populist cultivation of reality prioritizes episodic and conflict framing to interpret 




issues so that anecdotic evidence is trusted more than empirical evidence, which is related to 
some distant ‘fabricated’ and elitist construction of truthfulness. 
Populist reality constructions may not only be characterized by a specific type of framing, 
but also by prioritizing some issues over others. Hence, some topics may be deemed more 
important in populist reality, whereas other issues are deemed as not being worth any attention 
at all. In line with extant literature on populism, there are two issues in general that are typically 
owned by right-wing populist parties: criminality and immigration (Aalberg et al. 2017; Smith 
2010). More specifically, right-wing populist worldviews claim that these two issues should 
receive most attention in political decision-making, and politicians (i.e., the elite) who are not 
acknowledging the priority of these issues are accused of looking away, or only serving their own 
corrupt agenda. To provide an example, radical right-wing populists in Europe stress that Islam 
is the greatest threat to the Western world. At the same time, such populists emphasize that the 
mainstream politicians fail to see the importance of this issue; they are even blamed for protecting 
the ‘dangerous’ others. Populist realities can thus also be characterized on the agenda level in 
which the allocation of political and financial resources is depicted as a zero-sum game; the 
attention and money spent on supposed non-issues, like climate change, is a waste and should 
be spent to deal with ‘real’ and more pressing issues facing the ordinary people. 
The Political Consequences of Spreading Populist Truths and Disinformation  
Exposure to populist realities and disinformation may have far-reaching political 
consequences. As indicated by recent experimental research (Hameleers et al. 2018; Matthes & 
Schmuck 2017; Wirz 2018) and survey data paired with content analyses (Müller et al. 2017), 
exposure to populist worldviews may activate similar interpretation frames among receivers. At 
the same time, mis- or disinformation has been shown to result in factual misperceptions, or 
inaccurate attitudes among voters (Thorson, 2016). How should we understand the process by 
which receivers are affected by populist reality and disinformation constructions, and what are 
the consequences on a societal level? 
Populist rhetoric may affect people on an individual level by activating or priming 
support for a populist worldview or ideology (Bos et al, 2019). More specifically, populist 
references to reality emphasize a binary divide between the truthful ‘us’ and the lying or 
dishonest ‘them,’ which may activate similar mental schemata among voters. Hence, as shown in 
negative stereotyping research, exposure to binary worldviews and negative stereotypes may 
make negative stereotypes highly salient and accessible in the minds of receivers (Dixon 2008). 
Thus, when citizens are exposed to populist realities in their daily environment, for example in 
their news media diets, their interpretation frames may become more aligned with populist 
realities. When they need to arrive at a political decision (voting, attributing, responsibility) the 
primed stereotypes may be used as a heuristic cue; the elite is punished and the populist 
contenders who voice similar negative stereotypes are rewarded at the ballot box. Exposure to 
populist ideas may thus even correspond to a higher populist vote intention (Hameleers et al. 
2017). 
The theoretical framework of priming and negative stereotyping presupposes that 
populist worldviews and (mis)perceptions of reality are not easily created or altered. Hence, 
populist worldviews and realities may be relatively stable traits that are not easily swayed by 




cues in people’s information environment. This means that misperceptions may not be created 
when people are exposed to populist realities or disinformation, but rather that pre-existing 
incorrect perceptions of a populist reality are reinforced or activated when people are exposed to 
disinformation and populism (Hameleers et al. 2018). 
As a key political consequence, existing divides in society may be strengthened or 
augmented when populist realities are disseminated through online information channels. More 
specifically, people who oppose populist interpretations of reality (i.e., those who prefer 
empirical evidence and expert-centered news coverage) may not only reject populist worldviews, 
they may also counter-argue populist ideas when exposed to populist realities. This means that 
their existing disapproval of populist realities and their preference for expert-based coverage and 
empirical evidence is activated. At the same time, people with pre-existing populist worldviews 
may selectively expose themselves to more populist news coverage, and these self-selected 
populist realities may further prime their existing worldviews (Hameleers 2019; Müller et al. 
2018). This means that, as a key political consequence of the spread of populist constructions of 
(un)truthfulness, the societal divide between supporters and opposers of populist worldviews 
may be further consolidated, and the cleavage between the ordinary people and the elite may be 
reinforced. 
The perseverance of such populist echo chambers can be explained in the framework of 
defensive motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957; Taber & Lodge 
2006). More specifically, people have a tendency to process information in a way that confirms 
their prior attitudes; incongruent information is avoided, rejected or counter-argued, whereas 
congruent information stands a higher stance of selection and acceptance. When people’s prior 
attitudes are in line with populist constructions of (un)truthfulness, they are more likely to accept 
these populist interpretations of reality. When people are exposed to populist reality 
constructions that run counter to their views, in contrast, they may reject or avoid these 
interpretations to prevent cognitive dissonance. Another key political consequence of the spread 
of populist constructions of reality can be connected to the characterization of the current 
information setting as post-truth or post factual (Lewandowsky et al. 2012; Van Aelst et al. 2017). 
In other words, in the midst of the perseverance of technological affordances of high-choice and 
fragmented media, the ‘objective truth’ has increasingly become a matter of interpretation and 
opinion, and the evidential value of facts is no longer undebatable. Hence, in line with populist 
worldviews, expert knowledge and evidence is seen as subjective, and dismissed as a tool of the 
powerful elite to maintain their power positions, and to manipulate the general public. Citizens 
that support populist worldviews may thus become increasingly more skeptical of empirical 
evidence and expert opinion as these sources of knowledge are regarded as part of hidden evil 
forces that hide the reality the ordinary people are living and witnessing. Facts and verifiable 
evidence may thus lose power in a society where populist worldviews prevail since these sources 
of truth conflict with a people-centric and anti-elitist worldview. 
Dealing with the Challenge of Populist Realities 
Although the omnipresence of populist realities in the media, public opinion and politics 
may be regarded as a key threat to representative democracy and democratic communication 
(Waisbord 2018), there are some potential treatment recommendations that we can put forward. 




Here, we can rely on two potential interventions that have been applied to political 
communication, and disinformation more specifically: news media literacy interventions (Vraga 
& Tully 2016; Tully et al. 2019; Vraga & Tully 2019) and corrective information that refutes 
disinformation (Hameleers & van der Meer 2019; Nyhan et al. 2019; Wood & Porter 2018). 
Generally, we can discern two ways of combating the potential negative consequences of the 
spread of populist realities—initiatives that make the audience more critical and resistant by 
inducing their critical skills before populist disinformation is received (pre-bunking), and tools 
that respond to populist reality constructions by verifying and refuting falsehoods (de-bunking). 
Even though we should not understand political decision-making as an exclusively rational 
process on the individual-level of voters who are guided by facts and empirical evidence, making 
facts easily available to citizens and offering recommendations on how the facts can be 
distinguished from erroneous information and lies can help citizens to navigate the increasingly 
more complex digital information setting. Hence, the aim is to make factual reality central to 
political disagreement: even though citizens may disagree on causal and treatment attributions 
for problems experienced in society, these sources of disagreement should be based on agreement 
on the underlying facts.  
In the setting of the correction of disinformation, fact checkers that debunk falsehoods 
have received most empirical attention (Hameleers & van der Meer 2019; Nyhan & Reifler 2010; 
Thorson 2016). The results of most experimental research are mixed: in some cases, fact-checkers 
that rely on empirical evidence to refute incorrect claims in political communication may help to 
correct misperceptions (Hameleers & van der Meer 2019; Nyhan et al. 2019), whereas other 
research points to a central role of defensive motivated reasoning (Thorson, 2016). This means 
that, when news consumers are exposed to false information (in our case populist reality 
constructions that rely on inaccurate and fact-free statements to attack the elite) that they strongly 
agree with, they will avoid, reject or even counter-argue corrective information presented in fact-
checkers. A so-called ‘backfire effect’ of corrections is, however, not identified in recent research 
that shows that fact checkers are at least capable of correcting factual misperceptions among 
partisans, even if their ideological lenses align with the communicative untruthfulness 
(Hameleers & Van der Meer 2019; Nyhan et al. 2019). Overall, research on fact-checking indicates 
that factual misperceptions can be corrected by exposing people to facts (Wood & Porter 2018), 
but ideological or affective perceptions are relatively hard to change by confronting people with 
the factual reality.  
Even though fact-checkers that debunk populists’ false representations of reality may be 
effective at times, there are at least three major drawbacks that can be associated with debunking. 
First of all, although factual misperceptions can be corrected on a short term, fact-checkers do not 
affect the evaluation of candidates or ideological identities (Nyhan et al. 2019). This corresponds 
to the notion that politics is not only about making rational judgements pertaining to the veracity 
of information, but also a matter of identity and emotions. As argued by Arendt (1969), 
democracy is about opinions, but these opinions should be based on agreement on the basic facts. 
Second, in times of information overload and fragmentation, it is impossible to verify all political 
information that reaches citizens. Hence, the setting of personalized communication implies that 
it is hard to establish an individual’s news diet, so how can we reach people with corrections in a 
fragmented news setting if we do not even know what falsehoods they have seen? Extant 




experimental research has mainly looked at the effects of fact-checkers in a forced exposure, 
artificial media setting, but we know little about the real-life effects. Third, although backfire 
effects may be scarce, there is at least evidence that fact-checkers are less likely to be selected 
when they attack existing views (Hameleers & Van der Meer 2019), which indicates that the actual 
impact of corrective information spread via platforms such as PolitiFact.com or factcheck.org is 
rather limited. Given these challenges, what can we do to mitigate the impact of populist 
untruthfulness? 
Extant research has shown that media literacy interventions can induce news consumers’ 
critical skills (Tully, Vraga, & Bode 2019). Media literacy can be defined as the critical skills 
needed for news audiences to navigate their information environment (Aufderheide 1993; 
Ashley, Maksl, & Craft 2017), as well as the skill to recognize disinformation (Tully et al. 2019). 
As shown by Tully et al. (2019), news media literacy interventions that teach audiences how to 
recognize and deal with disinformation can have an impact on misperceptions, although one 
single learning intervention may not be enough to make an impact. Yet, news media literacy 
interventions may be a powerful weapon in the fight against disinformation as they are not 
connected to one single news article, which also means that their effects depend less on existing 
partisan ideologies or existing attitudes. Moreover, they may reduce the impact of all instances 
of disinformation that reach news consumers in fragmented digital information settings, as they 
induce critical skills among citizens that they can use whenever they encounter novel 
information. In the long term, governmental interventions and educational packages may help to 
promote more critical skills among news consumers and  the impact of disinformation and 
populist constructions of reality may be reduced drastically. Yet, we need more empirical 
research on the effectiveness of pre-bunking initiatives to populist constructions of 
disinformation. 
Discussion 
It has frequently been argued that our current information society poses a threat to 
democracy. Among other things, the affordances of social media may have contributed to a 
fragmented and high-choice information setting (Bennett & Iyengar 2008; Stroud 2008) in which 
citizens show a tendency to selectively expose themselves to content that confirms their own 
frames of reference (Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2017). In this setting, alternative constructions of 
reality or disinformation may prevail since attitude-consistent information stands a higher chance 
of selection and acceptance than incongruent information, irrespective of the veracity of such 
content. Defensive motivated reasoning may thus be stimulated in a high choice information 
setting (Bennett & Iyengar 2008), and this may give rise to a so-called post-factual communication 
era (Van Aelst et al. 2017). In such a context, objective, verified evidence may be regarded as 
truthful insofar it confirms people’s existing views, and alternative realities that contradict 
empirical evidence are readily available in high-choice information settings. 
Such an information landscape provides the contextual backdrop for the central 
relationship between populism and (un)truthfulness explored in this paper. When people can 
shape their own biased information environment, expert knowledge and empirical evidence may 
be circumvented, whereas people-centric and anti-elite constructions of the truth may prevail at 
times of increasing distrust in mainstream institutions. More specifically, I identified three levels 




of affinity between the politics of populism and (un)truthfulness: (1) populist conspiracy theories 
that point to a deliberately hidden truth; (2) a populist de-legitimization of established expert-
based knowledge; and, (3) the introduction of alternative realities that resonate with a populist 
people-centric and anti-elitist worldview. Together, these associations between populism and 
discourses of (un)truthfulness give rise to political disinformation in two ways; elite knowledge 
and information is dismissed as untruthful or Fake News (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019), and 
people-centric experiences, emotions, and common sense are seen as more accurate and truthful 
than rational, verified and expert-based knowledge.  
The perseverance of populist constructions of reality and disinformation have severe 
political consequences, of which three are most central. First, when accusations of dishonesty and 
conspiracy theories resonate with citizens’ existing populist perceptual screens, they can result in 
factual misperceptions. The attacked elites and experts are distrusted and regarded as the 
peoples’ enemies, irrespective of the factual basis of the accusations. An uninformed electorate 
may be dangerous for democracy, as voters are not able to base their political decisions and 
accountability on factual information, and instead rely on emotions and sentiments that can easily 
be swayed or manipulated by political actors that aim to gain power, such as radical right-wing 
populists. Second, such confirmation biases and defensive motivated reasoning may augment 
polarized divides in societies; people with populist interpretation frames may increasingly be 
separated from people who do trust expert knowledge and empirical evidence. One example is 
the increasing cleavage between right-wing populists and the left in Western European countries 
that have historically been regarded as relatively less polarized. Finally, the salience of 
accusations of Fake News and the introduction of alternative fact-free interpretations may cause 
more confusion and skepticism among citizens, who may no longer be able to discern truthfulness 
from dishonest and manipulated information. This is even more important in the setting of 
increased technologies and artificial intelligence. More specifically, it is already possible to 
fabricate audiovisual material that looks authentic. So-called Deep Fakes are already being used 
to make an existing person say and do things they never did, and they are increasingly easier to 
make. These technologies are rapidly evolving, and, when in the wrong hands, can be regarded 
as powerful tools for political actors to influence society and public opinion in a goal-directed 
way. 
Despite these threats to democracy, this paper ends on a more positive note. Different 
interventions have been developed to combat the consequences of untrue or biased information, 
of which news media literacy interventions and fact-checkers are potentially the most salient 
examples. Although fact-checkers that refute partisan disinformation may be effective 
(Hameleers & van der Meer 2019; Nyhan et al. 2019) they cannot keep up with the high pace and 
fragmentation of today’s stream of digital information, and they may not be selected by citizens 
that disagree with their attacks on their beliefs (Hameleers & van der Meer 2019). It may thus be 
important to make news consumers more media savvy, and stimulate more critical skills and 
healthy skepticism needed to filter out inaccurate and dishonest information from reality. In this 
setting, pre-bunking initiatives and news media literacy interventions have been regarded as 
viable alternatives to make people more resistant to persuasion by communicative untruthfulness 
(Tully et al. 2019). Yet, evidence on their effectiveness is scarce, and messages that tell people how 
they should behave are at risk of being rejected or avoided. Again, this indicates the challenge of 




interventions that aim to combat disinformation by confronting people with facts: people are not 
always consciously and rationally navigating the digital information environment, and may 
accept and approach information that confirms their ideological perceptual screens that act as 
filters to distinguish convenient realities from factual information that undermines their beliefs.  
Against this backdrop, we can formulate the following practical recommendation. News 
media literacy interventions should be tailored to overcome confirmation biases (Tully et al. 2019) 
and frequently repeated through different channels to make sure that these messages actually 
reach people with different ideological leanings. Even though political decisions are not always 
rational, fact-free discourses may best be combated by making factual information easily 
accessible for all citizens. Moreover, these interventions should reach people at a younger age, 
and should also provide practical recommendations on how to deal with the challenge of populist 
disinformation—what can people do to expose themselves to balanced and truthful information 
that does not simply confirm their priors? Finally, these news media literacy interventions should 
be combined with de-bunking initiatives that should have a preventative impact on the longer 
term. Repeated exposure to fact-checkers should induce more knowledge and confidence in 
media consumers so they can recognize falsehoods and manipulative content in their daily 
information environment. 
Although this paper aims to offer new conceptual insights into the alignment between 
populism and (un)truthfulness, and its potential consequences and remedies, future empirical 
research is needed to map the salience of populist constructions of reality and dishonesty, and 
the effects of such constructions on public opinion. We lack research on the impact of populist 
ideas and disinformation in real-life settings. How are populist constructions of reality and 
disinformation reaching people in a fragmented information setting, and how are people affected 
by it outside of artificial laboratory settings? When future research sheds more light on the 
process by which citizens are affected, we can also start to design more effective interventions 
that can prevent the political consequences of dishonest populist communication among societies 
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In the Introduction of your book, Democracy in Chains, you write that "the single most powerful and least 
understood threat to democracy today" is "the attempt by the billionaire-backed radical right to undo 
democratic governance" (xvii). It is very clear that you mean this statement without exaggeration. Why do 
you think this is so little understood? Why do you think it should be our most pressing concern? Finally, 
how do we combat these billionaire-funded radicals who are determined to de-democratize the United 
States? 
Nancy MacLean (NM): I think the reason that this threat is so little understood is that the 
architects of this project do not want it to be understood by the majority. They understand that 
what they are really seeking would be repellent to the majority and can only succeed by means 
of stealth and incremental changes of the governing rules of our society, including the legal and 
constitutional rules. Therefore, they are trying to achieve what they are doing kind of behind the 
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public's back. They, of course, have public faces. In fact, the Koch network funds over 150 
organizations in the United States alone - not counting the overseas ones. And all those 
organizations of course have public faces, but the key elements of this project are being done in 
stealth by deliberate misinformation and disinformation. For example, consider climate science 
denial and promoting the myth of voter fraud to justify voter suppression. And we could go on 
about the other stealth efforts. In summary, the reason why it is so ill understood is that they do 
not want us to understand it. They would like to go under the radar. And in fact, Charles Koch 
has said that his father had an expression that the whale that surfaces is the one that gets 
harpooned. They would much rather operate in secret. And in fact, a new book on the Koch 
business empire called "Kochland" by a business reporter shows that secrecy is also built into the 
Koch industries business model. That addresses why it is ill-understood. 
 
Why do you think it should be our most pressing concern? 
NM: The reason it should be our most pressing concern is that the scale of money that the Koch 
network is investing in all these operations to render our democracy dysfunctional for the 
majority has absolutely no parallel in contemporary life. No parallel in history. This is so 
audacious and radical and effort that the social sciences do not even have a concept for what is 
happening. We have let inequality develop in our society to such an absurd extent that Charles 
Koch and his recently deceased brother, David Koch were among the two wealthiest men in the 
world each having a fortune of some $50 billion. As a result, investing hundreds of millions of 
dollars to change our society is chump change to them. It is pocket change. Their political 
spending is so significant that it rivals the major political parties. At times when it is not election 
time, it is even more than those political parties. It is vast. And I think an alternative way to get 
it, why it's so important and why it should be the urgent focus, is that if we took that Koch money 
out of our political system and those organizations that it funds out of the public conversation, 
we would be having very different experience of the last 20 years and of the future. For one thing, 
we would be able to act on the catastrophic threat to our planet that comes from fossil fuel 
industries like Koch industries at this point. 
The foundations that Charles Koch is associated with are the leading funders of climate 
science denial. By Greenpeace calculations they have provided over $127 million to organizations 
engaged in climate science denial. In other words, deliberately trying to deceive the public about 
what the science is telling us. I cannot even find words to describe the human impact of that. And 
the number - the millions of people whose lives will be harmed, disrupted, and sometimes lost 
entirely because of that effort. For example, the UN estimates conservatively that by 2050, we will 
have 150 million climate migrants in the world and that is a conservative estimate. Some other 
estimates predict 2 billion. This is what this fossil fuel industry is doing to us and Koch industries 
leads the effort. 
 
It is interesting because Koch industries is not publicly traded. So, there is no stakeholder intervention or 
potential for intervention because it is not publicly traded. Do you think that makes this more dangerous? 
NM: Yes. I write about this in the book and others who have written about the Koch industries 
business model have also commented on this. Charles Koch is contemptuous of publicly  traded 




companies because they do have transparency and therefore do not engage in the kind of very 
long-term strategic planning that Koch does and are subject to shareholder and other public 
pressures. I might add here your university has a Koch funded center on campus - the Center for 
Free Enterprise. And as a scholar, it is mystifying to me that university administrators would take 
monies from an organization like the Charles Koch Foundation knowing what they have done to 
our political system and particularly knowing that they have engaged in systematic 
misinformation about the science of climate change. I do not see how any university can host 
disciplines in the sciences and in good faith recruit students and faculty to the sciences when they 
are also taking money from the Charles Koch foundation and its associates. 
 
What can students do about that? 
NM: Well, I think all citizens can do something about this Koch network. The single most 
important finding of my research is that the Koch network is operating in the way that it is 
because they understand that they are a permanent ideological majority, that nobody wants to 
live in the world they are trying to create. And that is why they have used the strategies that they 
have. Therefore, just bringing sunshine to this by informing the greatest number of people 
possible about who they really are, what they are up to and how they work is a huge contribution. 
Students can alert other students, alert faculty, alert community members, alert donors, 
alert alumni, and alert the press to the dangers of these Koch centers is important. There is a 
wonderful organization called UnKoch My Campus. That organization was created by two 
students who attended universities with large Koch centers. One of them, the flagship Koch center 
at George Mason University that I wrote about in Democracy in Chains, and the other is at Florida 
State University. And the students witnessed firsthand, over four years, how the Koch presence 
on their campus undermined academic integrity and created all kinds of problems. Their reports 
on these centers document how universities welcome this presence at their own peril and that 
has been shown, case after case. Their website is full of good materials on that and reports that 
really show the dangers of Koch investment. I think if students took the leadership on this it could 
have a very big impact. 
 
The Koch brothers publicly denounced Trump in the last election – breaking, arguably, their Republican 
allegiance. What does this mean for the Republican party? Do you think that this foreshadows the 
splintering of the right between libertarians and populists? 
NM: I do not think David Koch, who is now deceased, ever said anything against Donald Trump. 
David met with Trump at Mar-a-Lago, but Charles Koch at one point described Donald Trump 
as a monster. I think that Charles Koch probably finds Donald Trump to be vulgar - someone he 
would never invite over for dinner. But at the same time, the Trump administration has been very 
useful for the Koch network. When Charles Koch boasted at a donor summit last year, he said: 
we have gotten more accomplished together in the last five years than I was able to accomplish 
in the previous fifty years. At another donor summit, he said we have accomplished more in the 
last year than the previous ten years. 
In other words, things are going swimmingly for them in many domains in the Trump 
administration. Key examples of that are how the Koch network through the Federalist society 




and through Donald McGahn as White House counsel were vetting all of Trump's judicial 
nominees. Trump appointed their judges to the bench. Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh were 
their choices and they invested a fortune in making sure that they were confirmed. They have 
also advised on the federal judiciary nominees that Trump has proposed. Trump has been able to 
name more federal justices to the bench than any president in living memory, thanks to Kentucky 
Senator Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority Leader. Essentially taking many of those 
appointments away from President Obama. So, in terms of defining the operating rules of our 
government and society, the legal rules, they have had huge victories through the Trump 
administration. 
The tax bill was also something their people were advising on almost daily. They boasted 
that they were in daily contact with White House. That tax bill is going to be devastating to most 
Americans over time and has already driven up the deficit considerably, which they will use then 
to argue for a constitutional convention. Additionally, they have gotten things that they want in 
domain after domain, from attacks on public education and funding for private education and 
for-profit colleges, from Betsy DeVos in the Department of Education, to unending all kinds of 
workers' rights and protections in the Labor Department under its shifting leadership over time. 
Certainly, they are getting the fossil fuel industries’ agenda through the EPA and the Department 
of Energy. In domain after domain, they are getting what they want. The one exception to that is 
tariff policy. They have not been happy with the president’s protective tariffs, but that is small 
potatoes compared to everything else that they have gotten. 
It is interesting now that Trump is facing impeachment. I have been kind of following, 
trying to see what the most Koch allied members of Congress are doing regarding this and how 
their think tanks are commenting or not commenting on it. They all seem to be sticking by the 
president. I really think that future historians and journalists are going to find out that there were 
much closer connections between members of this administration and the Koch network than 
journalists had been paying attention to. 
Trump is getting his policy directives from people who are interested and do have a stake 
in these things, and they are shaping those policies and he is putting them through. I think of him 
now as the Distractor in Chief. And in fact, one of his energy officials recently boasted about this 
in meeting with oil and gas executives, he said it is absolutely thrilling to be working for this 
administration. The president has a knack for turning the attention of the press and the people 
elsewhere while we do the work that we need to do. There are some people who portray Trump 
as kind of coming out of nowhere and being this bizarre exception in American politics. But really 
if you look historically, he is the culmination of a long process of the decay in that party. 
What the Koch network has done kind of brilliantly, and they boast about it, is basically 
change incentives and punishments to bend the Republican party to the biggest donors’ purposes. 
Through their capacity to raise huge amounts of money to invest in candidates who will toe the 
line or to primary any who do not toe the line, they get their way. The Trump base attacks 
anybody who does not toe the line. And again, you see that most dramatically in the case of 
policies related to the fossil fuel - protecting the fossil fuel industry. In Democracy in Chains, I write 
that in the 1990s, there was no difference between the two major parties in their recognition of 
global warming, climate change as human caused, and the threat that needed action. Of course, 




they differed on how to address it, but both parties recognized it as a threat that needed action. 
This dates to George Herbert Walker Bush in the early 1990s. Yet, by 2014, only 8 of 278 
Republicans in Congress would admit that climate change was happening and caused by human 
activity. It was Vice President Mike Pence who circulated that climate pledge. 
I think people need to understand that traditional notions of Democrats and Republicans 
or liberals and conservatives just do not apply anymore in understanding this situation. There 
are many Republican voters who want to make sure we have clean air and water and want to 
make sure we act on all the extreme weather. They are getting directly affected, especially in rural 
areas and coastal areas. But their party is not listening to them. It is listening to these powerful 
donors. 
 
Some scholars have argued that the rise of populism (this is assuming that Trump can be categorized, of 
course as a populist) has included the erosion of democratic institutions by weaponizing them with 
ideologues. Brett Kavanaugh and the other the federal judges that Trump has appointed are all libertarian- 
leaning. How do you think that this affects the erosion of our democratic institutions? 
NM: As a historian, I cannot talk about populism without modifier. There is reactionary 
populism, for example, I wrote about that in my first book, on the Ku Klux Klan. There's 
progressive populism: the kind that we saw in the People's Party during the 1890s and that you 
see in the Bernie Sanders campaign. Elizabeth Warren and many progressive populist 
organizations are doing great work around the country. I think that at some level, some amount 
of populism is part of the air we breathe in modern democratic societies because people who are 
campaigning for office are trying to get things done and have to appeal to masses of people. And 
anger is a powerful motivator, so they will couch what they are doing in terms that arouse 
people's anger against elites of some kind. 
But what is distinctive in the kind of populism that we are seeing from figures like Donald 
Trump and Bolsanaro in Brazil, is these reactionary populists or right-wing populists, do not give 
a damn about the people. They are using the anger of the people over decades of neoliberal 
austerity and failed promises, but they are harnessing and weaponizing that anger in order to 
move an agenda that is about corporate supremacy. It is a disgusting sleight of hand. I was just 
reading this book by Michael Lewis called The Fifth Risk and it highlights what the Trump 
administration has done in federal departments and agencies. Lewis discusses the Department of 
Agriculture, writing that Trump is a president who won the rural vote, particularly the white 
rural vote; thus, those white, rural Evangelical voters are his strongest base of support. Lewis 
argues that surely Trump would care about the Department of Agriculture given his base is rural. 
However, Lewis documents that the Trump administration did not attend the briefings by the 
Department of Agriculture to orient the new administration. They appointed Trump loyalists 
who do not care about the rural people. And if you look past the rhetoric and instead at the 
policies, you see the policies are serving corporate elites. And similar to what I learned from my 
research on Ku Klux Klan and lynchings in early 20th century America and then on this Koch led 
project in our time - it is an old trick to use populist language to achieve elitist ends. And 
considering the kind of populism that is coming from the political right now, it is attacks on elites 
who are perceived to be too liberal. Elites who are obeying the law with regard to refugees, 




upholding the dignity and rights of African Americans and Latinos and others subject to racism. 
It is a cheap trick. That is how I think about it. 
 
This is an issue on theories of populism. Thus, do you see any connections between your historical work in 
the rise of right-wing populism in the US and Trump as the culmination of a plan? 
NM: We've seen a kind of long-term deterioration in the Republican party. Many political 
scientists, historians and journalists have written about that, but there was a kind of crossing of 
the Rubicon in 1964 by making Barry Goldwater their presidential candidate, which was the 
outcome of deep organizing from college Republicans and other adult figures on the political 
right. But Barry Goldwater was really the first neoliberal candidate, free market fundamentalist, 
not on his foreign policy, where he was cold war Hawk, but domestically. He talked about 
privatizing Social Security. He was against labor unions. He wanted to prioritize the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. An agenda against minimum wage, maximum hours, all these different things. 
To get him to be the candidate the folks who were doing this (and this included William Rusher, 
who was editor of the National Review), they were very explicit in their meetings. And I've seen 
the documents from the meetings stating that they wanted to shift the Republican party from the 
Northeast, where its leaders then were based, to the, they actually said the States of the former 
Confederacy, to plant the Republican flag squarely in Dixie. And the idea was to appeal to white 
voters who were hostile to workers' rights from the CIO and the New Deal and especially to the 
Civil Rights Movement. So, when Barry Goldwater ran in 1964, he basically only won in the States 
of the Deep South that were most hostile to civil rights and his own state of Arizona. That was 
the beginning of a process that then went on through the Nixon administration. People talk about 
the Southern strategy. Ronald Reagan held his first post-convention rally after he became the 1980 
nominee in Philadelphia, Mississippi, where civil three civil rights activists had been murdered. 
That was a deliberate attempt on the part of his campaign to reach what they called the Wallace- 
inclined voters. This is clearly pandering to racism and stoking hostility using a kind of 
reactionary populism to agitate white voters to hate the federal government. 
So, this has been in play for a very long time and Donald Trump is the kind of strange 
fruit of all of that, in that he has taken this to such an extreme. In terms of his candidacy though, 
his populist stance was very helpful for him in distinguishing himself from the rest of the 
Republican field. It is hard to remember today, but all the other Republican front runners, 
including many that folks thought would be the nominee, like Jeb Bush or Marco Rubio, they had 
taken that kind of Koch pledge. They were carrying out that agenda. They were talking about 
cuts to Social Security and Medicare. They were against workers' rights. They were attacking 
public education. They denied climate change, etc. Donald Trump was the only person who had 
not taken the kind of Koch pledge and he called them puppets. And that really stuck with voters 
as they could see that something was happening to their party and he did not require them to 
take that nasty Koch medicine. He said he was going to give everybody healthcare better than 
Obamacare. No cuts in social security and Medicare. Of course, he said all the ugly things that he 
had said from the beginning about Mexican citizens and Mexicans in the United States. And he 
denied President Obama had been born in this country. 




For a Republican voter, who would not vote for a Democrat, who wanted to be loyal to 
the party, but who did not want that Koch medicine, Donald Trump looked like the guy. I think 
he used populist appeals very effectively to distinguish himself from the rest of the Republican 
field, which had bowed to the donors, that rich radical-right Donor class. The other thing I think 
that a lot people on the left do not understand is that when the radical right talks about the 
swamp, they mean something different from the rest of us. You or me or people who are writing 
for our national newspapers, they assume the swamp is K street, right? The corporate lobbyists. 
But for Trump and for James Buchanan and Charles Koch and the others, the swamp is not really 
that swamp. For them, the swamp is teachers, public school teachers who are pushing for more 
money for public education. The swamp is Planned Parenthood, which is an effective lobbyist for 
public health measures that benefit low-income people. The American Association of Retired 
People (AARP) is a big target for them. So, they think all these citizen-led organizations, labor 
unions of any description, particularly public sector unions, they think all of these organizations 
based on collective power among the citizenry are the swamp. These groups can move policy and 
get tax transfers for particular purposes. We have two understandings of the swamp that are 
completely at odds. 
From another angle, the Trump administration needs to be seen as a culmination of things 
long underway on the libertarian right. That is, they have been attacking the administrative state 
for a long time. The federal agencies, they would call them bureaucracies, they would say that 
these bureaucrats are essentially independently enforcing their will and it is a gross 
misrepresentation of how politics in a modern society operates. For every federal agency that is 
doing work, it is licensed to do that work by majoritarian representation. For example, Congress 
passes a Clean Air Act, the legislation creating the Environmental Protection Agency, but House 
and Senate members know that they do not understand the science of that, so they create the 
goals for the agency and then delegate the scientists in the agency to figure out how to accomplish 
those goals on the part of the public. The right tries to de-legitimize regulation by saying this is 
this kind of unchained administrative state with these rogue bureaucrats running roughshod. 
But, but the whole point of what they are doing is trying to get it so we will no longer use 
government to restrain corporations from harming the public or harming competition. So they 
created this whole language of the deep state that now, has been taken in whole new directions, 
but the vocabulary was created by the kinds of people that I write about in Democracy in Chains 
and that operate through these Koch organizations. 
And a lot of what they spin out along these lines is created by their academic grantees, 
their faculty grantees who work in these centers. And many of the people at these centers have 
nothing to do with academia. Yet they spin out all these policy studies that make the case for 
deregulation, attack the administrative state, etc. At the Scalia School of Law at George Mason, 
there was a project on the administrative state run by Neomi Rao, who is now a federal judge, 
thanks to Donald Trump, is in Brett Kavanaugh's old seat. One of the Koch center donors stated 
that they were going a bring her back to GMU with this multimillion-dollar center after she takes 
down the administrative state. 
Koch has been personally very strategic has been investing in changing the courts since 
the 1970s, by investing in law and economics programs, in something called the Institute for 




Justice. He also boasted that he provided seed money for the Federalist society. He understands 
that legal and constitutional rules can be used to constrain what the people in government can 
do. And it is interesting that after all these years of the right attacking what they called the activist 
judiciary, now that the power has swung the Cato Institute publishes a book called the Case for an 
Activist Judiciary. 
© 2020 The Author(s). This is an open access article published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits 
unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the original author(s) and 
the publication source are credited.  
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This paper serves three purposes relating to a lecture Adorno gave in 1967 on “the new right-wing 
extremism” that was on the rise then in West Germany; in 2019, the lecture was published in print 
for the first time in German, to wide acclaim, followed by an English translation that appeared in 
2020.  First, it is important to situate the lecture in its historical and political context, and to relate 
it to Adorno’s status as a critical theorist in West Germany.  Secondly, Adorno’s diagnosis of the 
new right-wing extremism (and related forms of populism) and his conclusions about how to resist 
and counteract it are relevant to the current political situation in the United States, even though he 
presented his analysis more than half a century ago.  Thirdly, Adorno’s lecture provided the model 
for a type of education that is oriented toward enabling students to face unpleasant facts about 
modern social life in constructive ways, including recognizing and resisting right-wing populism 
and extremism, in an age that imposes greater and greater uncertainty and challenges on 
individuals.  In conclusion, it is evident that in a rapidly changing world, the “tricks” of right-wing 
populists and extremists are astonishingly unoriginal and static, which in part may explain their 
appeal and effectiveness.  Reading the pedagogy Adorno suggested as a practical application of his 
critical theory highlights the importance of enabling individuals to recognize the “normalcy” of 
proliferating experiences of cognitive dissonance, and to respond to such experiences by adopting a 
productive rather than defeatist stance with regard to the increasing complexity and the intensifying 
contradictions of modern societies in the twenty-first century, as they are accompanied by myriad 
possibilities and threats. 
 
I consider the survival of National Socialism within democracy to be 
potentially more menacing than the survival of fascist tendencies against 
democracy. …  That fascism lives on, that the oft-invoked working 
through of the past has to this day been unsuccessful and has degenerated 
into its own caricature, an empty and cold forgetting, is due to the fact that 
the objective conditions of society that engendered fascism continue to 
exist. 
       Theodor W. Adorno ([1959] 2005, p. 90, 98) 
 
[O]ne might refer to the fascist movements as the wounds, the scars of a 
democracy that, to this day, has not yet lived up to its own concept. 
       Theodor W. Adorno ([1967] 2020, p. 9) 
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In 2019, the original German version of Theodor W. Adorno’s 1967 public lecture, “Aspekte des 
neuen Rechtsradikalismus,” appeared in print for the first time (Adorno [1967] 2019; translation: 
Aspects of the New Right-Wing Extremism, Adorno [1967] 2020; subsequently Aspects)1  Thus, the 
publication of this lecture occurred half a century after Adorno’s death in 1969, in the context of 
proliferating right-wing populist movements in Germany and elsewhere, and a growing number 
of right-wing governments around the world.  What may be most striking about the lecture, in 
retrospect, is not so much that his effort was directed at illuminating right-wing trends that are 
virulent again today, but that he did so with astonishing clarity, efficiency and accuracy so many 
years ago, while difficulties remain today to conceive of effective strategies to contain or prevent 
the destructive potential of right-wing movements and politics.   On the one hand, these 
difficulties might be indicators that the appeal of fascism and its ability to garner support is 
symptomatic of problematic dimensions of modern societies that are integral to their functioning 
and structure, such as the persistence of a spectrum of inequalities; on the other hand, this appeal 
also might be expressive of the limitations of formal democracy that today is being viewed, 
erroneously, as a sufficient substitute and approximation of an emphatic understanding of 
substantive democracy, broadly conceived.  After addressing the need to distinguish between 
populism, radicalism, and extremism, I will situate Adorno’s lecture in its historical and political 
context in the 1960s in West Germany, in the process pointing out parallels with current 
circumstances in (unified) Germany.  Next, I will provide a summary of key points of his 
diagnosis of the new right-wing extremism, focusing especially on the role of fear, and compile a 
catalogue of practical strategies and tactics he suggested for resisting and counteracting right-
wing populist ideas and forms of extremism.  Even though Adorno presented his analysis more 
than half a century ago, the section that follows will illustrate in cursory fashion the relevance of 
his diagnosis as well as practical suggestions for how to assess the current political situation in 
the United States, by employing the category of American exceptionalism, with analytical (rather 
than political or ideological) intent.  Although Adorno did not address the issue of education 
explicitly in his 1967 lecture, it is so heavily implied that appreciating fully what he was trying to 
convey demands drawing attention to the type of education (and requisite mindset) he was 
advocating towards the end of his life, during exactly the same time period when he gave his 
lecture on the new right-wing extremism.  Without having become familiar with this kind of 
education, many individuals will not be able to face, and especially not be likely to master, the 
challenges of life in modern societies constructively, and in ways are consonant with their values 
and life goals.  The type of education Adorno advocated is intended to foster explicitly spelled-
out, critical and reflexive perspectives on the past, present, and future – with regard to both 
individuals’ socially and historically situated selves, and their particular society’s darker side.  
Adorno’s combined preference for the openness of the essay form, and his reservations about his 
lectures being recorded, illustrate his pedagogical commitments exceedingly well and support 
related propositions he formulated on many occasions.  In its succinctness, Adorno’s 1967 lecture 
 
1 The recording of the original lecture in German had been available for years on the web-site of the Österreichische 
Mediathek, Audio-visual Archive of the Technical Museum, Vienna, for years: https://www.mediathek.at/oesterreich-
am-wort/suche/treffer/atom/014EEA8D-336-0005D-00000D5C-014E5066/pool/BWEB/  (Adorno 1967a). The web-site 
also includes several other recordings of Adorno lectures, see https://www.mediathek.at/oesterreich-am-wort/aus-
aktuellem-anlass/archivaufnahmen-von-und-mit-theodor-w-adorno/.  
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– influenced and inspired as it was by his American experience, and representative of his 
multifaceted work as a whole – may have the potential of serving as a model for how to enhance 
our understanding of political and educational dilemmas all modern societies should have faced 
much more explicitly, non-defensively, critically, and reflexively, in the past, must face in the 
present, and will have to commit to facing in the future, if ever more predictable catastrophes of 
many kinds are to be averted, and the preconditions of those catastrophes transformed in favor 
of modes of social, political, and economic organization that are more conducive to authentic 
(rather than increasingly alienated, anomic, and disenchanted) forms of individual, social, public, 
and societal life. 
 
Populism, Radicalism, Extremism 
Adorno’s lecture was located at the intersection of populism, radicalism, and extremism, 
though neither explicitly, nor necessarily in ways that were intended to clarify the issues at hand, 
and the differences involved.  For one thing, Adorno never referred to populism in the lecture, 
which is a term that at the time was not as common as it is today.2  On the other hand, the lecture 
was interspersed with references to and observations about “people“ and “the people.”  These 
remarks, references, and observations pertained to people as subjects, as active – though not 
necessarily self-possessing – individuals belonging to larger aggregates, such as societies or 
countries, yet holding certain views, having specific experiences, and representing particular 
practices from a catalogue of options provided by their society or country, with various 
implications for how they see and situate themselves in relation to their own, each other’s, and 
their society’s past, present, and future, and how they confront corresponding challenges.  In 
addition, Adorno acknowledged that in modern societies, “people” – as individuals and groups 
of individuals – in myriad ways are being “framed” as objects, e.g., as the bearers of ideology and 
the targets of propaganda who are expected to serve certain purposes, by forces – both concrete 
groups of actors and abstract processes – that usually are not transparent to most members of a 
society, and which would have to be revealed and identified overtly for individuals to be able to 
move toward being subjects with agency.3  Moreover, in the original German version, Adorno 
referred to “right-wing radicalism” (Rechtsradikalismus), whereas the translation refers to “right-
 
2 As far as I was able to determine, in Adorno’s twenty-volume set of collected works in German, he used “populist” 
just once (in vol. 14, p. 308), in the section on musical life in Introduction to the Sociology of Music ([1962] 1988), p. 118, 
and he did not refer to “populism” at all. 
3 This is an important issue that I cannot address here in detail; suffice it to say that frequently and erroneously, such 
forces are being identified in terms of “conspiracies,” even though they may be representative of the normal operations 
of corporate capitalism, as recently scrutinized by Jane Mayer (2016) and Nancy MacLean (2017), or of what I have 
referred to elsewhere as the “constitutional logic” of modern societies (Dahms 2009, esp. 91-94; 2012;in preparation; 
and Jalata and Dahms, 2015); neither the “normal” – i.e., internally consistent and predictable – operations of corporate 
capitalism (see Panageotou 2017), nor the “constitutional logic” of modern societies, is consistent with “common sense” 
assumptions individuals obtain in the process of socialization and education, nor are they admissible in terms of 
conventional assumptions; still, many people yearn for more or less easy explanations in an increasingly disorienting 
world, regardless of whether they have the necessary mindset, training, and skills, or willingness to make the effort to 
acquire them, or not.  Regarding frequent flaws in conspiracies “theories,” see, for instance, deHaven-Smith (2014) and 
Cassam (2019). 
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wing extremism” (which, not surprisingly, would translate as Rechtsextremismus, and which 
Adorno is not known to have used).  However, this distinction is indicative less of a clear 
conceptual difference than of different terminological conventions in time and space: during the 
first two decades of the Federal Republic of Germany, which coincided with the last twenty years 
of Adorno’s life (after returning from America in 1949), the established usage was “right-wing 
radicalism.” which during the early 1970s – at the time of nascent left-wing and international 
terrorism (Aust [1987] 2008) – was replaced by “right-wing extremism.” 
Since the beginning of the current century, populism, radicalism, and extremism are terms 
that have been used frequently in political and cultural discourse and analyses, to draw attention 
to, describe, try to respond to, advocate, or assess profound changes and reorientations in, or in 
relation to, modern democratic societies.  In academic debates, social theory and social research, 
interest in the phenomena these terms refer to, along with their origins and growing appeal in 
public life, has been intensifying continuously.  Yet, even in academia, it is not unusual for these 
terms to be used loosely and interchangeably, and they do not often reach the level of clarity 
typically associated with carefully formulated and distinguished concepts.  Indeed, it is in the 
nature of these terms that differences in how speakers or writers have been using them is 
confusing, in part because they commonly appear to refer to similar – if not exactly the same – 
phenomena, and because populism, radicalism, and extremism also are used as labels to refer to 
a range of agendas, activities, and actions.  Often, how populism, radicalism, or extremism is 
being used tells us more about the users and their agenda than about the phenomena, and it does 
not necessarily advance the purpose of clarifying the distinctiveness of a specific social 
movement, an ideology, a set of political goals, or the vital aspects of the condition of modernity 
or democracy.  In addition, rather than serving the purpose of illuminating pivotal and 
controversial issues and challenges, the terms also are being employed and deployed to reject any 
and all views that do not directly and strongly reaffirm conventional or mainstream notions about 
how to act in a particular situation or how to position oneself with regard to a particular issue, 
such as “democracy,” without specifying the kind of democracy that is being alluded to or regard 
for careful distinctions and specific circumstances, or whether or not at least some of the 
grievances voiced by populists, radicals or extremists may or do have a basis in reality, in lived 
experiences, or are justified in some form.  At the same time, there are – undeniably – important 
differences that must be acknowledged and distinctions which must be made, for a productive 
engagement with a range of phenomena that do not all fit into one category, to be within reach. 
 In recent years, among the phenomena the three terms refer to, both populism and 
extremism have been examined and discussed to a much greater extent than radicalism, with 
populism applying especially to trends in societies with democratic political systems and 
cultures.  Conceptually, radicalism and extremism refer to more or less abstract categories and 
often pursue goals that are “global” in nature (in the sense of: without discernible limits), and 
with practical intent being oriented toward the transformation or creation of a totality (e.g., 
society, humankind, or planetary civilization).4  Abstract categories are being applied or goals 
 
4 In a kind of “short-circuit,” liberal theorists, such as Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, and Ralf Dahrendorf, more or less 
blatantly took the etymologically shared root of “totality” as a philosophical and theoretical concept and 
“totalitarianism” as a political concept as evidence that thought that aspires to address and clarify issues at the level of 
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pursued with determination, and occasionally with a sense of moral righteousness, regardless of 
whether they are grounded in a shared and agreed-upon reality, and whether the goals, 
realistically speaking, are at all attainable.  In some cases, actions even may be motivated by the 
recognition that the successful transposition of abstract categories into reality in fact is highly 
unlikely.  By contrast, populism joins a long line of efforts to advocate the “interest of the people,” 
of promoting the “real” interests of the people that make up society, or of being most responsive 
to popular needs and demands.  According to William Outhwaite (2018, p. 1790), 
Populism, like nationalism and democracy, is an ideology of popular rule.  
However, where nationalism (in some of its aspects) stresses the civic or ethnic 
‘belonging’ of the people, populism invokes ‘the people’ as opposed to elites, such 
as an established political class.  It can therefore take a left- or right-wing form, 
and is often ambiguous or ambivalent between them.5 
The distinction between left-wing and right-wing populism indeed has received much 
attention in recent years, including in the U.S., especially since the 2016 Presidential campaign, 
which was accompanied by the formation of two opposing forms of populism, represented each 
by a Presidential candidate whose campaigns rejected established approaches and strategies to 
achieving goals that they deemed to benefit mostly the political class.  Although populism usually 
is seen in terms of left-wing or right-wing ideologies, there is nothing inherently fixed that 
demands that it should lean in one political direction or the other.  In both fact and principle, 
promoting the interest of the people implies all the people, not just this group as opposed to that 
group, and if attainable, orienting actions toward such a goal would be difficult to disagree with.  
However, promoting the interest of all the people constitutes a truly tall order: who determines 
who “the people” are and what “the people” want, and how does one go about making such 
determinations, in the absence of established and widely accepted and supported practices 
designed to insure that the interests and needs of all the people will be taken into consideration 
and account of?  After all, for the most part, “the people” is an indispensable rhetorical device 
employed for the purpose of attracting voters or to generate mass-loyalty, and to simulate unity 
where there are conflicting and competing interests, the constant potential for strife, and an 
absence of shared understanding and purpose, except under certain highly unusual 
circumstances, such as after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (“United We Stand!”), but not during the 
current Coronavirus pandemic during which the tensions between different segments of the 
population are on full display.6  Would it be possible to identify and assess conflicting interests 
 
totality inevitably, in some way, lays the foundation for, and legitimates, forms of totalitarianism.  See, e.g., Rotenstreich 
(2000). 
5 See also Müller (2016) and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017); regarding extremism, see Berger (2018). 
6 This complex of issues has been discussed at length in the debate about American exceptionalism, if employed as a 
productive analytical and comparative concept in social and political theory, as well as sociology, but not as a political 
or ideological category.  At the beginning of the first chapter of Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1996) related work, he wrote, 
Born out of revolution, the United States is a country organized around an ideology, which includes 
a set of dogmas about the nature of a good society.  Americanism, as different people have pointed 
out, is an “ism” or ideology in the same way that communism or fascism or liberalism are isms.  As 
[the British writer, philosopher, and critic] G. K. Chesterton put it: ‘America is the only nation in the 
world founded on a creed.  That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the 
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and whether and how well existing strategies to reconcile such interests might work?  Is it 
possible to truly reconcile conflicting interests at a time of continuously diminishing solidarity, 
when the latter concept is used mostly as a means of political propaganda, without corresponding 
commitments and efforts to sustain and cultivate actual solidarity across groups in society?7  
Considering the immense obstacles that have been standing (or intentionally were placed) in the 
way of successful forms of both collective action and political programs which may be genuinely 
oriented towards the advancement of “the people’s interest,” in recent decades, with the ideology 
and policies of neoliberalism having been especially effective at thwarting progressive efforts, it 
may have been inevitable that populism has taken more or less radical and extreme forms, 
focusing on right-wing or left-wing ideals, ideas, goals, and tactics.  At the same, though, it is 
important not to establish a simple and seemingly straightforward equivalence between both 
versions of populism, as the substance of their ideals, ideas, goals, and tactics generally are 
qualitatively different, with potentially very different implications and intended end-results. 
Both radicalism and extremism are different from populism, since at the most fundamental 
level, they do not have a referent such as “the people” (vague as the latter may be in many 
instances), but follow and advocate an abstract ideal or set of principles that is more or less highly 
contested, and distinguishing radicalism and extremism from each other is more difficult.  To 
begin with, context usually does play a key role in determining what the terms in fact do refer to, 
in different countries, political parties, and time-periods.  For instance, there is not necessarily 
anything wrong with pursuing or applying a radical approach to achieving an objective, since 
going to the root of an issue or perspective, for instance for analytical, theoretical or critical 
purposes, may not only be justified, but necessary for a task at hand.  On the other hand, adopting 
an extremist position to achieve a goal implies a structural flaw, a mismatch between a task or 
challenge and the basic presuppositions that inform practical steps, or a strategy chosen to attain 
a goal or prevent a development or event.  The lacuna between “radical” and “extremist” is 
further complicated if we – as in the case of populism – try to compare between radicalism and 
extremism as “isms” – as ideological renderings. 
 
Declaration of Independence.’  … [T]he nation’s ideology can be described in five words: liberty, 
egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire. (p. 31)  
Note that Lipset identified populism as one of the five key dimensions of “Americanism.”  The quote within the quote 
is from Chesterton (1922, p. 7), not to be confused with the British fascist A. K. Chesterton.  The ubiquity of tensions 
within American society, which – in terms of its foundation – may celebrate competition to a greater extent than any 
other society, resonate strongly with Mugambi Jouet’s (2017) more recent book on American exceptionalism, and his 
central observation that in many ways, American conservatives (who, if they vote, usually support the Republican 
Party) are not only separated by a major ideological, intellectual, and policy-related gulf from Europeans, and in many 
ways from the rest of the world, but also from liberal and progressive Americans who tend to support the Democratic 
Party (again, to the extent that they vote).  In a sense, in terms of population, there are “two Americas” which appear 
to see less and less eye to eye, on more and more issues, as time goes by.  Disagreements about whether to support 
lockdowns and to wear masks during the pandemic illustrates this gulf in attitudes, convictions, and willingness to 
consider and support the welfare of others (or not).  See also Brown (2005) and Voss (1994).  Regarding the implicitly 
and more or less subtly limiting horizon of American ideology, see Dahms (2019b). 
7 See, e.g., McCarthy (2017), who uses the U.S. pensions system as a foil for an in-depth analysis; on a related topic, 
also Hardy and Hazelrigg (2007).  
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Radicalism as an ideology may amount to the stance that under specific conditions, in the 
face of particular circumstances, anything short of radical position is unjustifiable – maintaining 
the radical stance is taken to be morally, politically, or culturally imperative, and anything short 
of it will adulterate how we grasp a problem, choose to advocate an approach to tackling a 
problem, or conceive of a reference frame necessary for solving a problem.  By contrast, 
maintaining an extreme viewpoint or starting point for practical actions, by definition, is “out of 
bounds” and exaggerated, not merely by those who disagree or who certain actions may be 
directed at, but also those who perpetrate an action – the excessiveness of the action is the means 
of choice to attain the goal, e.g., to disseminate “a message.”  Put differently, a radical approach 
implies the possibility of a categorical distinction between, on the one hand, how a situation is 
being assessed, e.g., through a theoretical, analytical, research-related (as in basic research), or 
ideological lens for the purpose of diagnosis, and on the other hand, an array of possible conclusions 
that can be drawn with regard to what to do practically, in light of the diagnosis, e.g., whether to 
accept or ignore it, etc.8 
Yet, such a distinction does not apply with regard to an extremist position: there is neither 
an interest in the accuracy or legitimacy of a diagnosis or the evidence it might have produced, 
especially from the vantage point of others (for instance, the extremists’ targets), but also with 
regard to the extremist precepts, on the basis of which a course of action could be scrutinized; 
extremists exist in a universe of self-fulfilling prophesies in which nothing is being tolerated that 
does not confirm or reinforce the extremist position and objectives, and there is no real need for 
a diagnosis, except within the narrow confines of means in relation to ends: which action to 
choose to attain a desirable goal that was set in the past, and which must not be examined or 
questioned in terms of previously unavailable data.  In this regard, too, especially etymologically, 
there is a major difference between radicals and extremists: a radical must engage in a measure 
of reflexivity, since going to the root of a matter demands a distinction between surface 
appearances and underlying causes, whereas an extremist must not permit the possibility of 
crucial distinctions beyond the assignment of good and evil, which is taken to be obvious and 
clear-cut, and which all actions must reaffirm. 
To return to Adorno’s lecture on right-wing radicalism/extremism: recalling the earlier 
point regarding the need to recognize that differences between populism, radicalism, and 
extremism tend to be influenced not least by changing terminological conventions in specific 
societies during particular time periods, and acknowledging the fact that Adorno’s analysis of 
right-wing radicalism/extremism was formulated in (West) Germany and resonated strongly in 
unified Germany more than half a century later, it may not be entirely surprising that – possibly 
expressing a more or less similar combination of sensibilities and mentality – the Federal Office 
for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) – the German domestic 
 
8 Claus Offe’s comparison of similarities and differences between attacks on the welfare state from the Left and from 
the Right during the early 1980s found that the “analyses” (really, their diagnoses) presented by “the liberal-conservative 
and the socialist critics,” of the problematic character of the welfare state as it started to become evident during the 
1970s, “exhibit[ed] somewhat surprising parallels” ([1981] 1984, p. 157).  By contrast, their conflicting conclusions about 
how to remedy those problems pointed in very different directions. 
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security agency – currently provides this official distinction between right-wing radicalism and 
right-wing extremism: 
Efforts that are being directed against the core of our constitution – the free 
democratic basic order – are being referred to as extremist.  There is often a lack of 
clarity about the concept of extremism.  Unjustifiably, it often is being equated 
with radicalism.  Thus, critics of capitalism, for example, who express fundamental 
doubts about the structure of our economic and social order, and who want to 
change it from its foundation, are not yet extremists.  In our pluralistic social order, 
radical political views have their legitimate place.  Those who want to realize their 
radical objectives do not have to fear being observed by the Protection of the 
Constitution; at least not as long they recognize the basic principles of our 
constitutional order. (quoted in Nandlinger 2008; my translation; emphases 
added) 
Since in this distinction, what Adorno referred to in the 1960s as “right-wing radicalism” is 
equivalent with the current usage of “right-wing extremism,” we do not have to concern 
ourselves with the distinction between radicalism and extremism with regard to his lecture, but 
is still is useful to keep in mind that there are bound to be important differences between 
radicalism and extremism, and that these differences are likely to have a bearing on a more 
rigorous distinction between right-wing populism and left-wing populism. 
 
Adorno and Aspects of the New Right-Wing Extremism in Context 
The purpose of the lecture Adorno gave on April 6, 1967, at the University of Vienna in 
Austria, entitled “Aspects of the New Right-Wing Extremism” (Adorno [1967] 2020) was to 
present9 “informal observations” (p. 1; literally, “loose remarks”) intended to complement 
existing theories of right-wing extremism.  He was motivated to do so in light of recent electoral 
successes of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), which had been founded in 1964 
and was the only neo-Nazi party in West Germany.  Just over two decades after the end of World 
War II, the NPD, which styled itself after the main established parties in West Germany during 
 
9 The 1967 lecture whose recent publication provided the occasion for this article had been recorded in Vienna and has 
been available online (Adorno 1967).  It appeared in print for the first time in summer 2019 in German, initially on its 
own as a small paperback with an afterword by the historian Volker Weiss, as Aspekte des neuen Rechtsradikalismus 
(Adorno [1967] 2019), and later that year in a volume of Adorno lectures, Vorträge 1949-1968, and edited with great care 
by Michael Schwarz (Adorno 2019), as part of Adorno’s Nachgelassene Schriften (posthumous writings) which comprise 
many volumes, including, e.g., his correspondence, and seminar notes and transcripts.  Both Aspekte des neuen 
Rechtsradikalismus and Vorträge 1949-1968 were published by Suhrkamp, which also published Adorno’s Collected 
Writings in twenty volumes, and a long list of associated volumes, conference proceedings, and secondary literature; 
the English translation by Wieland Hoban appeared in the U.K. in April of 2020, and in the U.S. in June, under the 
imprint of Polity.  While the German edition of the lecture on its own plus Weiss’s afterword includes one single 
footnote referring to a lecture Adorno gave the night before on social conflict, also in Vienna on the same occasion 
(though without the related references: see Adorno 1967b for the lecture, and Adorno [1968] 1972 for the essay), the 
translated version of Aspekte has three additional clarifying endnotes, but the same text included in Vorträge 1949-1968 
comes with two informative paragraphs and forty-four endnotes by the editor, most of which are exceedingly detailed 
and helpful (pp. 730-742).  I consistently will refer to the translation of the lecture in italics, since both the original print 
publication in German, as well as only version available in English, appeared as stand-alone publications. 
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the postwar era (especially CDU/CSU – the Christian Democratic Union in most of West 
Germany, and Christian Social Union in Bavaria; SPD – the Social Democratic Party; and FDP – 
the Free Democratic Party), successfully garnered enough votes to be represented in several West 
German state parliaments, but was not able to reach the required 5% minimum of votes cast to 
be represented in the federal parliament.  In Aspects, Adorno expanded on themes he previously 
and explicitly had addressed, and related insights he had presented eight years earlier before the 
Coordinating Council for Christian-Jewish Cooperation in Wiesbaden, in his well-known 1959 
public lecture, “The Meaning of Working Through the Past” ([1959] 2005), at a time when there 
was no right-wing party in West Germany.10 Adorno later referred to it as “an attempt to deal 
with the threat [of right-wing extremism] not through fruitless indignation and cosmetic 
measures, but rather by comprehending it in its deeper dimensions” (Adorno [1962] 2005, p. 
308).11  He returned to these themes precisely because during the mid-1960s, the newly founded 
right-wing NPD achieved a series of electoral successes.12 
 
10 The 1959 lecture appeared in print shortly after Adorno had delivered it (Adorno 1959) and then in 1963, in a 
collection of his essays (Adorno 1963).    A recording was aired as part of the educational programming of Hesse state 
radio (where both Wiesbaden and Frankfurt are located, the former being the state capital) in early 1960, which is 
available as the first of a set of CDs with Adorno lectures and an interview (Adorno [1960] 1999/2006).  The first 
translation into English appeared under a different title in 1986 (Adorno [1959] 1986), but the above-mentioned version 
I will rely on here appeared in 2005.   
11  After Nazi Germany’s capitulation in May 1945, the victorious Allies formed four occupation zones.  West Germany 
resulted from a merger between the western sectors controlled by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
while East Germany was identical with the Soviet Zone; both lasted from 1949-1990, when they were unified under the 
umbrella of the legal and political system of West Germany.  The distinction between East, West, and unified Germany 
is important for many reasons, including for the purpose of this article.  For instance, while the western Allies 
demanded that their zones adopt western-style democratic political systems within the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and also made more or less formal and determined efforts to establish a commitment to democratic citizenship and the 
rule of law, the German Democratic Republic was modeled on Soviet communism.  While the western Allies also tried 
to instill – within limits – a sense of responsibility and an admission of culpability among leaders and the citizenry for 
the Nazi period that translated – among other things – into reparation payments to other countries, the Soviets allowed, 
indeed encouraged East Germans to view West Germans as fascists who bore all the responsibility for Nazi crimes and 
for unleashing World War II.  In West Germany, by the 1970s, resistance to facing up to Germany’s responsibility for 
some of the worst atrocities ever committed and for millions of deaths started to weaken, in no small part as a 
consequence of a major change in government 1969 that brought with it far-reaching educational reforms.  We will 
return to some of these issues below.  For a trend in the military that many suspected and which recently has come to 
light and confirmed, and which also highlights a measure of difference between the former East and West Germany, 
see Bennhold (2020). 
12  The English edition includes the clarifying endnote (carried over from the endnotes included in Adorno 2019) to the 
effect that the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) was a “collective movement that initially united a 
spectrum extending from national conservatives to right-wing extremists and, as a party, became the leading German 
neo-Nazi organization.  In the new millennium it became largely insignificant” (Adorno [1967] 2020, p. 66).  Inevitably, 
as usually is the case, the situation is more complicated.  Suffice it to say here that the party originated in West Germany 
during the 1960s, when Germany was still divided, and played no role in “actually existing socialist” East Germany – 
as the officials in the German Democratic Republic referred to their system – since it would have been illegal.  The 
success of the NPD played an important role in Adorno’s Aspects, and it will be necessary to address this below merely 
in cursory fashion, since – as is typical for parliamentary democracy – the political party landscape in West Germany 
was (and in unified Germany is) far too complicated to detail on this occasion, and does not compare to the American 
two-party system.  For a useful and early examination of the NPD’s ideology, see Schreiber and Chen (1971). 
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What was new about this form of right-wing extremism was that the NPD propagated and 
promoted ideas and approaches to social, political, cultural and economic challenges that were 
not identical with, but in many ways inspired by the National Socialists, and more than thirty 
years after the latter had begun to implement similar ideas and motifs, and more than twenty 
years after the detrimental and destructive consequences resulting from their efforts had become 
blatantly apparent – during World War II, the Holocaust, with Nazi Germany’s unconditional 
capitulation in 1945, and in the years that followed.  In addition, even though most West Germans 
remained in a state of mostly defensive denial about the Nazi era and – depending on their age – 
their involvement during the time period, the incongruity between the NPD’s approach to 
“solving problems” and the nature and condition of the real societal circumstances that prevailed 
during the 1960s in politics, culture, and society, was apparent to most voters.  On the other hand, 
there is a perverse sort of congruity inasmuch as especially formally democratic systems for the 
most part were then and are now not truly suitable to meeting political, social, economic, and 
cultural challenges either, and their success largely has been resting on their ability to manage 
those challenges in ways that relieve the bulk of citizens from having to acknowledge and worry 
about corresponding paradoxes, contradictions, threats, and the permanent presence of crisis, 
while delaying efforts to address the causes of those challenges into a distant, and from our 
vantage point, ever more uncertain and precarious future (see Wolin 2008). 
A productive reading of Adorno’s 1967 lecture in the present context, as democracy is 
being weakened, undercut, and under attack around the world once again, requires situating it 
in broad strokes in the socio-historical and political context to which it was a response and into 
which it was an intervention.  In addition, the lecture resonates with many aspects of Adorno’s 
critical-theoretical work, as the latter evolved from the 1930s to the late 1960s.  In this regard, it is 
important to keep in mind that critical theory was not conceived in Germany, but in 1937 in New 
York, by Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, after they had spent three years in the United 
States (Horkheimer [1937] 1986, Marcuse [1937] 2009).  After Hitler came to power and the Nazis 
had taken over the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in 1933, Horkheimer – who as 
director had made preparations to pull up shop, if necessary – arranged for the Institute to leave 
Frankfurt and move – first to Geneva, then to Paris – to settle in a building on the campus of 
Columbia University in New York  in 1934.  In important regards, the conceptualization of critical 
theory reflected their early experiences of living and working in the United States, especially with 
regard to the (in)ability of mainstream approaches in the sciences, the social sciences, and 
philosophy, to reflect on and respond to the exceedingly disturbing world-historical situation, as 
fascism was spreading and becoming increasingly influential internationally, and while the only 
concrete attempt to rein in the spread of capitalism had begun to deteriorate into Stalinism.13  
Adorno, who was not a member of the Institute at the time, had remained in Europe, staying in 
regular contact with Horkheimer from Oxford, England, where he lived and worked between 
1934 and 1938, and joined the Institute for Social Research in New York a few months after 
Horkheimer’s and Marcuse’s respective essays introducing and advocating critical theory had 
appeared in print.14 
 
13 Regarding some shared elements of the New Deal, Italian fascism, and National Socialism, see Schivelbusch (2007). 
14 Regarding Adorno’s time in Oxford, see Müller-Doohm ([2003] 2004), pp. 187-241. 
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As it turned out, in retrospect, without Adorno’s determined commitment to promoting 
and developing further this tradition of thought, and willingness to embrace his American 
experience (and somewhat ambivalent experience of life in America15), critical theory in all 
likelihood would not have become as recognized and prominent after World War II, initially in 
West Germany, decades later in the U.S., and then in (unified) Germany after 1990.  Indeed, 
Adorno’s years in the United States consistently and distinctively exerted a clearly discernible 
influence in his writings, at a much higher pitch than in the works of Horkheimer (who returned 
to West Germany at approximately the same time as Adorno) or possibly even Marcuse (who 
decided not to return to Europe).  Moreover, Adorno’s active participation in empirical research 
activities, as well as his focused concern with social, cultural, and artistic conditions and trends, 
sensitized him to a much greater extent to differences between European and American life, and 
to social expectations and modes of communication and interaction characteristic in and of the 
latter.  Finally, even a merely initial assessment of the relevance of Adorno’s Aspects today 
demands that insights he spelled out and enumerated in his lecture be related to recent and 
current work and research which resonates with, confirms, or develops further his observations, 
thus illustrating the persistent relevance of his mode of theorizing and critiquing societies with 
democratic political systems in the twenty-first century. 
 Despite various ups and downs and regular shifts in the appreciation of Adorno’s 
writings and overall contribution since Adorno’s passing in 1969, he never entirely disappeared 
from what Habermas ([1962] 1989) has been referring to as the “public sphere,” initially in West 
Germany, and since 1990, in unified Germany.  In intellectual and artistic circles, Adorno and his 
work continue to occupy a prominent place in German culture and society.  Although there was 
a noteworthy Adorno revival of sorts in 2003, on the occasion of the centennial of his birth, and 
amplified by the publication of three biographies, numerous conferences, and programming on 
television and radio, few would have expected the strong and almost enthusiastic reaction in the 
media to the release in print of his 1967 lecture in 2019, half a century after his unexpected death, 
which occurred just over a month before he would have turned sixty-six years old.16  For several 
weeks, Adorno once again was everywhere, to the excitement of many, and the chagrin and 
annoyance of some. 17  The reason was as simple as it was obvious: the rise in preceding years of 
the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a center-right conservative party that has been fraught with 
internal conflict between more moderate and more far-right groups, including a strong right-
 
15 Despite are many related misrepresentations and problematic assessments, Adorno’s American experience, was 
much more positive than often is claimed; e.g., Jenemann (2007), Mariotti (2016); for a problematic misrepresentation, 
see Offe (2005). 
16 Adorno was born on September 11, 1903, and died on August 6, 1969.  The German edition of Aspects appeared on 
July 14, 2019.  The biographies were by Detlev Claussen ([2003] 2008), Stefan Müller-Doohm ([2003] 2004), and Lorenz 
Jäger ([2003] 2004).  Of the three, Claussen’s is very engaging, Müller-Doohm’s impressively detailed and 
comprehensive, and Jäger’s most problematic and least necessary, in that his stance regarding Adorno the person and 
his work is based on hostility or lack of comprehension, or both. 
17 E.g., Dietschreit (2020), Dirsch (2020), Mersman (2019), Moldenhauer (2019), Reichwein (2019), Schuster (2019), 
Widmann (2019). For examples of radio or television programming, and responses in newspapers, see 
https://www.3sat.de/kultur/kulturzeit/buch-adorno-aspekte-des-neuen-rechtsradikalismus-100.html, 
https://www.swr.de/swr2/doku-und-feature/swr2-essay-2019-12-09-100.html,    
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wing populist wing, and which, like the NPD in the mid-1960s, initially won seats in several state 
parliaments, and then superseded the success of its precursor, the NPD, by entering the federal 
parliament in Berlin in 2017, with 12.6% of the votes.18 
 Many moderate, liberal and progressive Germans were stunned and consternated by the 
AfD’s rise and success, which received an additional impetus and became more xenophobic and 
anti-immigrant when, during the 2015 refugees crisis caused mostly by the Syrian conflict in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring, German Chancellor Angela Merkel committed to helping refugees 
especially from war-torn Syria and Libya’s civil war, but also from other parts of Africa, to seek 
asylum in Germany, while close to one million arrived in Germany.  Merkel’s “Wir schaffen das!” 
(We can handle it!) initially received broad support across the German population, especially in 
the former West German states that became the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) in 1949, but 
in the former East Germany (the late German Democratic Republic, or DDR, which institutionally 
and legally had been absorbed politically, legally, and economically into the BRD in 1990), 
resistance quickly took shape, especially in Dresden in the growth of PEGIDA (or Pegida) – 
Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident – a pan-European, anti-Islamic, and 
far-right political movement, whose demonstrations had begun in 2014. Although the 
relationship between the AfD and Pegida has been strained throughout, there has been 
synergistic (if tenuous, never formal) cooperation, and many personal associations, e.g., with AfD 
members participating in Pegida demonstrations (see Klikauer 2020; for analyses of right-wing 
populism in different European countries that were published in 2013, along with counter-
strategies, see Melzer and Serafin 2013, especially Botsch, Kopke, and Virchow 2013). 
 Despite a wave of blog posts, newspaper and magazine articles, editorials, and scholarly 
publications, as well as debates in the mass media, which were dedicated to explaining the 
formation of Pegida and the success of the AfD, none of the analyses or related hypotheses 
presented stood out as providing a remotely satisfying explanation.  In the meantime, prominent 
members and leaders of the AfD, including Alexander Gauland, a former member of the 
conservative party, the Christian Democrats, made increasingly outrageous claims, such as that 
the Nazi period was “bird shit” within the purportedly grand 1000-year German history, and 
several AfD members were charged with engaging in “Volksverhetzung” (incitement of the 
people, usually on the basis of objectively incorrect, misleading, or knowingly false claims 
relating to National Socialism and with manipulative political intent, such as Holocaust denial), 
a punishable offense, and similar charges.  To many citizens and observers, it occurred that the 
up until then unexpectedly successful model of postwar (West) German democracy and political 
stability might be in peril, as in successive state elections and the most recent federal election, the 
rabidly anti-constructive right-wing AFD clearly exceeded the phenomenon of a “protest vote” 
and was able to establish a substantial measure of reliable popular support. 
 Yet, just as Adorno and his work remained an integral component especially of the (West) 
German intellectual and cultural public sphere, so, too, at least tacit support for right-wing 
positions and politics never entirely disappeared from (West) German politics.  Aside from the 
NPD, the Republikaner Party (a national conservative party opposed to immigration founded in 
 
18 The AFD was founded in 2013, in response to the European debt crisis – the Euro zone crisis that began in 2009. See 
Costa Cabral, Gonçalves, and Rodrigues (2017) regarding the Euro crisis. 
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1983, and modeled on the Republican Party in the U.S.) was a noteworthy instance, even though 
its half-life was rather short, and its appeal geographically limited.  The famous “Historians’ 
Dispute” (see Knowlton and Cates 1993) of the mid-1980s highlighted another undeniable 
blemish on the commitment in West Germany to democracy and unwillingness to learn from the 
past, at the highest level of government, triggered by Habermas in an article in one of the main 
West German weeklies, DIE ZEIT, in which he drew attention to the prominence of revisionist 
historians among conservative chancellor Helmut Kohl’s closest advisors (who, after the SPD-
FPD coalition had ended in 1982, as party leader of the CDU headed a coalition government that 
included the CSU – the CDU’s Bavarian version equivalent – as well as the FDP). 
One also must keep in mind that whenever the Christian Democrats – the conservative 
“catch-all party” – worked with the Social Democrats at the federal level in Germany, as from 
1966 until 1969 in a “Grand Coalition,” as well as between 2005 and 2009, and since 2013, support 
for right-wing populist groups tended to strengthen, since during these “legislative periods” of 
cooperation with the SPD, the CDU/CSU no longer provided a “home” for the most conservative 
and right-wing groups in West Germany, and later in Germany.  It is noteworthy that in the 
former East German “actually existing socialist” states, the AfD has been more popular than in 
the West, and more extreme.  With the rise of the AfD, which coincided with developments 
elsewhere – such as the Brexit movement and referendum of 2016, the 2016 Presidential election 
campaign and its outcome in the U.S., Duterte in the Philippines, Bolsonaro in Brazil, and moves 
toward “illiberal democracy” within the borders of the EU, as in Hungary and Poland – groups 
and citizens in German that have been committed to democracy were increasingly flustered by 
several elements of the AfD’s success, which seemed to adhere to and reflect a more or less 
mystifying logic, such as employing democratic tools and procedures to advocate against or 
subvert democracy.19 
 In this context, the publication of Adorno’s Aspects of the New Right-Wing Extremism, 
combined with historian Volker Weiss’s helpful “Afterword” (2020), struck a chord and was 
appreciated as an effective way to begin to situate right-wing trends and movements in societies 
with democratic political systems, in general, and the rise and electoral successes of the AFD, in 
particular, in a larger historical and international context fraught with similar developments.  It 
had been apparent for some time that the accelerating pace of social change, related uncertainties, 
and concurrent real or perceived threats of many different kinds scared and made a growing 
number of individuals susceptible to simpler answers than the complexities of a globalizing 
world allowed.  The latter for some time has been translating into a peculiar kind of resentment 
and anger directed at purportedly singularly (and singularly powerful) responsible parties 
(including especially established political parties), groups with specific characteristics (such as 
immigrants), or decision-makers purported to pursue surreptitious and malevolent agendas.  
During the Coronavirus pandemic, for instance, right-wing groups in Germany and elsewhere 
 
19 For a set of sociological analyses of Brexit, many provided by social and political theorists such as Gurminder 
Bhambra, Craig Calhoun, Colin Crouch, Gerard Delanty, John Holmwood, and Simon Susen, see Outhwaite (2017), 
including Dahms (2017a); also Diamond (2020). 
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have been suggesting that efforts are afoot to create a totalitarian world government, among 
many other similar claims being made in many countries.20 
Still, how were Adorno’s “informal observations,” formulated in 1967, perceived to be so 
noteworthy in 2019, especially since they were entirely in keeping with his diverse interests, many 
of his publications, and the research agendas pursued at the Institute for Social Research, by 
himself and several of his colleagues, such as Max Horkheimer, Leo Löwenthal, Herbert Marcuse, 
before and after his arrival in New York in 1938 and formal employment at the Institute, and after 
his return to Germany in 1949?21  As Adorno kept pointing in out his lecture, conspicuous 
affinities exist between his observations in Aspects and insights gained from his involvement in 
The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, Sanford.  [1950] 2019)), the 
famous (and somewhat notorious) study whose research had been conducted during the 1940s, 
and whose results were published in 1950, with Adorno having written the introduction and 
several other parts.22  One of the main conclusions presented in The Authoritarian Personality was 
that in liberal democracies, a substantial segment of the population is not necessarily in support 
of liberal democracy or its values, and frequently are opposed to them, without necessarily 
revealing – or being willing to reveal – this fact.23  From the vantage point of liberal democracy 
and positions that are consonant with it, this notion evidently is highly disturbing – after all, what 
reasonable person would not be in support of at least some of the personal and collective 
advantages and benefits liberal democracies have to offer over all other historically known and 
empirically existing forms of government in societies comprising millions of members?  The 
evidence that is emerging in recent years, and for which ample indications were available 
throughout the history of democracy, suggests that the share of those with ambivalent or negative 
attitudes toward democracy, especially if it does not serve above all their own very tangible 
interests, is much greater than was assumed.24 
Indeed, to liberal democracy and its proponents, the notion that many citizens of modern 
societies with democratic political systems would oppose it, is largely anathema – despite the fact 
that most institutions and regulated processes in modern societies with democratic political 
systems were designed and built specifically to make it difficult for those eager to take advantage 
of others, to harm others, to denigrate others, to do so, and that to the extent to which (and in the 
ways in which) these and other practices have turned out to be discernible and observable and 
irrepressible, that they occur within the limits of law, whose enforcement in various ways is 
fraught with the perpetuation of injustices, and especially social injustices, that modern social 
structures – as specific forms of social organization – inherently are contingent on.  In addition, 
this qualifier is necessary since the economic system modern societies with democratic political 
systems are based upon, at the same time legitimates, relies upon, and encourages activities that 
 
20  For a related article, see D’Urso (2020). 
21 See Wiggershaus ([1986] 2007), pp. 149-260. 
22 I will not even begin to delve into the expansive literature that emerged in response to this work, but would like to 
mention a short piece that was published almost a decade ago, before concern with right-wing populism and extremism 
became a widely discussed theme: Stoner and Lybeck (2011). 
23 See my essay on Brexit (Dahms 2017a). 
24  See, e.g., Jouet (2017). 
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are designed to facilitate and perfect techniques for taking advantage of others, harming others, 
and denigrating others, even if in subtle ways, within clearly defined boundaries which are beneficial 
to the stability and functioning of modern societies as specific social orders and distinctive forms of social, 
political, and economic structure. 
 
Aspects of the New Right-Wing Extremism (1967) 
Adorno set the stage by referring to the above-mentioned, earlier public lecture and 
subsequent publication, “The Meaning of Working Through the Past” (Adorno [1959] 2005).  The 
lecture and essay are well-known for Adorno having highlighted the need to confront German 
history in light and because of the unspeakable atrocities committed during the Nazi era, in the 
name of Germany, and by many of its members at all levels of social and bureaucratic 
organization, from the very top – the national government – to the very bottom – in everyday life 
and interpersonal relations.  Ignoring the darker features and episodes of any society’s past and 
present inevitably comes at a price, in the form of myriad consequences that manifest themselves 
in the very fabric of social, political, cultural and economic life, in many ways.  Specifically, 
Adorno addressed paradoxes in West German politics, culture, and education, and difficulties 
and impediments to live up to claims which would suggest that West German society was 
committed to taking on the challenge of working through the past in constructive fashion, to 
ensure that nothing of the sort would ever happen again, and to strengthen forces and dimensions 
in society determined to prevent related tendencies.25  Yet, as he showed, for the most part, such 
claims cover up that most Germans, including especially many individuals in decision-making 
positions, developed uncanny skills to reject or dispel confrontation with and to avoid or subvert 
actualization of those claims.  At the time in Germany – and this is true for societies in general, 
including modern societies to this day, and contrary to appearances – processes of socialization 
and priorities in education for the most part are coded in ways that are meant to turn children 
into “good,” obedient members of society who are eager to act and make decisions in ways which 
support and stabilize, are beneficial to, and reinforce the dominant features of a given society, 
such as with regard to social structure and economic inequalities.26  Inevitably, children don’t 
have much of a sense – if any – of what their socialization and education means, where and how 
they originated, which patterns define and orient them, and what tasks and myriad functions 
they are supposed and expected to fulfill, with what kinds of implications and consequences, as 
far as institutions and different segments of a given population are concerned.  After all, 
individuals are prone to reliving not only their own past, but the past of their forebears also.  This 
 
25 Note that unless I explicitly am referring to East Germany or the German Democratic Republic, my observation will 
apply to West Germany (until 1990) or to unified Germany (since 1990).  Whereas in West Germany, the earlier and 
initially rather disingenuous claims about working through the Nazi past – an effort that was demanded by Allies, 
especially the U.S. – took hold at a certain level of intensity, especially in the educational system and cultural 
institutions, as well as the mass media, in East German, such efforts were neither made, nor expected by the Soviet 
Union; see Dirks (2005), Leide (2007).  Incidentally, Austria, where Adorno held his 1967 lecture (and which had joined 
Nazi Germany in 1938), a process of working through the past began, like in West Germany, during the 1970s, when 
the Social Democrat Bruno Kreisky was chancellor (see Neugebauer 2000).  For a discussion of Germany and Austria 
in relation to effects that the Vichy Regime had on postwar French politics and culture, see Axer (2011).  
26 For an informative overview over this and related issues, see the handbook edited by Apple, Au, and Gandin (2009). 
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is an issue in all societies in which social structure and identity structure are sufficiently 
compatible, complementary, and congruent, to insure that existing social and especially economic 
inequalities are being maintained, along with the division between those who benefit from the 
existing social order and those who make it work and pay the price for its operations – socially, 
psychologically, emotionally, physically, and politically.27 
Arguably, the dimension of Adorno’s Aspects that may well be most relevant today, 
especially in the context of social theory, pertains to the ability and willingness – or lack thereof 
– of individuals, especially as members of certain groups characterized by distinctive modes of 
socialization and education, to respond to proliferating and different kinds of expectations, to 
seize upon the opportunities, and to bear the burdens that living in the early twenty-first century 
entails.  Like a thread, the singular theme that resonates throughout the different dimensions of 
the new right-wing extremism Adorno addressed in his lecture is fear.  Evidently, there has been 
an intrinsic link between the inclination to support or subscribe to right-wing extremism, along 
with a sense of increasingly being overwhelmed by the demands individuals have had to face, 
cope with, and confront in the post-World War II modern world, and especially under conditions 
of globalization, and concurrent threats to one’s established identity, as it is tied to, and both a 
reflection and a function of, concrete socio-historical circumstances.  The evidence would suggest 
that the proliferation and intensity of this inclination to be favorably inclined towards forms of 
right-wing extremism has been increasing in recent years.  Put differently, how individuals are 
positioned and able – or not – to face the past, present, and future, appears to translate into and 
to be expressed in their political views and preferences, and the latter in reverse may also serve 
as indicators of the former.  In his 1959 lecture, Adorno observed that “working through the past” 
– which during the postwar years in Germany had been put forth as a necessary means for 
maintaining a moral compass, mental and emotional health, and what Fromm ([1955] 1990) 
referred to as a “sane society,” in political and cultural life had deteriorated into  
[a fashionable] slogan that has become highly suspect during the last years.  In this 
usage “working through the past” does not mean seriously working upon the past, 
that is through a lucid consciousness breaking its power to fascinate.  On the 
contrary, its intention is to close the books on the past and, if possible, even remove 
it from memory.  The attitude that everything should be forgotten and forgiven, 
which would be proper for those who suffered injustice, is practiced by those party 
supporters who committed the injustice. …   
One wants to break free of the past: rightly, because nothing at all can live 
in its shadow, and because there will be no end to the terror as long guilt and 
violence are repaid with guilt and violence; wrongly, because the past that one 






27 Elsewhere, I have framed this issue in terms of “planetary sociology,” see Dahms (2018), esp. 166-167, and Dahms 
(forthcoming). 




At the beginning of Aspects, Adorno picked up a theme he addressed in his 1959 lecture, 
“the thesis that the reason for right-wing extremism, or the potential for such a right-wing 
extremism, which was not yet truly visible at the time, is that the social conditions for fascism 
continue to exist,” and that “despite the collapse of fascism itself, the conditions for fascist 
movements are still socially, if not politically, present” (Adorno [1967] 2020, pp. 1-2).  He 
explained these social conditions as causally related to economics and the fact that the process of 
capital becoming more and more concentrated continues unabated.  Yet, it is precisely this 
“tendency toward concentration” that produces a very basic and common fear, or rather, a set of 
fears, since 
[it] still creates the possibility of constantly downgrading strata of society that 
were clearly bourgeois in terms of their subjective class consciousness and want to 
cling to, and possibly reinforce, their privileges and social status.  These groups 
still tend towards a hatred of socialism, or what they call socialism; that is, they lay 
the blame for their own potential downgrading not on the apparatus that causes it, but on 
those who were critical towards the system in which they once had a status, at least in a 
traditional sense. Whether they are still critical and have the same practices today is 
another matter. (p. 2; emphasis added) 
Without the constant “threat of impoverishment” (p. 3), right-wing extremism would be much 
less attractive.  Among its possible causes, the possibility of “technological unemployment 
continues to haunt society to such a degree that in the age of automation … even the people who 
stand within the production process already feel potentially superfluous – I put this very starkly 
– they really feel potentially unemployed” (ibid.).  Anticipating how many individuals have been 
experiencing globalization, Adorno referred to the fact that “in the age of the great power blocs” 
– at the time, the conflict between the superpowers U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. – the role of nations is 
bound to diminish, with clear implications for many individuals: “in both socio-psychological 
and real terms, there is a very widespread fear of being absorbed by these blocs and, in the 
process, being severely impaired in one’s material existence” (p. 4): to the extent that individual 
identity is wrapped up with or grounded in national identity, what towards the end of the 
century was described as the impending “end of the nation-state” indeed must have been 
frightening and have accounted for anti-globalization attitudes at least to a certain extent.  
Adorno compared efforts to firmly hold on to the nation at a time when the real circumstances of 
more and more countries, during the Cold War, became less and less conducive to independent 
national decision-making, to Catholic witch trials during the Counter-Reformation: both 
instances describe phenomena – the nation and Catholicism – that were in the process of 
becoming less influential (and never may have been as influential as nostalgic imagination would 
have had it).  Just as the witch trials did not occur during the Middle Ages, when Catholicism 
was still hegemonic in Europe, but during the early modern period when Catholicism needed to 
defend and assert itself against nascent forms of Protestantism, so, too, the nation was being 
celebrated during the 1960s – a period of declining importance.  “And this fluctuation, this 
ambivalence between an overwrought nationalism and the doubt about it, which has to be 
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covered up so that one can convince oneself and others, so to speak – this could already be 
observed [in 1959]” (p. 5). 
 Adorno then turned to a set of initial conclusions that all were linked to an imminent fear 
of the consequences of societal developments that was at the heart of the new right-wing 
extremism – a fear of loss of identity and an inability (or resentful unwillingness) to face the 
modern condition, with adherents of newer versions of fascism being distributed across the entire 
population, regardless of social class or strata positions, differences between rural and urban 
populations becoming more intense, and new fascism was not just being attractive to established 
Nazis or sympathizers, but also to younger people, especially those whose identities had formed 
under National Socialism and were threatened by Germany’s collapse and capitulation (pp. 6-8). 
Referring to research relating to the “lunatic fringe” in the U.S., Adorno acknowledged 
that in all democracies, a certain percentage of the population is likely to resist or reject the 
expectations, standards, and values of democratic societies, and pointed out that this may be 
symptomatic at least in part of the fact that all existing democratic systems have remained 
incomplete and formal, in terms of socio-economic criteria and conditions (pp. 8-9). He rejected 
attempts to tie increases in right-wing extremism to business cycles, with economic downturns 
supposedly making such extremism more appealing; empirical evidence did not confirm such a 
link.  
Moreover, while fears are a central factor in the new right-wing extremism, paradoxically, 
the anticipation of horror is a central feature also, and draws attention to a complex relationship 
between fear and a peculiar excitement at the prospect of social catastrophe: while being 
concerned about “what will become of it all” should there be a major crisis, individuals with such 
concerns also tend to yearn for catastrophe, and feed off of apocalyptic fantasies.  The strength of 
an unconscious desire for disaster and catastrophe should not be underestimated, since it is not 
just psychologically motivated, but has an objective foundation: 
Someone who is unable to see anything ahead of them and does not want the social 
foundation to change really has no alternative but, like Richard Wagner’s Wotan, 
to say, “Do you know what Wotan wants? The end.” This person, from the 
perspective of their own social situation, longs for demise – though not the demise 
of their own group, as far as possible, the demise of all. (pp. 10-11)28 
Certain aspects of the new right-wing extremism were integral features of German society, such 
as a strong inclination towards efficient organizations, a favoring of unity, and rejection of loners, 
 
28 A minor detail: both Volker Weiss in his “Afterword” (2020), p. 53, and Michael Schwarz in a related endnote in 
Adorno (2019), p. 732n633, reference Wotan’s purported question and answer, as Adorno purportedly quoted it.  
However, since in its original form, Aspects was a lecture, Adorno did not reference this quote, as he might have (but 
probably would not: his writings are filled with implicit and explicit references meant for those in the know, who are 
presumed to be familiar with what he was alluding to, and the specific context where it originated); still, in this instance, 
in the flow of free speech, Wotan’s question and answer – “Do you know what Wotan wants?  The end.” – was not one 
quote, but two separate quotes: Adorno combined the question, which Wotan posed in Siegfried (the third opera in The 
Ring of the Nibelung cycle) to the earth goddess, Erda, with the answer, which Wotan gave in Die Walküre, the previous, 
second Ring opera, in his conversation with Brünnhilde, his favorite daughter: “Auf geb' ich mein Werk; nur Eines will 
ich noch: das Ende, das Ende!” – “Ended is my work, but one thing waits me yet: the ending, the downfall!” (libretto 
by Frederick Jameson). 
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as well as “the idea that political compromise per se is already something degenerate” (p. 12), 
which was strong in certain segments of the bourgeoisie – the fear of betraying one’s self by 
working with opponents.  Adorno further pointed out that neo-Nazis are prone to pretend or 
exaggerate purported achievements, which trigger a concern among those reluctant to join that 
they be left behind.  Moreover, Germans “seem to live in perpetual fear for their national identity, 
a fear that clearly contributes to an overvaluation of national consciousness” (ibid.), e.g., in the 
face of the division of Germany into East and West.  
Adorno emphasized that one must not underestimate these movements on account of 
their low intellectual level and lack of theory; rather, Right-wing movements are generally 
capable of extraordinary perfection in applying and relying on available means of 
communication, even though usually their actions and goals usually are not informed by a 
coherent and discernible theory, the level of intellectual sophistication is typically low, and the 
tension between ends and means is fraught by a peculiar blindness and abstruseness.  Yet, this 
constellation of rational means (which are being used with consciousness and purpose) and 
irrational ends,  
corresponds to the overall tendency of civilization, which leads to such a 
perfection of techniques and means while the overall social purpose falls by the 
wayside.  The ingenuity of the propaganda used by these parties and movements 
is that it balances out the … unquestionable difference between the real interests 
and the fraudulent aims they espouse. It is the very substance of the matter, just 
as it was with the Nazis. When the means increasingly become substitutes for 
aims, one can almost say that, in these extreme right-wing movements, propaganda 
actually constitutes the substance of politics.” (p. 13; emphasis added) 
Given that political groupings have a capacity to survive systems and disasters (p. 14), “all the 
manipulation and coercion of these [right-wing] movements, the fact that they are somewhat akin 
to the ghost of a ghost” (p. 15), manifests as their potential to grow into delusional systems.  
Drawing on The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford 
[1950] 2019), Adorno referred to the “manipulative type” – individuals “who are simultaneously 
cold, without relationships, strictly technological in their mindset – but also insane in a certain 
sense [representing a] strange unity of a delusional system and technological perfection [that] 
seems to be on the rise and once again playing a decisive part in these movements” (p. 16). 
Right-wing extremists and those who support them tend to respond well to the “cultural 
sector” being used 
as the area in which they can rage most and will surely try and try even more to 
rage.  There is a whole array of designated enemies.  One of these is the imago of 
the communist.  … [Yet, today] there is no longer a communist party in Germany, 
and this has really given communism a sort of mythical character – that is, it has 
become completely abstract; and this peculiar abstractness means that anything 
that somehow does not fit is subsumed under this all-purpose term ‘communism’ 
and opposed as something communist. (pp. 18-19) 
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Intellectuals, “another bête noire, of course – as long as one cannot be openly anti-Semitic and as 
long as one cannot murder the Jews, because that has already happened – … are especially hated. 
The phrase ‘left-wing intellectual’ is another one of these bugbears” (p. 21).29 
Adorno went on to reiterate the absence of any kind of theory that the new right-wing 
extremism might be able to rely on; the peculiar role existentialism played in legitimating 
rampant anti-intellectualism (p. 22); the peculiar and paradoxical prominence of anti-
Americanism (p. 26); and the warped ways in which anti-Semitism and ideology are being relied 
upon and deployed (p. 23), with a strangely inverted attitude toward democracy: “Openly anti-
democratic aspects are removed. On the contrary: they constantly invoke true democracy and 
accuse the others of being anti-democratic” (p. 24): “In its content, of course, this [right-wing] 
ideology, in so far as it is an independent, fully developed ideology – and I consider the ideological 
component entirely secondary to the political will to have one’s turn – is one essentially based on Nazi 
ideology. … [I]t is amazing how little in the way of new elements has been added to the old 
repertoire, how secondary and rehashed it is” (p. 25; emphasis added). 
There is, however, a peculiar unity between a highly fragmented ideology and 
propaganda, whose basis is the appeal to the authority-bound personality, the genuine and true 
audience of right-wing movements and parties (p. 29), and in related fashion, a combined hatred 
and deep-seated fear of psychoanalysis as a means to reveal the workings of the unconscious.  
Right-wing extremists have no interest in grasping how they are driven by the unconscious, and 
any attempt to convey this possibility – or that they may be captives of their unconscious – 
instantaneously produces rage, which is symptomatic of a particular type of syndrome: right-
wing propaganda specifically is not meant to, and does not bring unconscious tendencies out in 
the open, but pushes them further into the unconscious – to artificially keep them there.  A 
pronounced fixation on the reliance of symbols is symptomatic of this syndrome, and “it is a 
substantial part of this syndrome that these authority-bound characters are inaccessible, that they 
will not let anything get through to them” (p. 38).  This explains why “a relatively small number 
of recurring, standardized and completely objectified tricks that are very poor and thin in 
themselves yet, by being constantly repeated, gain a certain propagandist value for these 
movements” (p. 30).  In sum, “right-wing extremism is not a psychological and ideological 
problem but a very real and political one. Yet the factually wrong, untrue nature of its own 
substance forces it to operate with ideological means, which in this case take the form of 
propagandist means” (p. 39). 
 
Practical (and Pedagogical) Implications 
 Having covered a vast array of topics – ideology, propaganda, power, anti-Semitism, anti-
intellectualism, anti-Americanism, communism, the authoritarian personality, the unconscious, 
democracy, ghosts, and apocalypse – Adorno also provided a range of suggestions about how to 
respond actively and constructively to the new right-wing extremism in the 1960s. His 
suggestions add up to a call for critical self-reflexivity, to face the challenge in ways that are not 
fraught by fear but motivated by determined resistance to both the phenomenon of right-wing 
extremism, and the causes that sustain it.  As he put it at the end of his lecture, 
 
29  “Bugbears” is a somewhat odd word, especially in American usage; Adorno referred to Schreckwort – “scare word.” 
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Perhaps some of you will ask me, or would like to ask me, what I think about the 
future of right-wing extremism.  I think this is the wrong question, for it is much 
too contemplative.  This way of thinking, which views such things from the outset 
like natural disasters about which one makes predictions, like whirlwinds or 
meteorological disasters, this already shows a form of resignation whereby one 
essentially eliminates oneself as a political subject; it expresses a harmfully 
spectator-like relationship with reality.  How these things will continue, and the 
responsibility for how they will continue, that ultimately lies in our hands. (p. 40) 
Adorno strongly advised against operating “with ethical appeals, with appeals to humanity, for 
the word ‘humanity’ itself, and everything associated with it, sends the people in question into a 
rage; they see it as fear and weakness” and he identified as 
one of the most crucial aspects of how to resist this movement – the only thing that 
really strikes me as effective is to warn the potential followers of right-wing 
extremism about its own consequences, to convey to them that this politics will 
inevitably lead its own followers to their doom too, and that this doom was part 
of it from the outset, just as Hitler started saying, at an early stage, ‘Then I’d rather 
put a bullet in my head’, and then repeated the claim at every opportunity.  So if 
one is serious about opposing these things, one must refer to the central interests 
of those who are targeted by the propaganda.  This applies especially to young 
people, whom one must warn about every kind of drill, about the restriction of 
their privacy and their lifestyle. (p. 17)  
Rather than reconstructing Adorno’s suggestions for how to confront the phenomenon of the new 
right-wing extremism and related “tricks” and techniques, which are interspersed throughout his 
lecture, it may be most useful to compile them into a list of bullet-points, not least because they 
take the form of clear instructions.  While this treatment may appear to be incompatible with 
Adornos’ dialectical way of thinking and theorizing, he evidently was intent on providing a sort 
of catalogue with practically oriented critical instructions for how to contest right-wing ideologies 
and movements, and a reminder about the varied forms that especially extremist tactics and 
strategies take.  His suggestions were as follows: 
• Study closely and resist a sophisticated “technique in the new manipulation of anti-
Semitism,” i.e., allusion and innuendo, especially its cumulative effect.  
•  “[T]ry to find legal means by which a democratic state would be able to intervene” (pp. 
23-24) whenever the manipulative anti-Semitism technique is being used. 
• Develop an “art of opposing [the proclivity of right-wing extremists to put truth in the 
service of untruth that] lies substantially in picking out the abuse of truth for untruth and 
resisting it” (p. 26). 
• Scrutinize attacks on the democratic political establishment and parties that are in support 
of democracy, which provide supporters of right-wing movements with “the feeling that 
now, with this movement that seeks precisely to abolish freedom, they are regaining their 
freedom, their freedom of decision and spontaneity” (which is linked to anti-Americanism 
in a strange manner) (p. 27). 
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• Analyze the “autonomy of the symbol in relation to what it represents,” since it is an 
“allergic point” (p. 34). 
• Avoid “the tactic of keeping quiet about these things [which] has never paid off, and [the 
new right-wing] development has surely advanced much too far today for it to work” (p. 
37). 
• Appeal to individuals’ real interests, instead of moralizing, since research for The 
Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, Sanford [1950] 2019) 
showed that  
even prejudiced personalities, who were certainly authoritarian, repressive, 
politically and economically reactionary, when it came to their own transparent 
interests, transparent to themselves, reacted quite differently.  So they were mortal 
enemies of the Roosevelt administration, for example, but with those institutions 
that were of direct benefit to them, such as tenant protection or cheaper medicines, 
that was where their anti-Rooseveltianism immediately stopped and they behaved 
relatively rationally. This split in people’s consciousness strikes me as one of the 
most promising points of departure to counter the developments I have discussed 
(p. 37). 
• Focus on “the real subjects of a study that would need to be understood and changed … 
the right-wing extremists, not those against whom they mobilize their hatred” (p. 38). 
• Make “a socio-psychological problem out of these [authoritarian] personalities who 
behave in this way and not any other, by reflecting on them, and on the connections 
between their ideology and their psychological, their socio-psychological structures … [in 
order to eliminate] a certain naivety in the social climate … and a certain detoxification 
has taken place” (pp. 38-39). 
• Clearly identify the various “tricks” right-wing extremists use (as identified by Adorno), 
“give them very drastic names, describe them precisely, describe their implications and 
thus attempt to immunize the masses against these tricks, as it were, for nobody wants to 
be the fool.” (p. 39). 
• Show “that the entire thing is based on a gigantic psychological … rip-off” (p. 39). 
• “[A]side from the political struggle by purely political means … confront [right-wing 
extremism] on its very own turf.  … [W]e must not fight lies with lies, we must not try to 
be just as clever as it is, but we must counteract it with the full force of reason, with the 
genuinely unideological truth” (pp. 39-40). 
 
* 
Among the many different angles from which Aspects can be read today, two might be most 
striking.  Regarding the first angle, Adorno drew attention to several key issues that have come 
to the fore with the rise of the Right and its growing appeal in recent years, and which social 
theorists and social scientists have worked to identify, after they had been neglected for decades.  
Moreover, there is a conspicuous congruency between his thought and his ability to look behind 
the veil of modern societies, including the formally democratic political systems without which 
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modern societies, such as they are, could not exist and function.  In terms of the first angle, a series 
of works and observations have been published over the course of the last decade (e.g., relating 
to white privilege, apocalypticism, rejection of “socialism” in any form, and the unconscious) that 
confirm how needed the type of diagnostic scrutiny Adorno practiced remains today, and that 
we must strive to sustain a similar critical focus even when problematic issues do not force 
themselves upon us, and especially when progress and the various achievements of the modern 
age (e.g., civil rights, democracy, rule of law, and prosperity) do not appear to be under threat.  
After all, it is in the very nature of modern societies that these achievements perpetually are under 
threat, not just by certain groups and actors, but also and even more so by the logic according to 
which modern societies maintain order and “evolve” – the perverse logic – indeed the socio-logic – 
of capital, above all else.30 
In terms of the second angle, the urgent pertinence of Adorno’s determined commitment 
to scrutinizing modern societies and uncovering conventional, ideological, uncritical, and simply 
false and unfounded views that persist in, are about, and to some extent make possible and 
reinforce societies of this type as warped and inherently contradictory realities, provided a model 
for studying a social universe in which facts and norms keep colliding, without any realistic 
expectation that they will be reconcilable in the foreseeable future, in the absence of major 
qualitative transformations.  He was willing to reject the widespread notion, especially among 
liberals and progressives, that all the people who inhabit these societies are concerned and 
interested in the welfare of others, unless specific experiences or circumstances prevent them 
from developing such concern and the ability to relate to others as equals or productively, to 
engage in empathy; in point of fact, among many other things, neoliberalism constitutes an 
incentive structure not to develop such concern and abilities.  Instead, he acknowledged the many 
social, political, and cultural costs and economic benefits that come with this notion, as it conflicts 
with reality (as ample evidence has been suggesting throughout history, including recent history) 
and has been translating into and supporting the operations of modern societies, with costs and 
benefits being distributed unequally across society.  Predictably, the pertinence of Adorno’s 
commitment to unflinching critique continues to account for his writings and version of critical 
theory either being welcomed and appreciated, or regarded as a most annoying, unsettling, and 
brazen impertinence, not just in certain political quarters, such as the alt-right (e.g., Jay 2010/2011, 
Huyssen 2017, Wendling 2018, Forscher and Kteily 2019), but also among academics who pursue 
research and adhere to approaches in ways that are consonant with official and mainstream 
perspectives and representations of modern societies and do not require an explicit – and 
explicitly spelled out – commitment to critique. 
 
Aspects of the New Right-Wing Extremism in America Today 
When trying to assess the continuing relevance of Adorno’s Aspects in the present context, 
including in the United States, it evidently is important to avoid simple over-generalizations of 
his observations or superimposing his categories or reference frame directly.  Over the course of 
his life, Adorno became an increasingly astute observer and was attuned to regular convulsions 
and adaptations modern societies had been going through, including in his personal experience, 
 
30 See Dahms (2017b, 2020a, in preparation). 
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during his teenage years which coincided with First World War and the collapse of German 
Empire, followed by the Weimar Republic from 1919 until early 1933 as Germany’s first and 
flawed experiment with democracy, then during the first year of the Nazi era, before his move to 
England in 1934 (while continuing to visit Germany each summer until 1937), then his years in 
the United States from 1938 until 1949, and finally in West Germany after his return to Frankfurt 
that year.31  The long list of pointed conclusions he drew and the verdicts he was not reluctant to 
pass may have seemed to have been overstated at the time, but in retrospect, many of his 
statements appear to have applied rather literally and certainly do so today, as long as we keep 
in mind that they do not allow for simple, isolated and reductionist applications.  As he put in 
“The Meaning of Working Through the Past” ([1959] 2005, p. 99), “I have exaggerated the somber 
side, following the maxim that only exaggeration per se can be the medium of truth.” Rather, his 
verdicts and conclusions must be interpreted first within his agenda and the larger web of his 
positions, insights, and overall purpose, as they pertained to rescuing a modicum of humanity in 
a world increasingly incompatible with the notion of a good (or undamaged) life, especially after 
the combined catastrophes of National Socialism, Stalinism, Holocaust, and World War II (see 
Adorno [1951] 2005). 
As is well known, Adorno regarded with suspicion the desire to return to normalcy, to 
forget, ignore, downplay or rationalize the horrors of his or any other era in history that was 
fraught with catastrophes caused by humans, as they draw attention to the latency of what social 
theorists and scientists in recent years have started to refer to as the “dark side of modern society” 
– as a betrayal of the intellectual’s commitment to illuminating the social worlds we inhabit, 
distinctive as they are in space and time.32  Critical social theorists, philosophers, and social 
researchers ought to maintain this commitment as par for the course, especially since proponents 
of mainstream approaches frequently obsess – implicitly, if not explicitly – over how to reconcile 
the purported sanctity (but common inanity) of everyday life, with its often silly distractions, 
contradictory and conflicting practices and values, and irresistible narrow-minded 
preoccupations, with the requirements of knowledge about (modern) societies becoming less and 
less sustainable along an expanding spectrum of indicators, if they ever were sustainable to begin 
with.33 
Indeed, there appears to be a correlation between societies becoming more and more 
difficult to maintain due to many different types of intensifying strain, on the one hand, and how, 
on the other hand, they continue to stay stable by perpetuating – not least through everyday life 
practices, patterns, and habits – types of inequality, exclusion, and exploitation which are 
incompatible with the “self-descriptions” modern societies promote of themselves, and the 
validity claims they insist they embody, in no small measure through the legal, political, and 
 
31 There was a structural and proto-methodological comparativism at work in the research and perspectives of many 
members of the Institute for Social Research of the so-called Frankfurt School that also applies to Adorno; see Dahms 
(2017c).  
32 E.g., Mignolo (2011), Alexander (2013). 
33  For my delineation and critique of mainstream approaches, as they neglect to examine the gravity concrete socio-
historical conditions exert on efforts to illuminate those conditions, see Dahms (2008). 
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educational systems.34  In a growing number of instances, the determination to interpret in terms 
of everyday categories large-scale processes of transformation at the societal level that clearly 
both precede and are beyond the reach of human decision-making and influence – i.e., under 
most circumstances, human decision-making and influence are shaped by, but do not have the 
capacity to alter those processes transformations, except in very small ways – is producing 
disturbing and disorienting effects which many individuals have a hard time acknowledging and 
accepting.35  How we face the past, present, and future, with what kind of consequences for 
ourselves and others, depends on how well prepared we are to accept and understand, without 
despairing, that modern societies emerged and in many regards function and maintain order as 
a result of (and through) anonymous processes that we have little or no control over, but which 
shape and even constitute us to a large extent – our identities and selves, individually and 
especially socially and collectively, including at the national level.  Whether or not processes of 
socialization and especially educational institutions and priorities are conducive to turning 
unavoidable experiences of cognitive dissonance – which in modern societies are socially and 
economically necessary for how they are structured and function – into occasions for attaining 
greater (and ideally empowering) awareness and understanding of the vicissitudes of politics, 
culture, and economy in the context of global civilization, is bound to influence how individuals 
will cope with those experiences, and how many will turn violent, and to what extent.36 
 
34 I am referring here to Luhmann’s use of the concept, “self-description,” and its potential centrality to social theory, 
as a complement to ideology critique (though Luhmann did not intend it as such); see, e.g., Albert (2016/2019): 
[A]lthough Luhmann’s theory is a theory that is also a theory about politics, it is not a political theory.  
Rather, for Luhmann political theory is a form of reflexive self-description of and within the political 
system. … 
While public opinion provides a basic reflective scheme for the self-observation of the political 
system that is highly flexible in accommodating contingency, the self-description of the political 
system relies on a range of basic semantic figures that have been “frozen” since the late 18th century. 
Luhmann’s diagnosis in this respect does not deny variation and evolution, but emphasizes 
continuity in the three basic figures of representation, sovereignty, and democracy. All three figures 
provide related solutions to the problem of communicating about the system’s unity within the 
system, which inevitably leads to paradoxical communication, as communication within the system 
about its unity in fact itself perpetuates the system (it is not an observation from the outside). Put 
differently, the system needs to deal with the paradox inherent in the scheme of parts/whole, that is 
the paradox inherent in a unity that is supposed to mark a difference (of the system and its 
environment). 
These paradoxes cannot be resolved. … 
35 Leebrick’s (2015) study of the process of environmental gentrification in rural and small-town Appalachia (rather 
than in urban settings) employs early Frankfurt School critical theory (among other frames) to illuminate social 
change under conditions of global capitalism, and is highly instructive in this regard. 
36 Drawing on Adorno and Lipset, Erwin K. Scheuch and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1967) developed a model “that is 
based on the assumption that the potential for radical right-wing movements exists in all industrialized societies and 
should be understood as a ‘normal pathological’ condition.  In all fast-growing modernizing countries there are people 
who cannot cope with economic and cultural dislocation, and who react to the pressures of readjustment with rigidity 
and closed-mindedness.  These reactions can be mobilized by right-wing movements or parties offering political 
philosophies that promise an elimination of pressures and a simpler, better society.  These philosophies do not contain 
just any utopia but a romanticized version of the nation before the first large wave of modernization.  The core of the 
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To some extent, this constellation between cognitive dissonance and willful unawareness 
presents a paradox par excellence: on the one hand, we have the option of grasping how the 
constitutional logic of modern societies is inversely related to individual human agency; on the 
other hand, grasping and accepting this logic is necessary for whatever measure of such agency 
may remain.  Without the necessary kind of educational priorities, individuals will be more and 
more likely to be “caught like the dear in the headlight,” incapable to weigh the alternatives, and 
become increasingly disinterested, “simply” making a choice and then adhering to it for as long 
as possible, or they will become increasingly resentful. 
Expanding on the analysis Adorno presented in Aspects, right-wing populists and 
extremists resent that modern society is based on a logic that severely limits individual human 
agency.  Yet, they insist that the values, preferences and choices that motivate their actions (white 
supremacy, racism, sexism, etc.) are their own, while adhering to a program that closely mirrors 
the anonymous processes modern societies rest upon, and which frequently resemble or are 
modeled on premodern patterns of power and domination (and tied to persistent social 
inequalities, forms of discrimination, etc.).  Right-wing extremists appear not to be interested in 
understanding any these linkages, and if they do, then only in order to reaffirm the premodern 
patterns, even though modern societies necessitate a form of purposeful resistance against how 
they are structured and function, in order for individuals to retain any amount of autonomy.  This 
purposeful resistance is incongruous with the resentful stance of many right-wing extremists 
with regard to modern society, which they reject because its stability, and its ability to maintain 
enough legitimacy in the eyes of enough of its members, rests on and depends on the consistent 
promulgation of claims about its operations that point beyond the inequalities and forms of 
discrimination that are integral components of its fabric.  What right-wing extremists reject about 
modern societies are precisely these aspirational claims, not the fact that they are not being 
actualized; they would prefer for those claims not to be made, and for inequalities and 
discrimination to remain, as long they would be among the beneficiaries.   They also never would 
allow themselves to grasp any of these dynamics, since doing so would shake the illusion of their 
own individual autonomy and self-determination and shatter the values and presumptions their 
existence and worldview are based upon. 
There are many angles from which the relevance of Aspects for the U.S. could be examined.  
Evidently, his perspective was profoundly influenced by his American experience, and 
constitutes a sort of hybrid of lessons learned under exceptional circumstances in several socio-
historical and political contexts – four different political systems in Germany, and his years in the 
United States between 1938 and 1949.  Several of the issues he identified and discussed have 
special weight in America, such as the emphasis in certain religious groups on apocalypse, and 
the cultural prominence of imaginaries related to Armageddon, which in other nations with 
predominantly Christian populations are much less pronounced.  Fear in general is a much more 
common feature in the United States, partly because of attitudes about government, and partly 
 
problem consists of a specifically a-synchronous dealing with the past, especially a dissent about the evaluation of 
modernity in the respective societies” (Minkenberg and Schain 2003, pp. 156-7).  Note that the notion of “normal 
pathology thesis” is not a consensus position in the related literature; for instance, Cas Mudde (2010) has been 
advocating a shift from normal pathology to pathological normalcy.  See also Mudde (2007, 2019) and Taylor, Currie and 
Holbrook (2013). 
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because of a widespread distrust with regard to “others,” including many Americans, as 
expressed in the strong gun culture and extent of private gun ownership, and exacerbated by the 
celebration of violence in entertainment.  However, my focus here will be on education as an 
antidote to fear, regardless of whether fear is a response to difficulties to cope with increasingly 
challenging, complex, and contradictory expectations and demands, especially in relation to work 
and the need make a living, in the absence of a social safety-net as it still exists, if in reduced 
fashion, in most other industrialized nations.  In fact, the issues that often have been addressed 
in terms of American exceptionalism intersect in telling ways with the currency of Adorno’s 
warnings about the new right-wing extremism, with exceptionalism not being important as a 
basis for ideological combat, but as an analytical and comparative reference frame.  To begin with, 
a major impediment to assessments of the condition and prospects of a particular society, it is not 
sufficient to try to illuminate the society from within, as it is largely impossible to distinguish 
between features that are specific to a particular society, and features that are shared by all 
societies of the same time.  Thus, American society being a modern society does not translate 
necessarily into America being more similar than different when compared to other modern 
societies; the opposite may be the case, depending on the specific issue and aspect of social reality 
at hand.  By implication, efforts to identify the defining features of a particular society necessarily 
must rely at least on one other society of the same type as a foil for comparison.  In many ways, 
the discourse about American exceptionalism, if it is employed as a means to identify 
distinctiveness, rather than superiority (as usually is the case when the concept is being deployed 
for ideological purposes), can serve the purpose of recognizing how unusual American society as 
a modern society in fact is, without having to go through the arduous process of familiarizing 
oneself with at least one other society, which is not especially likely to succeed in any case, in the 
absence of extended lived experience within the other society. 
 Whether and how citizens of the future will have the opportunity to gain an adequate 
understanding of American exceptionalism, in the sense of American distinctiveness, will impact 
directly on the ability of most individuals to appreciate both the brighter aspects and the darker 
aspects of American society, and what effects the resulting field of tensions will have on their 
own life choices, with regard to an array of potential opportunities and impediments, e.g., 
whether they should expect to experience more or less systematic discrimination, and what status 
America will have in the global economy and the system of international relations, especially as 
it manifests itself in terms of the threat of war, and many related issues, including the form and 
content of democracy, and their ability to influence policy or are its passive and powerless targets.  
After all, we are currently once again living in a time period during which the tracks are being 
laid down for how and by whom the medium-term future will be shaped.  Determining who will 
have the opportunity to participate in this process and be involved in related decisions  is a highly 
contested issue today, with well-organized efforts afoot to make sure that some groups of citizens 
will be excluded from this process, at least as much as possible, and others trying to withstand 
the influence of vested interests, power or wealth (which have made their peace with the logic of 
capital and are willing to do its bidding, as long as they are being generously remunerated for 
their efforts). 
 Under such circumstances, the role of education could not possibly be overstated, and this 
is where Adorno’s Aspects implicitly (but undeniably) relate to his contributions to education.  
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Above all else, Adorno may have been an educator, and not only in his formal occupation, but 
also very much as a public speaker and personality, as indicated earlier.  The thrust of his thought 
was directed at conceiving and then practicing the kind of education intended and designed to 
prevent the sort of developments of which right-wing extremism is one of the worst and most 
dangerous examples (see Cho 2009).  At his time, these circumstances may not have been quite 
as conducive to noticing the intensity and speed of social change, the pressures and strain it has 
been imposing on individuals, and the degree to which many are utterly unprepared to meet 
resulting challenges.  Short of stopping progress in modern societies, and thus terminating their 
very possibility, the onus this condition imposes on education is enormous, to enable young 
people to understand their circumstances, the pressures they face, and the future that looms – 
and where it matters most, it appears that education is failing this task.  In many ways, this is 
especially pronounced in the United States, which has many of the world’s top universities, yet 
educational priorities are tailored in specific ways that are oriented towards skilling and training, 
responding to market needs, and protecting the existing social and economic structure, in a highly 
individualized fashion.  Moreover, especially public education is highly ahistorical.  Despite 
occasional fits and starts, history has remained an afterthought, and even more so, historical 
reflexivity.  There has never been a sustained and determined effort to “work through the 
American past,” especially as far as the nation’s origins are concerned, the prominent role that 
violence has been playing has been internalized in many ways rather than properly assessed.  Yet, 
a past ignored is a past prone to return to haunt us and to be repeated, at whatever price and 
costs.  In his essay on “Aldous Huxley and Utopia,” and referring to the reality imagined in Brave 
New World, Adorno ominously may have anticipated a terrifying future, which in many ways 
reads like our present: 
“History is bunk,” an expression attributed to [Henry] Ford, relegates to the 
junkpile everything not in line with the most recent method of industrial 
production, including, ultimately, all continuity of life.  Such reduction cripples 
[human beings].  Their inability to perceive or think anything unlike themselves, 
the inescapable self-sufficiency of their lives, the law of pure subjective 
functionalism—all result in pure desubjectivization.  Purged of all myths, the 
scientifically manufactured subject-objects of the anti-Weltgeist are infantile.  In 
line with mass culture, the half-involuntary, half-organized regressions of today 
finally turn into compulsory ordinances governing leisure time, the “proper 
standard of infantile decorum”, Hell’s laughter at the Christian dictum, “If you do 
not become as little children…”  The blame rests with the substitution of means 
for all ends.  The cult of the instrument, cut off from every objective aim …, and 
the fetishistic love of gadgetry, both unmistakable lunatic traits ingrained in 
precisely those people who pride themselves on being practical and realistic, are 
elevated to the norm of life. (Adorno  [1955] 1967, pp. 102-3) 
The discrepancy between the forces that are shaping or determining socialization processes and 
those that influence educational priorities and practices continues to grow, and anxiety in the face 
of rampant uncertainty is proliferating at greater and greater speed (see Crombez 2018).  Facing 
the future is contingent on the ability to face the past, and in the absence of the latter, the present 
is being ground up between the factual horrors that never were fully acknowledged and 
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examined, and the imagined horrors that are looming in the future.  Adorno’s characterization of 
the social causes of the new right-wing extremism not only apply still, they are getting more 
intense – worse – in many ways.  Fear of the consequences of automation and technological 
development (see Ford 2015, Knowles 2017) is more real than ever, and more justified, as 
projections suggest that with increasing reliance on artificial intelligence, millions of jobs will be 
destroyed, without a sufficiently equivalent number of jobs being created or being necessary – to 
recall one of Adorno’s observations in Aspects (p. 3), superfluous humans no longer will be 
needed to keep the economic machine humming.  Combine this sense of impending obsolescence 
with the fear that the status and influence of the United States in the world is declining, that the 
formerly “greatest nation on the face of the Earth”37 conspicuously is in danger of losing this 
purported quality, including in regards in which it once was undeniable, that those with white 
privilege feel under attack, and that maintaining a middle-class standard of living has been 
getting more difficult, and many other developments, not just in the agricultural sector, the 
feeling of vertigo is difficult to avoid.38 
 In many ways, such developments and related issues feed back into education not just as 
an ideal, but as a concrete practice and set of institutions mediated by policies, which in recent 
decades have been influenced and promoted neoliberalism.  Yet, in the United States, like many 
other aspects of political, social, cultural and even economic life, education also suffers from far-
reaching anti-intellectualism.  Mugambi Jouet has traced the deterioration of what started as an 
epoch of enlightenment in America, which in many regards already had characterized colonial 
life and manifested itself fully in the Constitution, into widespread anti-intellectualism.  In his 
recent book on Exceptional America (2017), with the benefit of an insider-outsider, Mugambi Jouet 
argued 
that American exceptionalism is not only what divides Americans from the world 
– it is also what divides Americans from each other.  Compared to other 
Westerners, Americans are far more polarized over fundamental questions 
regarding the purpose of government, socioeconomic equality, the literal veracity 
of the Bible, sexual morality, science, human rights, and foreign policy.  As a result, 
America is torn apart by conflicts and injustices existing nowhere else or to 
nowhere near the same extent in the modern Western world. (p. 6-7) 
Jouet explains this unique polarization as grounded in anti-intellectualism, Christian 
fundamentalism, culture wars of faith, sex, and gender, the tension between democracy and 
plutocracy, the fact that many Americans vote against their own economic interests or not at all, 
mass incarceration, executions, and gun violence, and America’s position in – and many 
Americans’ attitudes toward the rest of – the world.  Tellingly, all these dimensions can be traced 
back to education fulfilling a peculiar set of roles that appear to aggravate features of American 
life that put it in an outsider’s position among modern societies. 
 
37 Jouet (2017) uses this phrase as a foil, to emphasize his analysis of the distinctiveness rather than the superiority of 
American society (pp. 19, 24, 26, 235). 
38 Jock Young (2007) has provided a rather effective and convincing analysis that is pertinent in this regard. 
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Intriguingly, America and other nations are moving apart and closer at the same 
time.  While liberal America is mainly evolving in the same direction as the rest of 
the West, conservative America has become an outlier because of its unusual 
ideology.  Liberal America’s worldview is not simply vastly different from the 
worldview in conservative America but also closer to the dominant worldview 
elsewhere in the Western world: Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
Tellingly, universal healthcare is broadly supported by both liberals and 
conservatives in all Western nations except America, where Republicans 
persistently denounce the evils of “socialized medicine.”  In other words. 
“conservatism” tends to have a deeply different meaning in America than other 
Western nations. (p. 6) 
As far as anti-intellectualism is concerned, Jouet is not suggesting that it has “fully eradicated the 
spirit of American enlightenment” (p. 57), which would be an odd claim to make, “since diverse 
examples demonstrate how a vibrant intellectual life has coexisted in America alongside anti-
intellectualism – a powerful reminder that it is a nation of fascinating contradictions” (ibid).  
Rather, “[a]nti-intellectual populism could foster American decline, as it impedes rational-
decision making and problem-solving.  It also contributes to polarization by titling conservative 
America to the far right, thereby hindering the possibility to compromise with liberal America” 
(p. 74).  Recall Adorno’s point about right-wing extremists in Germany regarding compromise as 
a sign of degenerateness, which throws a peculiar light on American conservatives, whose 
commitments to democracy would appear to be in doubt.  “[T]he Republican Party is a 
mainstream party – a leading party in a two-party system – that as already heavily influenced by 
extremist leaders and a reactionary base adopting hardline positions on virtually every single 
issue” (pp. 78-9) well before the most recent Presidential election. 
Because demagogy has a noxious effect on the political debate, its prevalence in 
America has powerfully contributed to social polarization.  A crop of 
extraordinarily anti-intellectual leaders, who would usually be relegated to the 
fringe in other Western democracies, are regularly able to attain top offices.  
Resorting to an astounding degree of disinformation, they exploit their supporters’ 
ignorance, skepticism of education, and irrationality. (p. 79) 
So, is the problem then there is not enough education, since like any other institutional context in 
American society with the exception of the military, a system of intricate stratification is in place 
that serves all, from the very rich to the poor, and which insures that the existing class structure 
will remain as stable as possible?  As often is the case, the problem is much more qualitative than 
quantitative, and pertains to the pedagogical costs that come – among many other factors – with 
the need to sustain a widespread sense that America is “the greatest nation on the face of the 
Earth.”  This imperative, which defines the confines especially of primary and secondary 
education, and which reverberates in institutions of higher learning, as is further reinforced in 
other aspects of public life, especially the mass media, translates into invisible barriers on thought 
that pertain especially to the darker side of American society – the darker side of American 
history. 
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 It is in this regard that education represents the other side of Adorno’s critique of the new 
right-wing extremism.  At the time when Adorno presented Aspects, most Germans resisted all 
efforts to face the past, and was focused on almost exclusively economic matters, looking forward 
to a prosperous future.  Soon, the students would rebel and trigger developments that contributed 
to a major change in government, and a few years after the SPD-FDP administration came into 
power in 1969, the first major recession hit the world economy after World War II, threatening 
the “economic miracle” approach to the future.  At the same time, however, educational reforms 
were being implemented that targeted the higher levels of the public school system, and required 
that two years of classes in the History specifically would be dedicated to learning about the 
history of National Socialism, German culpability in World Wars I and II, responsibility for the 
Holocaust.  To my knowledge, this was the only instance to date that the political establishment 
in any society – supported by the educational system – encouraged several cohorts of high school 
students to apply and refine a critical perspective on their nation’s history (see Neiman 2019, also 
Dahms 2019a, esp. pp. 224-27). 
 During the 1960s, among all his other projects and commitments, Adorno also dedicated 
time and energy to advocating a model for the kind of pedagogy that is necessary in all modern 
societies, if members of society are to attain a critically-reflexive level of understanding their 
society, as a precondition for developing a healthy sense of purpose and self, characterized by 
maturity.  As Volker Heins wrote, 
Adorno’s interest in teaching was not external to his theoretical work; both were 
closely intertwined. Like other representational processes that have given rise to 
grand narratives of historical suffering, Critical Theory did not evolve in an 
institutional vacuum.  Rather, the process unfolded within the institutional arena 
of the system of higher education, to which a core group of remigrated German 
intellectuals added the “Frankfurt School”, as it was beginning to be called from 
the late 1950s onwards.  It also unfolded within the wider civil society of West 
Germany and its communicative institutions.  The choice of these arenas implied 
that meaning work was meant to be linked not only to social research, but also to 
the teaching of both students and the wider public. (Heins 2012, p. 71) 
Heins, whose article appropriately is titled “Saying Things that Hurt,” provides the following 
illustration for the effect and appeal Adorno has for his audiences: 
Adorno filled large auditoriums and attracted a wide readership because he 
offered a narrative that integrated the horrendous events surrounding the 
disappearance of the Jews from Europe into the larger framework of a narrative. 
The construction of the Holocaust as a traumatizing universal symbol of senseless 
human suffering prompted audiences across Germany not only to identify with 
the victims of the concentration camps, but also with victims of the Vietnam War 
or the nuclear bomb – situations that, according to Adorno, had ”certain 
catastrophic similarities” (Adorno 2006: 8; 2000b: 101, 106) with the Holocaust. 
Sometimes Adorno uses the Holocaust not only as a generic symbol to draw 
attention to the Vietnam War or other events, but also to dispel the illusion that 
anybody in the modern world lives on terra firma. The message is not simply: 
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identify yourselves with the victims of barbarism. It is also: you too are victims!  
Every one of you is an ”object”; no one enjoys genuine ”protection!”.  “The world 
is a system of horror!”, etc. (Heins 2005: 37–8, 113)39 
Adorno advocated a very specific and increasingly important kind of education, and on right-
wing extremism being symptomatic of failed or tilted education.  The fear of losing privileges in 
many ways is indicative of an inability to face facts, in general, and of fear rather than facts 
influencing one’s actions and decisions.  In particular, it is important to be able to face unpleasant 
facts, considering that resistance to facing such facts threatens one’s sense of self and identity, a 
situation which in a rapidly changing world is fraught with uncertainty and unpredictability, and 
requires a mode of teaching and learning that is incongruous with society protecting itself as a 
petrified social structure.  Most teachers are ill-equipped to take on this kind of educational 
challenge and may not even be in the position to conceive of it.  Some of the difficulties that come 
with the effort to read Adorno have to do with the fact that the movement of thought must be 
followed and reconstructed, instead of focusing on isolated statements pulled out and looked at 
on their own.  This is important methodologically: there are no clear-cut conclusions, but 
dialectical assessments that jive with the way reality works, which is not static, but highly 
dynamic.  If readers and listeners are not willing to follow along and “submit” to the argument, 
on the assumption that they may learn something new, the result inevitably will be a caricature 
of what Adorno was working to convey. 
 In his best-known contribution to a critical theory of education, “Education for Maturity 
and Responsibility” (Adorno and Becker [1969] 1999), in a conversation with the pedagogue 
Hellmut Becker on radio in 1969, Adorno said, 
The underlying cause is, of course, the contradiction in our society that the social 
arrangements under which we live remain heteronomous, which means that no 
individual in today’s society can, on their own, determine the nature of their own 
existence; that as long as this remains the case, society will continue to mould 
people through a vast number of different structures and processes, in such a way 
that, living within this heteronomous framework, they swallow and accept 
everything, without its true nature even being available to their consciousnesses. 
This does, of course, extend into our institutions, into discussion of political 
education and other such questions. The real problem of maturity today is whether 
and how one can work against this – and who this ‘one’ is, is a major question in 
its own right too.  (p. 30) 
If anything, the tension between heteronomy and maturity has increased precipitously in the 
interim, amplifying further the need to conceive of strategies designed to strengthen individuals’ 
autonomy and ability to engage in forms of agency that are consistent with the reasons for making 
the effort to attain agency, and with the objectives to be attained.  The concept Adorno used, 
Mündigkeit, and for which the English language does not have an exact translation or 
corresponding word, prominently was a key reference point for Immanuel Kant’s understanding 
of enlightenment: 
 
39 Heins provides the following references for Adorno’s formulation, “certain catastrophic similarities”: Adorno 
([2001] 2006, p. 8; [1998] 2000, pp, 101, 106). 
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Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity [Unmündigkeit].  
Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance 
of another.  This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, 
but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another.  The 
motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude!  [Dare to be wise!]  Have courage 
to use your own understanding!  (Kant [1784] 2009, p. 1) 
Though Adorno was critical of Kant, the idea of maturity was central to both his thinking and the 
project of critical theory generally.  Though the expectation should be that individuals would 
aspire to become and remain mature, like many other expectations, developments in recent years 
require perspectives on modern societies that are much more differentiated, or conducive to a 
much higher level of differentiation, with regard to whom and what such expectations in fact 
apply, and how.  As heteronomy has been increasing during the last half century – especially 
since the onset of neoliberalism during the 1980s and the acceleration of globalization during the 
1990s as an explicitly discernible and theorized process – enabling individuals to be mature 
nominally has remained a social, political, cultural and educational priority; but if promoted in 
earnestness through institutions and organizations, it would slow, disrupt, or redirect the 
trajectory of societal change that has taken hold in recent decades, since individuals as (more) 
self-aware and self-possessing actor would influence many different types of well-established 
and canonized decision-making processes.40 
 
Adorno as Critical Communicator and Teacher: Essays and Lectures as Forms of Resistance 
It is one of the many ironies of the current state of affairs around the world that education 
for the most part ignores this paradoxical tension between projecting individual autonomy as 
highly desirable, on the one hand, and acknowledging that the type of social organization that 
our lives are patterned on is incompatible with such autonomy, on the other hand.  Without 
determined and explicitly constructive efforts to ensure that individuals are capable of engaging 
in individual autonomy and of seizing on opportunities that objectively (and not merely 
subjectively) exist in modern societies, ideas, notions, and practices supporting or being oriented 
 
40 As Iain MacDonald (2011, p. 685) aptly wrote, 
The paradox implicit here is indeed disturbing, namely, that an education in maturity requires an 
autonomy that reality both demands and causes to atrophy, like a bonsai tree, stunted and yet still 
somehow clinging to the potentiality proper to it. Does Adorno mean that we can never achieve 
substantial autonomy? Not at all. For autonomy is not a state of affairs or a condition that one 
actualizes once and for all in history; and heteronomy is not a sovereign power that arbitrarily 
struggles to suppress autonomy. Heteronomy is hardened autonomy, fearful of its fading reality; it 
is society wresting away from the individual the very power by which it came to be what it is: that 
of the individual experiencing and giving voice to contradictions. Autonomy, conversely, is the 
individual’s contribution to spirit’s becoming, which is to say: it is the indictment of the heteronomy 
whose historical stagnancy now (it is always ‘now’) calls for autonomy. Maturity, autonomy’s 
generational coming of age, is in this regard simply the courage to experience the lived tension 
between autonomy and heteronomy without succumbing to either of the twin vanities of individual 
grandeur or resignation. 
See also Susan Neiman (2008, 2014); with regard to heteronomy, see especially Postone (2009). 
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solely toward individual autonomy, without stressing corresponding and predictable difficulties 
to enact such autonomy, will cause increasing levels of frustration that easily can turn destructive. 
Indeed, remaining cognizant of the field of tensions between everyday life and forms of 
structural violence above all requires a culture of remembering those who fell prey especially to 
horrors that were “man-made” with intentionality, as well as awareness of those who continue 
to fall prey to the seemingly normal and unavoidable workings of modern societies, within and 
across particular societies, both directly and indirectly, and the suffering they entail.  Needless to 
say, the day-to-day operations and professional requirements that modern societies rest upon 
and have been imposing on individuals during the twentieth and especially the twenty-first 
century, thwart such remembering and awareness.  As Adorno formulated in Minima Moralia, 
For the intellectual, inviolable isolation is now the only way of showing some 
measure of solidarity.  All collaboration, all the human worth of social mixing and 
participation, merely masks a tacit acceptance of inhumanity.  It is the sufferings 
of [human beings] that should be shared: the smallest step towards their pleasures 
is one towards the hardening of their pain ([1951] 1978, p. 26). 
In the context of the Coronavirus pandemic, as soon as lockdowns lasted for more than a few 
weeks, many individuals proclaimed that they had great difficulties coping without being able to 
meet those with whom they had had regular encounters, or without being able to make new 
encounters, and insisted on their constitutional rights; yet, it was difficult to avoid the impression 
that those very important social relationships many were claiming to be missing were an 
important part in the personal regimes of distraction many individuals maintain in order to be 
able to cope, and it was far more important to many to reestablish those regimes as quickly as 
possible, than to diminish the suffering of others, including especially the elderly and those 
whose immune systems were compromised for other health-related reasons.  
 Despite Adorno’s assertion that “[f]or the intellectual, inviolable isolation is now the only 
way of showing some measure of solidarity,” he was both a prolific writer and a prolific lecturer 
and teacher.  In both regards, however, specific modes of communication were key to his efforts, 
not least because he was highly aware of the pitfalls of communication, both academically, and 
in everyday life.  Also in Minima Moralia, he observed that “[t]he chance conversation in the train, 
when, to avoid dispute, one consents to a few statements that one knows ultimately to implicate 
murder, is already a betrayal; no thought is immune against communication, and to utter it in the 
wrong place and in wrong agreement is enough to undermine its truth” ([1951] 2005, p. 25).  In 
an essay written between 1954 and 1958, Adorno explained and justified his preference for the 
essay as a literary form that is exceptionally conducive to a writing style and an approach to 
addressing pivotal social-theoretical, aesthetic, and philosophical issues, and aspects of the 
individual-society nexus, by enabling the writer to provide an analysis in which every point is, 
as it were, equidistant from the center of the issue(s) addressed and examined and, by implication, 
of the essay itself:41 
 
41 This essay originally was included in the first volume of Noten zur Literatur (1958, pp. 9-49; published in English for 
the first time in 1984; again in a different translation in Adorno [1958] 1991, pp. 3-23), clearly as a kind of programmatic 
statement against prevailing views in Germany at the time, of the essay as “a hybrid … [that lacks] a convincing 
tradition … and [whose] strenuous requirements have only rarely been met” (Adorno [1958] 1984, p. 151).   
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The essay owes its freedom in its choice of objects, its sovereignty vis-à-vis all 
priorities of fact or theory to the circumstance that for it all objects are equally near 
the center to the principle that casts a spell over everything.  The essay refuses to 
glorify concern for the primal as something more primal than concern for the 
mediated, because to the essay primacy itself is an object of reflection, something 
negative.  It corresponds to a situation in which the primal, as a standpoint of the 
mind within a falsely socialized world, becomes a lie. (Adorno [1958] 1984, p. 167) 
Indeed, it is not possible to state explicitly or to convey directly and unambiguously the 
importance and substance of an essay regarding its most important and valuable insights, 
observations, and claims, in a few sentences, in a manner that is consistent with its purpose.  In 
fact, any attempt to bring the “heart” of an essay – a message, an observation, an “argument” – 
out in the open, to the point, and to present it seemingly ready-made to the reader, knocks the 
living spirit out of it and turn what ought to be an instance of active thought into dead matter 
entirely – a proposition, hypothesis, statement of fact, the specific context being immaterial, and 
prone to turning into dogma.  Adorno’s affinity with dialectical thought can be explained through 
this lens and on the basis of this conviction, as can his reservations about – indeed, his opposition 
to – the simplicity of positivism, which he regarded as utterly incongruous with the nature of 
human and social reality in the modern age in general, and as an obstacle to the study of social, 
political, and cultural life, especially in the history of the twentieth century, if left to its own 
devices.42 
[T[he essay is not intimidated by the depraved profundity which claims that truth 
and history are incompatible.  If truth in fact has a temporal core, then the full 
historical content becomes an integral moment in truth; the a posteriori becomes 
concretely a priori…  The relation to experience – and from it the essay takes as 
much substance as does traditional theory from its categories – is a relation to all 
of history; merely individual experience, in which consciousness begins with what 
is nearest to it, is itself mediated by the all-encompassing experience of historical 
humanity; the claim that socio-historical contents are nevertheless supposed to be 
only indirectly important compared with the immediate life of the individual is a 
simple self-delusion of an individualistic society and ideology. (Adorno [1958] 
1984, p. 158) 
Adorno’s stance regarding authoritarianism, and his remarks about the new right-wing 
extremism, must be appreciated in this reference frame, even though Aspects, as a public lecture, 
did not constitute an opportunity to adhere and exemplify the essay form.  The movement of 
thought, however, which evidently is at work, shares with the essay an unwillingness to organize 
the material in a manner that would have adhered to standards of clear and easily accessible 
presentation.  After all, what Adorno was trying to get across did not exactly lend itself to a 
straightforward list of facts: that authoritarian and right-wing responses could not be less suitable as 
strategies for coping with and addressing the challenges of modern life and especially the abstract, 
anonymous, and uncontrollable processes that sustain it, except in terms of the narrow-minded and short-
 
42  See Adorno’s introduction and contributions to The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (Adorno et al., [1969] 1976), 
pp. 1-86 and 105-122. 
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sighted acquisition of temporary political power designed to take advantage of those challenges for personal 
(or a group’s or class’s) gain or profit, and most importantly with regard to the burden of conceiving of 
solutions to persistent challenges that modern societies have been both generating and facing to date, and 
especially those they inescapably will have to confront in an increasingly uncertain future, given the 
growing array of looming crises. 
Adorno’s critique of identity thinking as both the centerpiece and the focal point of his 
version of critical theory, and his rejection of mechanisms and ways of relating to the world that 
preclude appreciation of and respect for non-identity, are directed at how modern ways of relating 
to world and other(s) are synchronous with, reinforce, and indeed amplify and further intensify 
processes of alienation and reification.43  Adorno’s take on critical theory also is highly consonant, 
compatible, and complementary with – and expands on – the works of classical social theory.  
This affinity is particularly pronounced with regard to what Marx described as capital 
accumulation producing ever higher levels of alienation, what Durkheim saw as an inexorable 
process of greater and greater division of labor producing more and more intense forms of anomie, 
and what Weber framed as the ongoing rationalization of everything existing which – modeled on 
a Protestant ethic that is increasingly devoid of meaning – has been leading to the disenchantment 
of the world (see Dahms 2009, 2017b).  If these processes – which include, but go beyond the ones 
theorized by Marx, Durkheim, and Weber – are being left unchecked and allowed to play out on 
their respective terms, the vanishing point of modern society is not the beginning of the “human 
millennium,” but the erosion or destruction of the social, potentially along with human 
civilization.  Adorno’s work was driven by a similar concern as the efforts of classical social 
theorists, his response being a more determined effort to promote a radical understanding of 
modernity in a manner that was oriented toward illuminating those operations and 
contradictions which members of society typically are ill-equipped (and not supposed to be able) 
to grasp, especially not in terms that “fit the bill,” partly because they are not being encouraged 
to make related efforts, and partly because they are actively being discouraged to do so, via a vast 
incentive structure designed and maintained to keep the underlying logic of modern societies 
from view.44  To the extent to which individuals comply with or submit to such discouragement, 
their experiences are not truly theirs, but transpositions of the workings of modern societies as at 
least partially regressive social systems, into the practices and conduct of individual and social 
everyday life, and forms of social interaction and intersubjectivity.45 
Indeed, in Adorno’s view, the advantages of the essay form in an era and under societal 
conditions that thwart the possibility of systematic knowledge about the intricacies, dynamics, 
and inherent tensions of those societal conditions, and in terms of how they are being perceived 
 
43  Regarding Adorno and non-identity, see Wellmer ([1984] 2012); regarding the continuing relevance of alienation and 
reification, see Dahms (2011), chs. 3 and 5.  
44  The combined result of the evolutionary nature of modern society as a heteronomous process that occurs beyond 
the influence and control of humans, and of certain groups making sure (to the extent that they can) that this underlying 
logic remains hidden, in order for those same groups being able to continue to benefit from them, may well be that 
fewer and fewer problems – such as social problems – are being perceived as solvable, or resolvable, so much so that 
more and more people are inclined to accept them and move on.  See Dahms (2011), ch. 4. 
45 With regards to practices typically associated with “love,” see Dahms (2020a, 2020b). 
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by individuals as members of different groups, correlate with the pace and nature of social change 
in the modern age.  The evolutionary vanishing point of modern societies from the outset was 
unclear, independent of or next to human will and desires, and outside the confines of most 
developmental narratives, ideologies, theological or theoretical traditions, but is especially so 
today.46  How, then, to communicate this effectively even to interested audiences, in a manner 
that does not pervert the insights that are meant to come across?  How to be an effective teacher 
at a time when it is exceedingly difficult to convey alternatives to an increasingly warped world 
in which, for example, humankind maintains itself by continuously reducing the global 
population of vertebrate animals, e.g., by 52 per cent between 1970 and 2010 (WWF 2014)? 
As the advantages of the essay form pertain to the core of what is to be conveyed, the fact 
that this core cannot be expressed or stated outright, and any effort at doing so in fact would 
destroy its content and turn it more or less into its opposite, was the nature of knowledge about 
human existence and social conditions at least since the second half of the twentieth century.  This 
constellation applies to an even greater extent in the twenty-first century, in the age of social 
media, despite the expectation that is so pervasive today: that all that matters ought to be 
conducive to explicit, unmediated expression.  Yet, this expectation is merely a conceit, and less 
and less appropriate, making it more and more difficult for more and more individuals (whose 
total number meanwhile also has been increasing), to face the past, present, and future in ways 
that are conducive genuine rather than simulated agency. 
 Whereas the essay was Adorno’s preferred form of writing, he had reservations about the 
spoken word being turned into text.  As Michael Schwarz, the editor of Adorno’s Vorträge 1948-
1949 (2019), wrote in a 2011 article about the neglect in research to date of Adorno as a public 
speaker and lecturer, the latter “felt an unease about recording the ephemeral, about objectifying 
the improvised and storing it.  He had almost all recordings of his lectures erased.  Regarding 
speech, which is used up in the moment, he did not have the will to preserve it.  His unwillingness 
to let something be printed that did not meet his sensitive textual standards was strong” (Schwarz 
2011, p. 289; my translation).  Fortunately, in recent years, many of his lectures have become 
available, as well as a growing number of recordings of lectures, speeches, and interviews.47  Still, 
as Schwarz described in detail, many of Adorno’s publications initially were speeches or lectures, 
which enabled him to “test” his arguments, analyses, and critiques in front of audiences, and 
which he continued to refine later on.  Adorno doubtlessly was able to appreciate the advantages 
of directly addressing and interacting with his listeners, and in turn reading his listeners and their 
reactions to what and how he presented his analyses and insights.  He engaged both in free speech 
and presented fully formulated texts that he read to the audience, depending on his objective or 
what the organizers needed or asked for.  He was a frequent speaker, employing many different 
formats, often taking the initiative in suggesting contributions or themes he was interested in 
addressing.  During the 1950s and 1960s, Adorno contributed almost 300 times to radio 
programming on public radio – a format he had become acquainted with before the Nazis came 
to power in Germany, making seven appearances in 1931 alone – plus more than 300 appearances 
 
46 See Lyotard ([1979] 1984; see also Dahms (1992). 
47 E.g., Adorno ([1993] 2000, [2001] 2006; [2003] 2008; [1995] 2001). 
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in front of live audiences.48  Although it often appeared to audiences that what Adorno presented 
was fully developed, this often was not the case, with him often speaking extemporaneously, just 
using a few handwritten notes jotted down on a piece of paper.  As far as he was concerned, there 
was “an abyss between the spoken word and the texts that [he had] worked through good and 
proper” (p. 289; my translation).  In fact, whenever Adorno wrote, he did so for readers, not for 
listeners, and many of his lectures were over the heads of at least most of the members in the 
audience (p. 291), partly because he was not prone to reiterating his views over and over, instead 
frequently developing them anew.  During the last two decades of his life, Adorno participated 
in 114 radio dialogues and interviews, with such well-known figures as the fellow critical 
theorists Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, the film director Fritz Lang, the writer Elias 
Canetti, the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, the sociologist Arnold Gehlen, the conductor 
Pierre Boulez and the composer Karlheinz Stockhausen (p. 292).  Adorno did not shy away from 
controversy and caused the occasional éclat, but he typically was entirely open-minded, 
spontaneous, and enjoyed the discussions.  “As an intellectual, he saw himself challenged to 
break through fixed listeners’ expectations and projections of his public role” (p. 294; my 
translation).  Schwarz concluded, 
To present critical theory as public speech would be the desideratum of a historical 
mode of observation that places the emphasis on what happened and was spoken, 
rather than on what was written.  Instead of the major works and large literary 
forms, the diverse praxis of speech and dialogue would come into view, a broadly 
dispersed activity – the ‘small change’ of verbal activities.  Thus, the acoustic 
dimension of the Frankfurt School would become recognizable, which cannot be 
exhausted in the form of a few radio programs. (p. 294; my translation) 
If we apply Adorno’s preference for the essay form and combine it with his reservations 
about the spoken word, to assess his lecture on the new right-wing extremism in relation to his 
work overall, we might suppose that it is one of only a small number of instances where he 
allowed himself to state the impetus of his overall work clearly and directly: modern society’s 
potential to progress permanently is in danger of being overtaken by the regressive dimensions of human 
and societal life, especially insofar as – paradoxically – modern society as an empirical form of social 
organization fosters and relies on the latter.  Although, strictly speaking, the above supposition 
would go too far – Aspects above all is about the persistent problem of the new right-wing 
extremism in so-called democratic societies – the lecture still does provide strong indications of 
key motifs at work in Adorno’s writings and of how to read them today, even though he delivered 
the lecture just over two years before his passing and more than half a century ago, and under 
what appeared to be increasingly disconcerting circumstances.  Ironically, and practically 
speaking, his immediate concerns would have been partly alleviated by the fact that as a result of 
 
48 After World War II, all television and radio in West Germany was “public-legal” (Öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk): “ 
Since the years 1948/49, an umbrella term for the system of democratic radio [and television] for all established then in 
the western zones, i.e., the later Federal Republic of Germany. The term if derived from the fact that all the radio 
stations of the allied occupied forces with their transfer into German control – 
 according to allied or German law – were organized as institutions of public law.” (my translation); 
https://www.ard.de/home/Oeffentlich_rechtlicher_Rundfunk/458368/index.html. – Regarding Adorno’s engagement 
on public radio in Germany, see Parkinson (2014); in the U.S., see Mariotti (2014). 
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the federal election on September 29, 1969, just weeks after Adorno’s death (on August 6), the 
SPD under the leadership of Willy Brandt – who had been in the resistance against the Nazis – 
and the FDP were able to form a progressive, “social-liberal” coalition government for the first 
time after World War II, thus forcing the CDU/CSU into opposition, enabling the latter to 
distinguish itself more starkly from the SPD as its former “grand coalition” partner (from 1966 
until 1969).  The coalition the new administration was based upon effectively pulled the rug from 
underneath both the right-wing NPD as a viable political party with popular support (the party 
garnered 4.3% of the more important “secondary votes” cast in the national election, thus failing 
to reach the required 5% needed for a party to represented in parliament), and the Leftist student 
movement and “extra-parliamentary opposition” (APO).49 
Compared to many of Adorno’s other public lectures, his notes for Aspects were unusually 
extensive: seven pages of densely handwritten notes, often (and equally unusually) in complete 
sentences that literally anticipated his formulations (Adorno [1967] 2020, p. 41; Adorno 2019, p. 
730).  The care Adorno took in preparing the lecture indicates how important it was to him, and 
that it was not just one more obligation he agreed to and willingly or eagerly fulfilled.  Evidently, 
the points he was making were close to his heart and getting them across effectively mattered to 
him.  For present purposes, aside from highlighting the current relevance of the Adorno’s 1967 
lecture and analysis, it illustrates how the complexity of his thought and the diversity of his 
interests were ideally suited to explicate the breadth and the depth of the challenge right-wing 
extremism and related forms of populism represents in the early twenty-first century.  Thus, we 
must aspire to both – complexity and diversity – in order to anticipate current and future 
challenges we already are, and undoubtedly will be facing sooner rather than later.  How to 
conceive, then, of the kind of praxis that is urgently needed today and from here on out?  This 
praxis will not result from focus on surface manifestations, but instead requires determination to 
grasp what kind of more or less visible forces produce and sustain those surface manifestations, 
such as right-wing movements and governments.  It may be most productive to treat Aspects as a 
sort of pivot point in the proverbial hand-held fan of the many different dimensions of Adorno’s 
overall work, as it correlated with key dimensions of modern social life, from individual 
experiences, to the culture industry, to art and music and their both regressive and dissident roles 






49 Compared to many other countries with democratic political systems, the (West) German electoral system and 
process are rather arcane, due to the fact that they were designed to avoid discarding votes that did not go to the 
winning party or candidate (as long as they amounted to at least 5% of the votes cast); by contrast, discarding votes 
that did not go to the winning side is not only typical for, but intended by explicitly adversarial types of democracy, as 
in the U.S. and Great Britain, in order to create strong government, or rather avoid weak government. – Regarding the 
political situation at the time, including the role of the extra-parliamentary opposition, see Burns and van der Will 
(1988); for a contemporary study that included a clear distinction between the extra-parliamentary opposition, which 
was directed at the deficits of parliamentary or representative democracy (but in support of democracy generally), and 
“traditional Right antiparliamentarism (sic!) [which] was above all hostile to the principle of democracy and only 
secondarily to the representative institutions through which it was expressed,” see Shell (1970), p. 653. 




Among social theorists, and critical theorists, in particular, Theodor W. Adorno occupies 
a distinctive and exposed position, for many reasons.  Like none other, even compared to other 
prominent and highly productive representatives of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, 
especially Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, or to later theorists like Michel Foucault, Jean 
Baudrillard, or Judith Butler, he at the same time maintained a level of consistency, rigor, and 
breadth in his work which, at a high level of output characterized by sophistication and mental 
clarity that continue to impress today, while also remaining connected to the norms and values 
according to which modern societies claim to function, and which they insist they support and 
promote like no other.50  More importantly, though, Adorno was committed to calling things by 
their name, and he refused to fall prey to the temptation either to simplify his depiction of the 
world as it is, in ways that accommodated the mood of this or that era, or to expedience, or 
consumer demand, or the willingness of those around him to comply with the demands of their 
circumstances.  For instance, while many others during the postwar era submitted to the regime 
of refraining from criticizing “western democracy” – really, modern societies in western Europe 
and North America – since not refraining from it was seen as support for Soviet Communism – 
Adorno insisted on the need to develop further, refine, and focus rigorous critique in light of 
developments at the time, as with regard to the “administered world.”  At the same time, Adorno 
was never in any danger of providing ideological or theoretical cover for “actually existing 
socialism,” either.  Just as he did in music, in theory, too, he did not compromise with the need 
to comply with any kind of system.  In music, he regarded the challenge of atonality, as a refusal 
to abandon the challenge of facing freedom, and to install some kind of regime to “escape from 
it,” to use the title of one of Fromm’s ([1941] 1994) books, as a betrayal of the demands of the age.  
As a consequence, Adorno was – and his work continues to be – resented, partly because he 
demonstrated that as a social scientist and scholar, it is possible to describe social reality in 
modern societies in ways that are not fraught with compromises and the desire to accommodate 
the powers that be, or to not edge on, or keep in mind how we are supposed to write about reality, 
to comply with what we ought to.51  There are certain artists who (or works of art which) can, in 
 
50 Inevitably, though, high levels of consistency come at a price, often in the form of a particular type of 
hermeticism.  Referring to the status of the “primacy of the object” in Adorno’s theory , Lawrence Hazelrigg wrote, 
Adorno’s output is difficult to hold in internal coherence, given all the crosscurrents and silences 
that pulsate through it, as much of it was left in sketchy, incomplete, and provisional condition.  On 
the one hand, his work can be understood as a late effort to overturn the limits which Kant left to 
us—that is, to offer a theory that would perform the function of a first-principle metaphysics, but 
without being overtly a metaphysics, and therein “rescue the nonidentical from the assaults of 
instrumental reason” (Habermas) …  The evident intent of Adorno’s “nonidentity thinking” or 
“negative dialectic” was to achieve revelation of the “conceptuality prevailing in the object itself”—
that is, the concept which an “object has of itself,” of what, “left to itself,” the object “seeks to be” 
(Adorno). (Hazelrigg 2020, pp. 68-69), 
The first quote is from Habermas ([1988] 1992, p. 123), while the last three are from Adorno ([1957] 1976, p. 69).  See 
also Bonefeld (2012). 
51 Günter Dux (a leading German social theorist whose works for the most part have not been translated into English – 
for an important example of translated work, see Dux [2000] 2011; also Niedenzu 2012 – and who studied sociology 
and philosophy in Frankfurt during the time when Adorno gave his 1967 lecture) dedicated one of his books (Dux 
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an odd reversal, serve the purpose of telling us more about a person assessing or passing 
judgment on an artist or a work of art, than about the artist or a work of art.  Adorno also fulfills 
such a function, and occupies such a position.  When verdicts are being passed on his work, they 
frequently (though evidently not always – nothing is foolproof!) tell us as much or more about the 
person passing judgment, than about Adorno.  One reason for this is that his work and thought 
are difficult to understand, the rationale behind his analyses, diagnoses, and conclusions difficult 
to grasp – they require a particular commitment, effort, and dedication, and are never easy to 
appreciate or understand, nor meant to be – and his verdicts demand that we reconstruct how he 
arrived at them, within what kind of larger normative, analytical, and theoretical reference frame, 
as they typically do not coincide with and conform to conventional wisdom or the limitations of 
“common sense.” 
One of the main problems with reading Adorno and transposing his writings and 
assessments to subsequent or later circumstances is that they criticize conventional assumptions; 
how, then, can conventionalist interpretations and applications do justice to what he was trying 
to get across?  “Doing justice” is important in this, and to all his efforts: not to turn what we study 
and examine into a function of what today is called “desire” – to turn the world into a function 
of “us” – with all our limitations – but to let the world stand as it is, to face it on its terms, rather 
than on ours, and draw related conclusions.  It is in this regard that Adorno’s radical thought is 
not just incompatible with, but precisely opposite to, populism and extremism, both in their right-
wing and left-wing incarnations.  He resisted his insights being “framed” in terms of political 
agendas, including when his own – leftist – students demanded that he support and join their 
cause.  Populism and extremism are inversely related to the nature of social life in the modern 
age generally, and especially in the current century.  Where willingness to face unpleasant and 
disturbing complexities, contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas is called for, willful and more 
or less aggressive determination to render the world simple again, even if only to be in a position 
to take advantage of it, will not be successful, and is far more likely to aggravate and drive the 
tension-ridden reality we all are part of toward, or beyond the “point of no return,” a prospect 
that appears to become more realistic with each passing day (e.g., Goodell 2018).  The conditions 
that have emerged demand rational solutions on the planetary scale, which evidently have been 
making irrational responses more appealing, even irresistible to many.  While right-wing 
populists and extremists see this as an opportunity to possibly get their way, at least for a while, 
and to the medium- and long-term detriment of all, left-wing populists and extremists appear to 
be motivated by the will to face the looming challenges constructively, on the assumption that 
their strategies will lead to qualitative and last improvements, and the formation of a political 
reference frame that is conducive to tackling impending and emerging problems in ways that are 
 
2004) to examining the issue and prominent status in modern society of individuals’ actions and choices in everyday 
life being regulated by being told and frequently reminded that they “ought” to do this or that, but not the other thing, 
without reflecting on such imperatives and expectations: how we exist in a matrix of suppositions that steer our actions, 
desires, goals, and practices, without us being cognizant of this fact, or curious about its origins.  According to Dux, 
normativity has to be reconstructed from knowledge of the real structures of society, which in turn are shaped by the 
market system, rather than conceived of in terms of abstract ethical principles; consequently, morality must be critically 
examined (in the sense of deconstructed), and justice clearly defined accordingly.  On the need for intellectuals to resist 
the temptation to comply with the “ought,” see Demirović’s (1999) detailed study of the development of critical theory 
and its transformation into the Frankfurt School. 
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consonant with the values of the modern age.  Yet, trends that have been underway in recent 
years suggest that both right-wing and left-wing proponents ignore the increasingly fundamental 
differences that separate both groups and their supporters, respectively, who will not disappear, 
or the majority populations who represent more or less insurmountable inertia and obstacles for 
both.  What “Adorno” stands for, then, is uncompromising determination to illuminate the 
conflicting dynamics at play in what seems like a post-dialectical age, regardless of whether there 
will be a tangible payoff or not, since only such determination may retain the potential of the kind 
of fearless understanding of which humankind in the twenty-first century is most in need. 
Finally, one of the main “criticisms” leveled at Adorno and the other first-generation 
critical theorists (except Marcuse) was and is that they were “too pessimistic.”  Yet, optimism, at 
its core, is an artifact both of modern society and capitalism as ideologies – we are supposed to 
be optimistic, to hope that things work out – mostly to keep our eyes away from the reality of 
concrete situations, even though modern societies and capitalism have been running with things 
not working out as planned, but working for certain purposes, to the benefit of certain groups or 
individuals.  Optimism and the prohibition against pessimism are a coping mechanism in a world 
in which we pre-consciously are cognizant of the fact – which we “are not supposed” to 
acknowledge – that we are never in control, that more or less anonymous forces (supported by 
certain types of human actors) are in charge and determine our fate: forces that require an 
uncompromising and probing look at how modern societies emerged, how they have been 
spreading, how they transformed our world in ways that we – born into this world – have great 
difficulties understanding, since we are its products and its perpetuators.  Fascists and supporters 
of fascism recognize that they are not in control, but rather than accepting that the world in 
general is not conducive to humans being “in control,” they insist on them being in control, even 
though in terms of their very nature, the dimensions of politics, culture, economy, and society to 
a certain extent may be influenced, but are not controllable by us, even though – in the modern age 
– these dimensions are supposed to serve “our” interests, be modeled on “our” objectives and 
shaped by us, reflect and correspond with “our nature,” and be subject to “our” decision-making.  
Yet, society produces and sustains us, not vice versa, through everyday life, existing structures of 
inequalities, and systems of power, along with (increasingly bureaucratic) institutions and 
organizations, regardless of whether or not we acknowledge or resent this fact.  Only on the basis 
of this realization can we begin to acquire the knowledge needed for us to be able to shape our 
collective fate.  In order to do so, we must – interactively and intersubjectively – recognize that 
and how we are products of forces whose machinations that are difficult to grasp, and impossible 
to comprehend and transcend without the necessary and sustained collaborative effort, 
encouragement, and support.  If the goal is to bring about lasting improvements in and of modern 
societies, we must accept that we are shaped by it in ways that demand the determined 
willingness and commitment to overcome our own, socially molded, inherently regressive selves. 
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